

**Title**

The permanent campaign strategy of Greek Prime Ministers (1996–2011)

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**Degree**

This thesis is submitted in fulfillment of the requirements of the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

## **Abstract**

Various academic authors have analysed the implementation, the causes and the impact of the permanent campaign strategy by political executives in presidential and parliamentary systems, notably the United States and United Kingdom. This study builds on this literature and extends the research on the permanent campaign in the European parliamentary majoritarian context by examining contemporary Greece as a national case study. In particular, the study addresses three questions. First, did contemporary Greek Prime Ministers adopt the permanent campaign strategy? Second, why did they do so? Third, what impact did the implementation of the permanent campaign have on their public approval? The research focuses on the cases of three successive Prime Ministers in Greece: Costas Simitis (1996–2004), Kostas Karamanlis (2004–2009) and George Papandreou (2009–2011). Simitis and Papandreou were leaders of the centre-left PASOK, while Karamanlis was the leader of the centre-right New Democracy.

The study finds that all three Prime Ministers undertook the permanent campaign strategy in order to maintain public approval, aligning themselves with their British and American counterparts. They established new communication units within the primeministerial apparatus, consulted with communication professionals to form a coherent communication strategy, used private polling to shape political strategy, policy and presentation, used campaign-like messages as mottos to promote their policy plans and made public appearances to woo public opinion. In addition, the thesis indicates that the permanent campaign in Greece was a result of the modernisation of political communication due to political and technological developments, such as the decline of political parties, the rise of television and the proliferation of new political technologies that have appeared in other countries as well. However, the results drawn from the data analysis suggest that the

primeministerial permanent campaign hardly affected the primeministerial approval, confirming the findings of empirical studies in the US and the UK.

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## **List of acronyms**

AUEB: Athens University of Economics and Business

EC: European Commission

ECB: European Central Bank

ECOFIN: Economic and Financial Affairs Council

EFSF: European Financial Stability Facility

EKKE: Εθνικό Κέντρο Κοινωνικών Ερευνών / National Centre for Social Research

EPT: Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία και Τηλεόραση / Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation

ET-1: Ελληνική Τηλεόραση 1 / Hellenic Television 1

NET: Νέα Ελληνική Τηλεόραση / New Hellenic Television

ET-3: Ελληνική Τηλεόραση 3 / Hellenic Television 3

EPA: Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία / Hellenic Radio

EU: European Union

EMU: Economic and Monetary Union

FECA: Federal Campaign Action Act

ΓΣΕΕ : Γενική Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών Ελλάδος / General Confederation of Greek Labour

GICS: Government Information Communication Service

GIS: Government Information Service

IMF: International Monetary Fund

ΙΣΤΑΜΕ - ΙΣΤΑΜΕ: Ινστιτούτο Στρατηγικών & Αναπτυξιακών Μελετών – Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου / Institute of Strategic and Development Studies-Andreas Papandreou

ΛΑΟΣ : Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός / Popular Orthodox Rally

MP: Member of Parliament

NAFTA: North American Free Trade Agreement

ND: New Democracy / Νέα Δημοκρατία

PASOK: Panhellenic Socialist Movement / Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα

PKK: Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan

PM: Prime Minister

SCU: Strategic Communication Unit

UK: United Kingdom

US: United States

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## **Time – line of events**

**1965** Media: Public television launched

**1974** Politics: Restoration of the democratic regime in Greece -

ND wins general election

**1977** Politics: ND wins national elections

**1981** Politics: PASOK wins parliamentary elections for the first time

**1985** Politics: PASOK wins general elections

**1989 (June)** Politics: ND wins national elections - Formation of Coalition Government between the ND and the Coalition of the Left

Media: Deregulation of media sector - First Private TV network launched

**1989 (November)** Politics: ND wins general elections - Formation of Coalition Government ND - PASOK - Coalition of the Left

**1990** Politics: ND wins general election - Formation of Single party Government

**1993** Politics: PASOK wins national elections

**1996** Politics: Andreas Papandreou resigns from the premiership - Simitis is elected Prime Minister in January - Simitis is elected President of PASOK in June - PASOK wins early national elections in September

**1999** Politics: ND wins elections for the European Parliament

Media: TV station of the Greek Parliament launched

**2000** Politics: PASOK wins parliamentary elections



**2004** Politics: ND wins national elections

**2007** Politics: ND wins national elections

**2009** Politics: Prime Minister Karamanlis calls early elections - PASOK wins general elections

**2010** Politics: The Greek Parliament approves Memorandum - Greece is set under the supervision of the Troika (EC-ECB-IMF)

**2011** Politics: Papandreou resigns from the premiership - Formation of Coalition government PASOK - ND - LAOS

## **Introduction**

The phenomenon of the campaigning style of governing appeared for the first time in the United States. From the late 1960s, all American presidents, motivated by the institutional, political and technological evolutions, have adopted the permanent campaign strategy to retain their popularity. To this end, the permanent campaign literature has largely been a US-focused one (Edwards, 1999; 2000; Kernell, 2007; Phillips, 2007; Smith, 2009; Tenpas, 2000). Nevertheless, executive leaders appear to have adopted the campaigning style of governing, not only in the United States, but also in the parliamentary systems of Europe and Australia, as well as in the presidential systems of developing democracies in Latin America. In particular, authors have analysed the permanent campaign strategy implemented by Prime Ministers Margaret Thatcher and Tony Blair in the majoritarian parliamentary system of the United Kingdom (Cockerell et al, 1984; Foley, 2000; Nimmo, 1999; Scammell, 2001); Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in the consensual parliamentary system of Italy (Roncarolo, 2005); the Prime Minister of Australia John Howard (Van Onselen and Errington, 2007) and the President of Ecuador Rafael Correa (Conaghan and De La Torre, 2008).

This research aims to extend the analysis of the permanent campaign process in the European parliamentary majoritarian systems by examining the national case of Greece. There have already been some indications that the permanent campaign has entered the Greek political arena. From 1990s onwards, various institutional, political and technological developments have gradually modernised the political communication environment setting the basis for the implementation of the permanent campaign (Demertzis, 2002; Negrine, 2008; Papathanassopoulos, 2007). In addition, modern premiers have adopted some forms of the campaigning style of governing. For instance, as some authors have observed, Prime Minister Konstantinos Mitsotakis,

centre-right (1990-1993), collaborated with pollsters, political marketing professionals and political journalists who were responsible for the analysis of polling data, primeministerial image-making and the formulation of the government's communication strategy (Kurtsos, 2003: 50-52; Sotiropoulos, 2001: 140-141).

Another example is Andreas Papandreou, the socialist premier (1993-1996), who established ministerial press offices by appointing journalists as managing directors and founded the Ministry of Press and Media, 'with the Minister acting in most cases as the government's spokesperson, rather than (...) a minister who tries to form and implement the government's policy in the field of communication' (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 138). In general, as Papathanassopoulos has described it, 'professional advertising, polls and political consulting that were scarcely used before have become an indispensable means, not only for carrying out pre-electoral campaigns, but also with respect to the on-going communication strategy adopted by the government and opposition parties' (2007: 129).

However, academic literature on the subject of the permanent campaign in Greece has so far lacked a systematic analysis in terms of both its implementation by the Greek prime ministers and the factors that have contributed to its emergence. This thesis aims to address these identified gaps by concentrating on three successive Greek prime ministers whose permanent campaign strategy, to the best of my knowledge, has not been previously examined: Costas Simitis, centre-left (1996-2004), Kostas Karamanlis, centre-right (2004-2009) and George Papandreou, centre-left (2009-2011).

As it has been noted, executive leaders conduct forms of permanent campaigning with the intention of influencing public opinion and securing its overall support. American presidents, specifically, have undertaken the permanent campaign primarily to retain or even improve their own approval ratings. This is related to the notion that, as Welch notes, 'presidential approval [is seen] as a barometer in evaluating the public's support

for the president and his policies' (2003b: 855). Several scholars have examined the impact of the permanent campaign with the help of quantitative methods. Some of them have provided evidence that the permanent campaign has significantly positive effects on presidential approval. Ragsdale has explored the impact of major televised speeches delivered by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter in relation to their popularity, finding that presidential approval increased by 3 per cent (1984: 980). Brace and Hickley have found that the presidents' major public appeals increased their popularity by 6 per cent (1992: 56).

Nonetheless, most studies have indicated that the permanent campaign has had neither a significant effect nor even a negative impact on presidential popularity. Baum and Kernell found that the presidential radio addresses by Roosevelt slightly improved his public approval by 0.5 per cent (2001: 218). Welch indicates that President Reagan's televised addresses from 1981 until 1984 had limited effect upon his popularity and sometimes even damaged it (2003: 871). Simon and Ostrom found that televised speeches and foreign travels had no influence on presidential public standing (1989: 79). Brace and Hinckley have shown that, although major televised addresses have a positive impact, increasing presidential popularity by 6 per cent, presidential foreign travels made no difference at all and domestic travels had a negative effect (1992: 56). Especially Edwards has provided the most extensive empirical research on the subject. Having explored the impact of 107 presidential nationwide live televised addresses delivered from January 1981 up to January 2003, he has concluded that only 13 of them had a significant positive effect on presidential approval, 6 of them were negative, while 88 failed to change president's ratings at all (2003: 29-32).

Similar trends have also been observed in the parliamentary majoritarian systems of Europe, though quantitative analysis is quite limited. In those systems, party approval is the key measure of success, yet primeministerial approval ratings also constitute a significant variable (Clarke et al, 2004; Evans & Andersen, 2005). Premiers' approval actually tends to be considered as the core political resource, allowing executive

leaders to maintain or strengthen their political authority or to achieve particular policy aims (Foley, 2000: 146; Heffernan, 2003: 353). In the UK, Blair's permanent campaign, as a means to influence public opinion towards his favour produced poor results (Needham, 2005: 345-346). In Greece, no study has provided evidence on the impact of the primeministerial permanent campaign on primeministerial approval ratings so far. Apart from the examination of the permanent campaign strategy implemented by recent Greek premiers and the analysis of the factors motivating them to do it, this study aims to fill the research gap of exploring the impact of the endless campaigning on the primeministerial popularity.

Overall, the purpose of the thesis is to examine the permanent campaign in contemporary Greece. In particular, the study addresses the following questions: whether and how recent prime ministers in Greece have implemented the permanent campaign strategy in order to sustain the approval of their constituents; what were the reasons that motivated them to apply the permanent campaign strategy during their term in office; and what was the impact that the implementation of the permanent campaign had upon their long term popularity. The research focuses on the terms of office of three successive prime ministers: Costas Simitis, leader of PASOK (Πανελλήνιο Σοσιαλιστικό Κίνημα/ Panhellenic Socialist Movement), who served as Prime Minister from 1996 to 2004; Kostas Karamanlis, leader of the conservative ND party (Νέα Δημοκρατία/New Democracy), who governed the country from 2004 to 2009; and George Papandreou, the successor of Simitis as leader of PASOK, who served as Prime Minister for two years, from 2009 to 2011.

## **Hypotheses, methods and data**

### *Hypotheses*

This research has generated three working hypotheses. First, it is expected that the three Greek Prime Ministers have applied the permanent campaign strategy to retain

their popular appeal. Second, in line with other countries, institutional, political and technological developments have taken place in Greece motivating modern executives to adopt the campaigning style of governing. Third, it is expected that the impact of the permanent campaign of Greek Prime Ministers on their public approval is weak. The case studies of Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou have been chosen for two reasons. First, the modernisation of the Greek political communication environment began from 1990 with the emergence of private broadcasting (Papathanassopoulos, 2000). Second, the development of private broadcasting was not fully developed until late 1990s. It should be highlighted that the electoral campaign of 1996 was seen as the first of a new period, during which television (primarily private) , the widespread use of televised political advertisements and the establishment of the televised debate between political leaders played a decisive role (Deligiaouri, 2011: 63; Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 132). In addition, as Papathanassopoulos has suggested, ‘with the dominance of the media in Greek society, the government especially since the late 1990s, has tried to adopt and implement a public relations and communication strategy’ (2007: 138).

Hence, the cases of Konstantinos Mitsotakis and Andreas Papandreou who served as prime ministers in the beginning of 1990s could not be considered suitable to study the permanent campaign concept. Moreover, Andreas Papandreou was unable to actively participate in the political events of the time or follow the permanent campaign trend due to his ill health. Therefore, the cases of Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou are considered the most promising ones regarding prime ministers acting in a context of advanced political communication.

### *Methods and data*

The study has used both primary and secondary data to analyse the permanent campaign strategy of prime ministers in Greece. However, due to the fact that the

academic literature on the Greek political communication is limited, the analysis of the permanent campaign relies mainly on primary data including press reports, official government documents, opinion polls and elite interviewing. Specifically, interviews constitute a major data source to examine and evaluate the causes and implementation of the endless campaigning, since they make it possible to address major key players inside the government. In addition, external interviews allow the verification of data found in official government documents, newspaper articles and various press releases.

However, it should be mentioned that over-reliance on interviews as a data source can be problematic, due to the potential prejudice of the interviewer, the questions asked and the interviewee (Brenner, 1985: 157-8). To be more specific, interview bias refers to the inclination manifested by the interviewer on leading the interviewee towards an obvious direction or to the general personal profile of the interviewer, such as age, education, socio-economic status and sex (Brenner, 1985: 157). Question bias, as Brenner has suggested, refers to the formality of the questions asked, which consequently might affect the formulation of the response given (1985: 157). Finally, as Richards has illustrated, informant bias refers to the effect that the respondent's personal characteristics may have upon his responses and potential errors in his responses which originate either from a memory loss on the particular issue discussed or from an attempt on behalf of the interviewee to present an improved image of his actions (1996: 201).

The aforementioned sources of bias can be properly dealt with by setting three particular guidelines. First, the interviewing procedure is required to be conducted, as Benny and Hughes (1970) suggest, by using fair practices, in order to limit any negative effects. Second, the use of leading questions should be avoided as well as questions that give the opportunity to the interviewee to portray favourable or unfavourable aspects of him. Third, the only possible way for informant bias to be abated is via a proper interviewer behaviour and accordingly via a proper question

formulation. Additionally, the findings, which originate from the interview, should be compared to findings of other interviews, and to other already available data such as documents and speeches.

Interviewing politicians and advisors in charge of the formulation and implementation of the government's communication strategy is considered to be of the utmost importance. Three types of interviewees appear to be especially valuable in this respect: prime ministers, press spokespersons and communication advisors, since their position offers them the necessary insight into the workings of government communication. A semi-structured model of interviewing is used in this study, allowing for flexibility in the sequence of questions. At the same time, the open-ended question format enables us to collect valuable data on all relevant aspects of our research project, while imperceptibly allow interviewees to contribute their own experience and analytic viewpoints.

For this study interviews have been conducted with former Prime Ministers, former Ministers accountable for the media management and former advisors responsible for the communication strategy of the government whilst in office. Yet it was not possible, despite efforts, to conduct interviews with all of the desired interviewees. Former Prime Ministers Karamanlis and Papandreou were unavailable. Also unavailable were the strategist John Loulis (though his books on the Karamanlis' administration offer a detailed log of Karamanlis' communication strategy) and the pollster Dimitris Mavros, both prominent advisers to Karamanlis, as well as Papandreou's government spokesperson George Petalotis. In the case of the two premiers particularly, this study draws data by their public appeals and media appearances. This kind of data offers the advantage of being able to interact with actual data sources and therefore is considered a valuable supplement to the interviews.



Furthermore, the documentation used in the research has been selected based on whether they contain material on communication. Therefore, primeministerial decisions, ministerial decisions, internal government documents concerning the government communications and press reports have taken precedence over other material. In the case of Simitis, data has been collected from Simitis' anthology of speeches, his official website ([www.costas-simitis.gr](http://www.costas-simitis.gr)) and the primeministerial e-archive (<http://web.archive.org>). In the case of Kostas Karamanlis, data has been taken from the archive of the official website of the New Democracy party (<http://www.nd.gr/web/press-office/archive>). Relevant data for George Papandreou has been gathered from his official website ([www.papandreou.gr](http://www.papandreou.gr)). In addition, primary data includes press reports about government communication taken from both left-leaning and right-leaning newspapers in order to ensure balance of sources. In particular, data is gathered by the leading daily left-leaning newspaper *To Vima* ([www.tovima.gr](http://www.tovima.gr)) (until 2010, when the daily edition shut down), the leading daily left-leaning (from 2010 onwards) newspaper *Ta Nea* ([www.tanea.gr](http://www.tanea.gr)) and its Sunday edition *To Vima of Sunday*<sup>1</sup> as well as the leading daily right-leaning newspaper *Kathimerini* ([www.kathimerini.gr](http://www.kathimerini.gr)) and the Sunday edition *Kathimerini of Sunday*. The aforementioned documents have also been used to verify and support the interview research.

The analysis of primary and secondary data aims to identify the implementation of the permanent campaign strategy. As it is shown in Chapter one, the campaigning style of governing applied by premiers consists of five components. The creation and function of communication institutions; the collaboration with communication experts; the use of opinion polling to steer policy and presentation; the formulation of a central political message acting as a label of the government's policy throughout the

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<sup>1</sup> It should be noted that the newspapers *To Vima* and *Ta Nea* belong to the same media group, Lamprakis Press.

governing tenure and finally the use of public appearances to disseminate political messages. In terms of the analysis of the political messages of Greek premiers specifically, almost only secondary data has been used. The main purpose was to identify and analyse whether these Prime Ministers formulated their central political messages in a campaign-like mode, using a single motto that would encapsulate their political goals throughout their tenures. For example, Simitis' main pledge in the national election of 1996 was the entry of Greece into the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Thus, it is explored whether Simitis managed to label this government plan and used it repeatedly in a campaign mode during his governing term.

To measure the impact of the permanent campaign implemented by Greek executives, the study considers the public appearances of the prime ministers as an indicator of their permanent campaign strategy and compares the number of their public appeals aimed at maintaining or improving public approval with the primeministerial public approval ratings on a regular basis. Specifically, the study explores a correlation between two variables: the premiers' appearances and the popularity of the prime ministers in Greece. In this case, the primeministerial appearances are the independent variable and the primeministerial popularity is the dependent variable. In particular, following Kernell's typology (1986) the primeministerial public appearances are divided into major public addresses directed to a national audience and minor public addresses directed to special or local audience. In the first correlation, the major addresses are the independent variable and the premier's popularity is the dependent variable. In the second correlation, minor addresses are the independent variable and the incumbent's approval is the dependent variable.

Pearson's correlation measures the degree of linear relationship between two variables (Yfantopoulos & Nikolaidou, 2008). The Pearson  $r$  is a number between -1 and 1. A correlation number of 1 represents a strong relationship between two variables, while 0 indicates no relationship between two variables. Whether the coefficient is positive

or negative, it shows the direction of the association. If both variables have positive signs, they change to the same direction. Particularly, a positive sign indicates that an upward change in one variable coincides with an upward change in the other variable. On the contrary, a negative sign indicates that as the value of one variable increases, the value of the other variable decreases. However, the correlation does not necessarily mean causality. Even in the case of a strong relationship between two variables, it is not valid to argue that the one variable has caused the change to the other variable (Chen & Popovich, 2002: 3). The association between two variables may occur by chance or there might be other intervening variables outside the equation that probably have an impact upon the two variables.

Nonetheless, correlation at least means that changes in one variable are somehow related to changes in another variable. In other words, correlation indicates the extent to which two variables co-vary or vary together (Kazakos, 2006: 326-327). Therefore, having ensured that the hypothesis about a plausible relationship between two variables has been generated from theoretical frameworks, a correlation can be an indication of the potential effect of one variable to the other.

The popularity is identified on the basis of poll data gathered in successive 3-4 month periods by the polling organisation *Metron Analysis*. This poll data is explored over a period of eight years (February 1997 to June 2003) for the case of Prime Minister Simitis; a period of five years (May 2004 to September 2009) for the case of Prime Minister Karamanlis and a period of two years (December 2009 - July 2011) for the case of Prime Minister Papandreou. It is true that the tenure, each of the three Prime Ministers under examination, varies and thus a question of how these cases are comparable is raised. However, the scope of the analysis is not to examine the pattern of change of the primeministerial approval ratings over time. The scope is to explore the impact of the permanent campaign on primeministerial popularity figures. Since the polling figures are examined in the same successive 3-4 month basis for all the

premiers, the difference on the duration of the respective primeministerial tenures hardly prevents the comparison of the cases.

As it has been noted in the US case, presidential approval is usually measured in terms of job approval/ disapproval polling figures and based on the question ‘Do you approve or disapprove of the way President [name] is handling his job as president?’ (Edwards, 2003: 15). In the UK, primeministerial approval is usually measured according to satisfaction/ dissatisfaction polling figures and the question ‘Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with [name] as Prime Minister?’ (Clarke et al, 2004: 258; Needham, 2005: 345; Newton, 2006: 226). In Greece, no such questions are posed in opinion polls. Conclusions about the primeministerial popularity can be drawn from the outcomes of the positive/ negative opinion poll and the question ‘Do you have a positive or negative opinion regarding Prime Minister [name]?’. This study obtains the relevant polling data from the *Metron Analysis* polling company, which posed the question regarding primeministerial popularity in a period of 3 to 4 months during the tenure of Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou respectively and published this data.

In order to identify and analyse the public appearances made by the Greek premiers, the study follows Kernell’s typology (1986) as revised by Corrigan (2000). Kernell (1986) has analysed the concept of the ‘going public’ strategy, which focuses on presidential public activities aiming to influence public opinion in favour of presidential policies and then use public support to exert pressure in Congress to approve presidential policy plans. Yet several authors have considered the going public as part of the permanent campaign and thus this study follows Kernell’s categorization with respect to the premiers’ public appearances (Edwards, 2003; Kernell, 1986). As he has suggested, ‘major addresses are those in which the president speaks directly to a national audience over radio or television; minor addresses, by comparison, are those the president delivers to a special audience either in person or via some broadcast medium’ (Kernell, 1986: 85).

Although scholars have adopted this typology, recent studies have suggested that it should be revised. For instance, Corrigan has illustrated that public events, which took place at the White House and received coverage from all news networks, new technological tools like teleconferencing and the Internet, as well as issue advertising with the president as protagonist, should be considered as presidential public activities and as major addresses, since they reach the national audience (2000: 160). Consequently, for the purposes of the study, major addresses include public speeches, media interviews and press conferences that received coverage by national television networks, radio stations, teleconferencing, the Internet, as well as issue advertising with the prime minister as protagonist. Minor addresses include speeches given to special audiences inside and outside the capital.

Based on Kernell's typology, the research builds an approach that conforms to the Greek parliamentary context. Hence, some primeministerial public activities are classified as major addresses, some as minor addresses and some move from the category of major addresses to that of minor addresses. All Greek prime ministers are expected to make public appearances since they operate in a parliamentary context. In particular, they are due to deliver speeches in the Parliament and the party conventions, give press conferences in the International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki on annual basis, give press conferences after the meetings they hold with their counterparts in Athens or abroad. This study considers all these primeministerial addresses as part of the permanent campaign strategy because they receive live coverage by the parliamentary television channel (from 1999 onwards), the national TV networks both private and public, as well by radio stations and websites. Therefore, it is reasonable to be considered as major addresses. Another example is related to foreign political travels. When Greek prime ministers travel abroad to meet other executive leaders or to participate in the European Union summits in Brussels, they give press conferences, which usually receive 'live' coverage by national mass media.

Therefore, it appears reasonable to add these public appearances to the group of major addresses too. Furthermore, Greek premiers give newspaper interviews and publish signed articles to the national as well as the regional press. Thus, it is appropriate to equally consider press articles and interviews that were published in the national newspapers as major addresses, while those published in the regional press could be identified as minor addresses. Particularly, major public addresses include speeches or interviews on national TV networks, on radio and national newspapers as well as signed newspaper articles by the prime minister of more than 1,000 words. Minor public addresses cover public addresses to specific groups or community events that took place inside or outside Athens and include primeministerial statements more than 1,000 words. Primeministerial statements or brief remarks in the press are not classified as public addresses. To be considered a public appearance for this research, the activity has to have taken place before the question on the positive/negative opinions on the Prime Minister was raised in the polls of *Metron Analysis*. In those cases where the activities took place after the question had been raised, these public appearances were included in the opinion survey that was carried out afterwards.

In order to examine primeministerial campaign activities, data is obtained from different sources. In the case of Simitis, data was partially extracted from the archives available on the prime minister's website (<http://web.archive.org/web/19980115212116/www.primeminister.gr/allsp.htm>) and the archives of the official website of PASOK (<http://www.pasok.gr/portal/resource/contentObject/contentTypes/basicText/pressRelease/true/pageNumber/1/t/arxeiotypoy>). In the case of Karamanlis, data was taken from the archives to be found on the official website of the New Democracy party (<http://www.nd.gr/web/press-office/archive>). In the case of George Papandreou, data was collected through his official personal website ([www.papandreou.gr](http://www.papandreou.gr)).

## **Limitations of the research**

The analysis of the impact of the permanent campaign on the primeministerial popularity has faced two limitations. First, the campaign activities of prime ministers are not the only factor influencing the popularity ratings of prime ministers. There are also several factors that affect public opinion and electoral behaviour and consequently leadership's evaluations and popularity ratings. A vast amount of studies, for example, has shown that the popularity of the American presidents has been influenced not only by campaign activities, but also by various factors such as domestic policy issues, the state of the economy, scandals, foreign policy issues, wars and major international events (Baum & Kernell, 2001; Hibbs, 1982; Kenski, 1977; Kernell, 1978; MacKuen, 1983; Mueller, 1970; Ragsdale, 1984; Shapiro & Con-forto, 1980; Stimson, 1976). However, the aim of this study is not to explore the impact of all these factors upon the primeministerial popularity. The aim is to explore solely the effect of the primeministerial permanent campaigning upon the primeministerial public approval.

Furthermore, the empirical studies in the US literature, which have examined the impact of the presidential campaign activities on the presidential approval ratings so far, have applied different methods. Some of them have explored only the effect of the televised presidential speeches and foreign travels upon presidential popularity (Simon & Ostrom, 1989). Some scholars have examined the influence of presidential major addresses, foreign and domestic travels (controlling for the conditioning effects of circumstances like the economy and events) upon pooled approval ratings in an effort to present a general model of approval within and across presidencies (Brace and Hickley, 1992). Other authors have explored the impact of various factors as multiple independent variables like speechmaking, the state of the economy, military activity and national events upon presidential approval ratings (Baum and Kernell 2001; Ragsdale 1984). Lastly, Edwards (2003) has assessed the effect of the presidential

permanent campaign by comparing the presidential approval ratings before and after a major live televised presidential address.

This thesis has not replicated the methods of these studies for three reasons. First, this study has chosen the categorization of major and minor public addresses to measure the number of primeministerial public activities, which has not been adopted by the other studies in full. Second, the replication of some studies, like that of Edwards (2003), requires the use of extensive opinion poll data, which is not available in Greece. Third, some of the studies have examined the impact on presidential approval, not only of presidential public appeals but also of other independent variables like the state of the economy, military war and events by applying regression analysis. As previously mentioned, the use of multiple variables exceeds the scope of this research.

The second limitation that this analysis has faced is about the role and function of a prime minister in a parliamentary majoritarian system compared to the role and function of a president in a presidential system. Presidents and prime ministers share a number of similarities since they operate in a political communication environment shaped by fluid voters, television, internet and sophisticated communication techniques, which reinforce the role of leaders, favour the personalisation of politics and motivate incumbents to engage in a permanent campaign process. Of course presidents and prime ministers share also a number of differences since they operate in different institutional contexts, presidential and parliamentary respectively (Heffernan, 2005; Lijphart, 1992). Nonetheless, the institutional constraints set by the features of the parliamentary system do not prevent the prime ministers to adopt the permanent campaign, but they influence its formulation and execution as well as its impact upon the primeministerial approval or in other words, they influence its adaptation in order to fit with the political landscape.



## **Chapter outline**

The structure of the thesis is as follows. Chapter one reviews the relevant literature on the permanent campaign concept and explores its main components. In addition, it analyses the contributing factors of the permanent campaign process. Given that the literature on the permanent campaign is mainly US-focused and that the Greek case forms part of the European parliamentary system, the review includes literature from the United States and the United Kingdom.

Chapter two focuses on the analysis of Simitis' political background and campaigning style of governing. This chapter examines the communication units operating in the Office of the Prime Minister and in the governmental communication machinery, the role of communication professionals in Simitis' staff, the use and impact of polling on government strategy, policy and presentation. In addition, it assesses the effectiveness of Simitis to promote his government plan in a clear and repeated way by using a motto and it discusses the public appeals of the former Greek Prime Minister as a means of delivering his message to the public. Finally, it measures and interprets the effect of Simitis' major and minor addresses on his public approval rating.

Chapter three discusses Karamanlis' political background, examines the function of the government's communication apparatus, analyses the role the communication professionals played in the Karamanlis' communication team and studies the use and impact of polling upon governmental strategy and policy. Moreover, it outlines the public appeals of Karamanlis by focusing on his governmental efforts to label his policy plan in order to sell it to the public and the media. Lastly, it measures and interprets the impact that Karamanlis' campaigning efforts had upon his public approval.

Chapter four discusses the political background of Papandreou. It analyses the structure and function of the communication institutions of the PASOK government,

examines the role of communication experts and focuses on the use of private polling as a means to shape government strategy, policy and communication. Furthermore, it analyses Papandreou's effort to communicate his government through a central motto and it outlines the public appearances of Papandreou as a means to vindicate his policy approach. Finally, it assesses and interprets the impact of Papandreou's permanent campaign on his public approval ratings.

Chapter five outlines the political communication context in Greece discussing to some extent the political communication of the Greek prime ministers before the emergence of the permanent campaign era, focusing on the factors that contributed to the emergence of the permanent campaign phenomenon from 1990 onwards. In particular, it analyses and evaluates the structure and operation of the political system in Greece, the role of political parties and party identification, the development of the media system and the rise of new political technologies.

Chapter six contains the conclusions of the thesis. It compares the permanent campaign applied by the three political executives in Greece. Given the limited impact of the primeministerial campaign-to-govern style on the incumbents' approval ratings, it explores to some extent which factors beyond the campaign activities shape the primeministerial popularity highlighting the role of issues such as the economy, domestic and external crises, scandals and major political events. Moreover, it outlines and evaluates the contributions of the study to the relevant academic literature. The thesis shows that, in line with the UK and US, modern Greek premiers have adopted the permanent campaign strategy motivated by political and technological developments, yet the effect of the non-stop campaigning on the primeministerial popularity has been weak. In other words, the study has confirmed that the components, the preconditions and effects of the permanent campaign, which have been identified elsewhere, occur in Greece as well, though the Greek premiers have not simply copied the permanent campaign practice but they have adapted it in the

Greek institutional, political and media context. Lastly, the thesis poses new questions for future research.

## **Chapter 1**

### **The Permanent Campaign**

The political communication literature has shared the assumption that the process of political communication is divided into a series of five steps: ‘who (the source) says what (the content) through which channel (the media) to whom (the audience) with what effect (the impact)’ (Lasswell, 1949; Lilleker, 2006; Norris et al 1999). The source includes both elective political officials like presidents, prime ministers and cabinets, national governments, local administrations, political parties, political leaders, candidates and non-elective political officials, such as business corporations, trade unions and interest groups. The content incorporates the messages that various sources or messengers disseminate through the channels. The channels in turn include print, broadcast and digital media, journalists, editors, broadcasters, news executives, as well as pamphlets, canvassing, speeches, paid ads, websites and group email. The audience includes citizens, constituents, voters and, in general, the infamous public opinion. The impact relates to the effects of political communication upon political knowledge, political attitudes, political behaviour and voting choice.

The process of political communication is interactive, interrelated and interlinked. As Norris et al (1996) have put it ‘the process operates downwards from governing institutions towards citizens, horizontally in linkages among political actors, and upwards from public opinion towards authorities’. This study explores the political communication process from the point of view of the source and particularly, the elective political officials. It focuses particularly on the political communication of political leaders.

The latter employ campaign communications in order to get votes and win elections. The election campaign communications have developed over time due to social and political changes shifting from a traditional mode party campaigning to a more modernised mode of campaigning. The decline of party identification and the expansion of fluid voters, as well as the advent of radio, television and internet, have changed the form and conduct of election campaigning which is gradually dominated by communication professionals and political consultants (Lilleker, 2006; Norris et al, 1996).

Political communication literature that deals with the communication side of party election campaign activities in advanced democracies has provided various interpretations of the phenomenon. There is literature on political marketing and on how the parties have adapted their policies and, even their values, to the expressed desires of public opinion (Farrell et al. 2001; Lees-Marshment 2001; Lilleker & Lees-Marshment, 2005; Newman, 1999; Norris et al, 1996). There is literature on the professionalisation of campaigning with the use of professional advisers, such as image makers, pollsters, advertising specialists and spin doctors, also literature on whether ‘the techniques have been borrowed from the private sector and are employed by communication experts’ (Gibson and Rommele 2001; Mancini, 1999; Negrine & Lilleker, 2002; Norris et al, 1996). There is literature on the Americanization of campaign communications (Holtz-Bacha et al, 1994; Negrine & Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Norris et al, 1996; Swanson & Mancini, 1996) including ‘strategies that are deemed successful in the US [and they] are carefully observed by actors across the democratic world then copied, often with the support of campaign consultants imported from the US’(Lilleker, 2006: 31).

Building on this literature Norris has offered probably the most complete typology of the evolution of campaign communications. She has argued that ‘changes in campaign communications can be best understood as an evolutionary process of modernisation that simultaneously transforms campaign organisations, the news media and the

electorate' (Norris et al, 1996). In particular, she has divided election campaigns into three forms: the premodern, the modern and the postmodern (2000: 137-140).

The premodern campaign, originated in the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, had the party leader at the center of an organisation mainly run by a handful of the leader's closest partners and relatively small concerning its size. This organisation relied heavily on local party volunteers, the partisan press media and from the 1920s onwards on the radio and less on a central guiding system, while the electorate was characterised by its strong party affiliations.

The modern campaign is characterised by its cohesion. The party organisation operates under the control of the party leader, who is being advised by communication experts and political professionals like pollsters. In the area of the media, television holds the reins on a national level broadcasting all political events. As for the electorate, it becomes less party-driven and loyal to a certain ideology.

The postmodern campaign is understood as that 'in which the coterie of professional consultants on advertising, public opinion, marketing, and strategic news management become more co-equal actors with politicians, assuming a more influential role within government in a "permanent" campaign, as well as coordinating local activity more tightly at the grassroots. The news media fragments into a more complex and incoherent environment of multiple channels, outlets, and levels. And the electorate becomes more dealigned in their voting choices' (Norris, 2000: 139-140).

Departing from the postmodern campaign, this study focuses on the analysis of the permanent campaign as a campaigning style of governing adopted by contemporary elected political leaders to retain public support as a means to increase reelection prospects. Although Norris suggests that the permanent campaign has taken place from the 1990s onwards, there are indications that in the United States (where it first appeared) the emergence of the permanent campaign happened long before. Nixon is seen as the first president who undertook the permanent campaign in the late 1960s

(Blumenthal, 1982: 24; Brace & Hinckley, 1992; Lawrence & Shapiro, 1995). Merely as an analytical tool, the concept of the permanent campaign was first put forward by Pat Caddell, US President Jimmy Carter's pollster.

After the elections of 1976, Caddell provided Carter with a 10,000-word memo entitled *Initial Working Paper of Political Strategy*, in which he noted the following: 'it is important to recognize that we cannot successfully separate politics and government'. He further suggested that 'governing with public approval requires a continuing political campaign' and advised Carter to immediately create 'a non publicized working group that would begin to plan the 1980 campaign' (Blumenthal, 1982: 56, 59). After all the term 'permanent campaign' is attributed to Blumenthal who wrote on the subject in a book with this very title and argues that the permanent campaign is a combination of 'image-making with strategic calculation [which] remakes government into an instrument designed to sustain an elected official's public popularity' (1982: 23).

The need for presidents to communicate with public opinion and their dependence on public support is anything but new. All presidents and in general, all governments across time and countries seek to communicate their messages, to gain or maintain the support of their citizens and to be re-elected (Lilleker, 2011: 4-5; Seymour-Ure, 2003). The difference in the case of the permanent campaign is that the campaign tools, methods, techniques and personnel follow the elected leader in office in order to back his constant efforts to retain or even increase public approval as well as advance their re-election prospects (Blumenthal, 1982; Nimmo, 1990). According to Seymour- Ure, 'what changes (...) is not the scope for prime ministers and presidents to prioritize public communication but the apparatus and techniques involved' (2003: 126).

Yet the permanent campaign has been considered as something broader than just the permanent effort to maintain public approval to secure re-election. As Heclo has argued, 'every day is election day in the permanent campaign. Such campaigning is a

non-stop process seeking to manipulate sources of public approval to engage in the act of governing itself' (2000: 17). Presidents tend to use campaign tools, methods, techniques and experts constantly in order to retain public approval for themselves and their policies, not only for being re-elected but also for influencing law-making (Edwards, 2003: 129; Jones, 2000: 202; Kernell, 1986: 1-2, 137; Tenpas, 2000). In addition, candidates for Congress as well as congressional representatives now are in a permanent campaign mode (Brady & Fiorina, 2000; Ornstein & Mann, 2000). Interest groups launch sophisticated advertising campaigns to shape important public policy debates (Loomis, 2000). Journalists employ campaign metaphors to frame their coverage of governing (Hess, 2000). As a result, the limits between campaigning and governing can hardly be maintained (Blumenthal, 1982: 26; Jones, 2000: 204).

However, irrespective of the engagement of particular political and non-political actors, as well as the use of public approval either to improve reelection prospects or influence law making, this study examines the campaigning style of governing implemented by political executives to affect their popularity ratings. Specifically, this chapter examines how and why political executives in the presidential system of the United States and in the European parliamentary majoritarian system of the United Kingdom implemented the permanent campaign strategy. It identifies and discusses the key components and contributing factors of the permanent campaign in order to formulate a theoretical framework for the analysis and evaluation of the permanent campaign in Greece and particularly of the permanent campaign implemented by the modern Greek premiers.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section one discusses the permanent campaign concept adopted by political executives by analysing its major elements based on the US-literature, since the phenomenon originated in the US. Section two considers the causes of the creation of the permanent campaign first in the US. Section three shifts the study of the permanent campaign from the the US to the European parliamentary context and particularly to the UK majoritarian system of single-party



government. Both Britain and Greece are considered the most striking examples of the majoritarian systems (Gallagher et al, 2006; Lijphart, 1999), hence UK has been selected as the subject of research. Additionally, British premiers have undertaken the permanent campaign so the British permanent campaign is a starting point to assess the permanent campaign of the Greek PMs. Section four discusses the causes of the creation of the nonstop campaign in the UK. Last section concludes.

### **1.1 The permanent campaign strategy in the US**

Since the permanent campaign is seen as the introduction and the continuity of the election campaigning into the governing of American presidents, it is expected that the key components of the election campaigning are reflected in the campaigning style of governing. The academic literature on the permanent campaign has identified various components of the endless campaigning and this study offers a theoretically informed analytic framework in order to understand and systematically analyse the permanent campaign of political executives. The components are the formation of public outreach institutions, the collaboration with communication professionals, the use of polling to steer policy and presentation, the formulation of labels to disseminate political messages and the use of public appeals to promote policies.

The first element of the campaigning style of governing is the setting up of institutions with a mandate to shape and implement the government's communication strategy. As Tenpas has argued, the communication machinery seeks to enhance 'the president's popularity among key constituents in an effort to gain support for a governmental program, policy, or campaign' (Tenpas, 2000: 109). The contemporary election campaigns in the United States are run by campaign units created within political parties. In the era of the permanent campaign, those units have been transferred into White House exerting centralised control over government communications. Those

public outreach units, which were created over time by different American presidents, became permanent communication machinery. The Office of Communications, established by Nixon, was responsible for shaping long-term communication strategies and for cultivating relations with journalists sympathetic to the administration (Tenpas, 2000: 110). The Office of Public Liaison, set up by President Ford, was designed to approach 'key constituencies to gather support for the administration's legislative proposals' (Tenpas, 2000: 111). In the 1980s, the Office of Political Affairs, formed by Reagan, was responsible for 'maintaining and expanding the president's electoral coalition by keeping in contact with party officials and key constituents across the country' (Tenpas, 2000: 111). In the aftermath of George W. Bush's election in 2000, the Office of Strategic Initiatives was created to monitor and analyse 'the results of numerous public surveys by major networks and news organisations as well as the findings of private commissioned polls' (Tenpas, 2003).

The second element of the permanent campaign is the participation of communication professionals in the presidential communication staff. According to Ornstein and Mann, 'campaign consultants move without pause from the campaign trail to work for the victorious elected officials and help to shape their policy messages and frame issues for advantage in the next campaign' (2000: 220). Strategists, pollsters, campaign managers, media advisers, image-makers, spin-doctors and advertisers provide their different kinds of expertise and play a central role within the White House even though most of them are not officially members of the presidential staff. Nixon was the first President to expand his advisory network by hiring two communication experts, the academic David Derge and the pollster Robert Teeter (Tenpas, 2000: 112). Jimmy Carter continued his collaboration closely with the pollster Pat Caddell (Blumenthal, 1982: 45). Stuart Spencer and the pollster Robert Teeter offered advice to Ronald Reagan, while communication experts Teeter and Fred Steeper acted as consultants to President Bush (Tenpas, 2000: 112). Bill Clinton collaborated with media experts like James Carville, polling experts such as Stanley

Greenberg and campaign strategists like Dick Morris (Tenpas, 2000: 113). George W. Bush was in close cooperation with Carl Rove, campaign manager and senior advisor to the White House (Cook, 2002: 757), as well as the pollsters Jan van Lohuizen and Fred Steeper (Tenpas, 2003). Following this trend, President Barack Obama appointed his campaign manager David Axelrod as senior adviser to the White House (Smith, 2009).

The third component of the permanent campaign concept is the ongoing use of opinion polling and especially private polling not only to shape election strategy but also to shape political strategy, domestic policy, foreign policy and political messages during the governing period (Bowman, 2000: 55; Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995: 190; Heith, 2004: 135; Tenpas, 2000: 116-118). Richard Nixon seemed to turn ‘a public opinion apparatus into an institutional component (..) of the White House’s operations’ (Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995: 192). His successors in the post, Ford, Carter and Reagan further developed this practice. They increased the number of polling staffers spending more money on the conduct of opinion surveys and making more extensive use of private poll data (Beal and Hinckley, 1984: 72; Heith, 1998: 165; Eisinger, 2003: 170). Probably the most striking example of a poll-driven president was Bill Clinton. His presidency was regarded as ‘a presidency based on a perpetual campaign to obtain the public’s support and fed by public opinion polls, focus groups and public relations memos’ (Edwards, 2000:27). More specifically, Clinton’s pollster, Greenberg, ‘did monthly tracking surveys and even met with the president about once a week for fifteen minutes during Clinton’s first year in office’ (Bowman, 2000: 67). With regard to George W. Bush, even though he pledged to stop using polls and focus group as a determinant of his governance, he eventually made use of numerous tracking polls and focus group data. As a matter of fact, Carl Rove, in his capacity as head of the Office of Strategic Initiatives, ‘outlined the campaign to pass President Bush’s policy agenda by constantly measuring the president’s job approval’ (Thurber, 2002: 3). Finally, President Obama also sought expert advice from pollsters with the intention to

communicate his economic recovery plan more persuasively (Smith, 2009). To sum up, all recent presidents in the United States have applied opinion polling to shape policy, even though the extent and frequency of its application has varied across incumbents (Murray and Howard, 2002: 545) or different periods and political circumstances (Tenpas and McCann, 2007: 349).

The fourth element of the permanent campaign is the design and delivery of campaign-like political messages. The message of the campaign is a short easily understood and memorable phrase, which is repeated frequently during the campaign, expressing and symbolizing the political vision, the ideas, the values and policies that the political leaders want to share with the voters (Lilleker, 2006: 122-124). If elected, this message takes a new shape and then is used as this elected leader's political motto for his tenure. This means that presidents continue to use and disseminate the same central election campaign message during the governing period or in general, they continue to use the method of formulating and communicating new messages, which are used as labels that express and symbolise their political strategy and policy initiatives (Morris, 1997). For example, Reagan announced a 'War on Drugs' in 1982, following concerns about the increasing crack epidemic. Another example Clinton in his 1998 State of the Union speech argued 'we have moved past the sterile debate of those who say government is the enemy and those who say government is the answer. My fellow Americans, we have found a Third Way' (Klein, 2002: 17). Moreover, President George W Bush after 9/11 announced a global 'War on Terror'.

The fifth element of the campaigning style of governing is leaders' public appearances, including public speeches, media interviews, press conferences, town meetings and political travels. Modern American leaders who run for presidents as well as modern American presidents rely heavily on such activities to get their messages across (Eshbaugh-Soha, 2010: 1; Tulis, 1987: 4). For example, Carter 'delivered four major televised addresses on the energy crisis' (Kernell, 1986: 1).

Reagan made numerous direct appeals to the public through television and radio addresses, press conferences and public speeches in front of special audiences inside and outside Washington (Kernell, 2007: 175). President Clinton undertook 184 political travels and made 259 public appeals across the country to promote large-scale reforms such as the economic plan, the Health Care plan and NAFTA (Jones, 1997; Phillips, 2007: 150-152). Following Clinton's campaigning mode, George W. Bush made 119 domestic political travels during the first year of his first term (Cook, 2002: 758). President Obama appears to have implemented this tactic more extensively. According to Mann (2009):

‘Hardly a day goes by without his public presence, including speeches, press conferences, and meetings with members of Congress, CEOs, policy experts, and ordinary citizens; exclusive interviews with network anchors and the national press; new access to minority media and sympathetic bloggers; an appearance on Jay Leno and a return to 60 Minutes; weekly trips around the country, with extensive local and national news coverage; and an eight-day trip to Europe and Iraq jammed pack with news-worthy public appearances’.

It should be noted that Obama was also the first sitting President who appeared on a television daytime talk show, called *The View* (Winnett, 2010). In addition, he makes extensive use of new media like YouTube. More than 1800 videos have been uploaded in the BarackObama.com site. As Heffernan (2009) has pointed out, ‘the White House new-media-operations team has supplied YouTube with Obama’s ‘Your Weekly Address’ videos, among other clips. The channel is regularly among YouTube’s most viewed and subscribed’.

## **1.2 The contributing factors of the permanent campaign in the US**

Although lately political leaders in the United States insist on making use of the permanent campaign strategy once in office, it should be mentioned that this has not always been the case. In the past, campaigning and governing were considered two clearly distinct activities. As Ornstein and Mann have argued, ‘for most of American history (..) political actors accepted as a matter of course that once the campaigns were over (..) campaign materials were put away (..) and the tools and personnel for governing emerged’ (2000: 222). As several scholars have suggested, what has changed relates to various political, technological and institutional developments that took place in the course of the 20th century, transforming the American political communication landscape (Heclo, 2000; Edwards, 2003; Kernell 1986; Jones, 2000; West and Loomis, 1999; King 1997). Thus, in order to properly understand the concept of the permanent campaign and to fully assess its impact on the underlying political dynamics, it is essential to examine those changes that proved to have such a major effect on shaping it.

One of the major changes is the decline of political parties (Blumenthal, 1982; Heclo, 2000; King, 1997). Parties have particularly weakened in the areas of recruiting and nominating candidates for office and also mobilising groups of people to vote for them. This development can be attributed to numerous variables, such as television, suburbanisation, decrease in public employment and electoral reforms (Heclo, 2000: 19). The latter took place in the late 1960s and early 1970s. According to Charnock, ‘the 1969-1971 McGovern-Fraser Commission made primaries “the preferred method of delegate selection” for the Democratic Party presidential nominating convention, and the Republican party soon followed suit. Also in 1971, the Federal Campaign Action Act (FECA) was passed, limiting campaign contributions and creating a system of federal “matching funds” for small donations raised by the candidates. Both of these reforms lowered the barriers to entry in the presidential race and undermined the power of the parties’ (2004: 19). Moreover, the improvement of living standards

and the subsequent growth of middle class lowered the significance of class-voting, decreasing party identification and increasing the number of fluid voters, which in turn gave prominence to the role of leadership and leadership's popularity as one of the crucial factors to influence electoral behaviour (Blumenthal, 1982; Dalton, 1996).

These social and demographic changes have contributed towards the transformation of elections from party-centred to candidate-centred, turning politicians from members of a party into largely independent political actors in their own right, who have to keep engaging the public and run their personal permanent campaign in order to achieve this (Wayne, 1992: 109). In particular, these evolutions have also affected members of Congress. As Kernell has suggested, contemporary members of Congress seem to act as 'independent members who have few group or institutional loyalties' (1986: 23). Thus, presidents seem to abandon the traditional bargaining with congressional representatives to ensure the legislative approval of their policy initiatives.

In contrast, they are motivated to engage in permanent campaign process to build and maintain public support as a device to persuade members of Congress to support their policy plans (Edwards, 2003: 8). The most important indication of public support is the president's popularity, given that he constitutes the central political figure of the American political system. Not surprisingly, 'the poll question "Do you approve or disapprove of the way President ... is handling his job as president?" is seen as the most prominent question in the history of public opinion research' (Edwards, 2003: 15). Therefore, the tendency of presidents to constantly campaign becomes stronger especially when congressmen appear to respond to public opinion. As Edwards notes, 'the visibility of the "presidential popularity" measure has made it the subject of almost constant commentary among observers and participants in national politics. Due to high visibility and frequency of presidential approval polls, it is safe to assume that members of Congress are aware of the president's standing with the public' (2003: 15).

Another contributing factor towards the emergence of the permanent campaign is the rise of organised interests in the mid-twentieth century, as the political system started to become more inclusive (Heclo, 2000: 20-2; Loomis, 2000). The fact that the system was progressively opening up meant, in particular, that social groups previously excluded from politics, such as minorities, women, or even the civil rights movement, now became fully integrated into the political process. Interest groups campaign constantly during the governing period to promote their own agendas (Loomis, 2000:175-179) contributing to the creation of politicians 'subject to interest group pressures and more obliged to engage in continuous campaigning' (Heclo, 2000: 21). For example, in the case of the health care reform promoted by Clinton with a policy campaign (Corrigan, 2000; Loomis, 2000) 'the insurance industry countered with its own focus groups and TV commercials' (Hess, 2000: 43).

The need to mobilise public opinion leads to another change contributing to the rise of the campaigning style of governing. Exercising considerable influence on the political landscape and triggering the permanent campaign, the use of new communication technology raised the political process to completely new heights (Blumenthal, 1982; Heclo, 2000: 21-23; Kernell, 1986: 2; Peters, 2002). Originally, it included television, which stands in time as the breakthrough landmark for the new age, allowing political actors to give a direct and intimate tone in their communication with the public.

The use of television by political actors had three implications. Firstly, politicians could deliver their messages directly to their constituencies in a constant campaign-like mode, setting the public agenda and influencing the public view on various issues (Kernell, 1997). Secondly, television has become the central stage concerning the display of presidential candidates, instead of the parties, influencing their selection in the primaries and consequently reinforcing in general the mentality of candidate-centered campaign (Patterson, 1993). Third, organised interests could orchestrate protests and media events in order to gain visibility and attract public attention to their cause (Loomis, 2000).



At the same time, it is also worth noting that the mass media intended to present politics in a campaign mode in order to add a sense of drama to developments, since this was expected to captivate viewers (Heclo, 2000: 22). As Patterson (1993) has pointed out, the horse-race coverage of political affairs has risen from 45 per cent to approximately 80 per cent based on the data over the years, while the coverage of stories framed in terms of policy have plunged from over 50 per cent in 1960 to less than 20 per cent. The presentation of the governing process as a 'horse race' similar to the presentation of an election campaign as a 'horse race' has resulted in blurred distinction between governing and campaigning (Hess, 2000: 49). In parallel, as some authors have suggested, the media tendency to cover the political process in a campaign mode focusing on who is winning and who is losing or on political strategies and tactics has contributed to the augmented political cynicism and disillusionment of the public (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997; Patterson, 1993).

Apart from the role of TV, this kind of communication strategy grew side-by-side with new communication technology that today includes cable television shows, talk radio, the Internet, the infamous twenty-four-hour news cycle. As Thurber has observed, in the case of the terrorist attacks in 9/11 it became apparent that the coordination of government communications in a 24/7 news cycle was significant (2003: 7). In addition, the role of Internet has become ever more important since the advent of new on-line communication channels like blogging, YouTube, Facebook and Twitter from 2004 onwards (Lilleker, 2011: 2). The latter have been seen as part of the Web 2.0 giving voters, citizens, and users the opportunity, not only to consume passively political information, but also to actively participate in an interactive political process (Gibson, 2009; Jaeger et al, 2010; O'Reilly, 2005). Moreover, as Papacharissi has noted, 'patterns of civic engagement online suggest selective uses of online media to supplement the representative model of democracy and mobilise subversive movements' (2002: 8). These evolutions seem to exert influence to the conduct of the campaigning style of governing. According to Lilleker, 'the nature of the permanent

campaign will be influenced by developments in the Internet, such as Web 2.0 applications (..) because the permanent campaign has no end, participants are always striving for new means of dominating the political agenda' (2011: 5).

Another feature that seems to contribute to the creation of the permanent campaign is the advancement of new political technologies such as public relations and professional polling (Blumenthal, 1982; Wayne, 1992: 109). The media or professional political consultants apply opinion polling as a means of accurately depicting the political and social trends using 'statistical sampling to produce representative surveys of public opinion' (Heclo, 2000: 24). The broadcasting of polling results intensifies the feeling of a permanent campaign being pursued in the political arena (Bowman, 2000: 59-62; Hess, 2000: 59-62). In addition, the new political technologies include 'the following services: poll and focus-group research, strategic planning, image management, direct-mail marketing, event management, production of media materials, "media buys", opposition research against competitors, and orchestration of "grassroots" citizen campaigns"' (Heclo, 2000: 25). However, this polling data would be useless without people able to exploit it. Professional public relations consultants emerged and began to provide services in order to promote, to improve or even change the policies and the image presented by politicians. The services provided in order to assist their employers in engaging the public's attention to the promoted policies or even to the politicians themselves resulted in the upgrading of their political status to a permanent basis.

All of the aforementioned leads to an increasing need for political funds, which contributes to the rise of the permanent campaign era as well (Corrado, 2000; Heclo, 2000: 26-27; Peters, 2002). Modern political marketing, including pollsters and public relations consultants, ultimately spends money on itself. A new demand emerged for politicians and interest groups to engage in constant fundraising activities, which target specific groups of the population (Fiorina & Brady, 2000; Corrado, 2000). As Heclo notes, 'the new impetus was to hunt out support - concentrating resources to

search for narrowly targeted groups of predisposed sympathizers - rather than to gather support within general coalitions' (2000: 27).

Another factor leading to the appearance and consolidation of the campaigning style of governing is connected to the notion that 'the stakes involved in activist government are what makes it worthwhile to pay out the money that keeps the permanent campaign going and growing' (Heclo, 2000: 27). Since the 1950s, the nature of government has been fundamentally altered. Governmental actions and policies affect the public more than they did in the past penetrating into several political, economic and social issues (Foley, 2000: 131). As a result, 'the more is done, the more can be criticised by opponents and so the greater potential for public support to be lost' (Lilleker, 2006: 146). Opponents such as members of Congress and organised interests have strong motivation to campaign aimed at affecting public view on their favour. The last factor that appears to have contributed to the rise of the permanent campaign process is the development of transport, which has facilitated political travel around the country, allowing presidents to deliver their messages directly to key constituencies and special audiences (Charnock, 2004: 20; Kernell, 1986: 2, 93-95).

Most of these factors are interconnected. According to Ornstein & Mann:

'The rise of the modern interest-group system was shaped in large part by the growth of the federal government and the collapse of the parties as vital and consequential umbrella organisations that could act as interest-group surrogates at both the national and, in machine areas, the local levels. The new communications technologies led to the advent of modern polling techniques, modern commercial advertising approaches that could be applied to politics and policy battles, and modern fund-raising (such as direct mail). The telecommunications revolution also led to vast expansion of the avenues of communication and made it more difficult and costly to get a message across to a broad audience and to cut through the cacophony of hundreds of competing "narrowcast" messages - hence the need for more money by candidates and parties to communicate with voters' (2000: 222).

However, the interrelation suggests that not all of these factors are of equal significance in exerting influence on the rise of the permanent campaign era. For instance, if the political parties had not declined in organisation and electoral terms and the number of fluid voters had not increased, political leaders would not need to constantly campaign in order to keep their electoral majority or they would not need to use opinion polling and focus groups to explore the views and preferences of undecided voters. Moreover, if the broadcast media did not exist, presidents would never need to make continual media appearances to get their message across. They would neither be in need to cooperate with public relations experts nor seek to raise funds to hire professionals and apply polling techniques.

Lastly, without the rise of communication experts other political and non-political actors could not undertake policy campaigns exerting pressure on presidents and administrations to satisfy their policy demands. Furthermore, the expansion of the activities of the federal government would not have motivated so strongly the campaigning of organised interests to affect government's decisions if mass media and especially television (and later internet) were not in place. Therefore, the decline of parties, the rise of television and the new political technologies are more important factors than the interest groups, the government activism or the need for political funding in contributing to the advent of the permanent campaign era. This observation facilitates the identification of the determinant factors of the permanent campaign in non-presidential systems across the world and particularly in the European parliamentary majoritarian systems on which this study focuses.

### **1.3 The key elements of the permanent campaign in the UK**

The permanent campaign implemented for the first time by American presidents, yet prime ministers in the parliamentary majoritarian system of the UK appear to have adopted the concept as well. Margaret Thatcher was the first premier who seemed to

follow the permanent campaign trend declaring after her second consecutive electoral victory in 1983 that ‘the next election campaign starts now’ (Cockerell et al, 1994: 189). More specifically, she reinforced the role of experts in British politics by collaborating with the well-known advertisers Saatchi & Saatchi, the TV producer Gordon Reece and the communication consultant Christofer Lawson (Cockerell et al, 1988: 192,195; Scammell, 1995: 98, 274-275). She monitored weekly focus groups data and opinion polls (Cockerell and Walker, 1988: 197) and she did several media appearances to get her message across (Cockerell and Walker, 1988: 205).

However, Thatcher’s campaign-like personnel, techniques and tactics were usually undertaken a year and a half before the national election took place. As a result, they fit with the ‘long campaign’ concept (Norris, 1998), not with the permanent campaign trend. According to Scammell, ‘if not yet the “permanent campaigns” of American presidential politics, the Conservatives have waged conscious and coordinated pre-campaigns, most obviously in 1978/9, and 1986/7, and by 1992 all the mainstream parties followed suit’ (1995: 277). Additionally, British political leaders seem to have adopted pre-campaigns even before Thatcher in 1959 and 1964 (Scammell, 1995: 250).

The first UK premier who implemented the permanent campaign strategy in full was Tony Blair (Butler & Kavanagh, 2001: 22; Needham, 2005; Newman, 1994; Nimmo, 1999; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 20-21, 62). According to Scammell, ‘Labour, more clearly than any of its post-war predecessors, is a permanently campaigning administration’ (2001: 510). Blair established new communication units within Downing Street exerting centralised control over government communications, collaborated with media experts, used private polling to formulate policy and presentation, communicated his policy through simple and repeated campaign-like messages and he adopted campaign-like tactics to get his message across. In the following paragraphs, the key elements of Blair’s permanent campaign are analysed in detail.

First, Blair brought into government the so called ‘Millbank model of command and control’ (Franklin, 2004: 58; Kuhn, 2007: 124-125), which had been built while New Labour was still in opposition and was used in the election campaign in 1997, running a tight media operation with carefully coordinated themes and messages (Riddell, 2001: 28). This was done not only because of the effectiveness of this media apparatus, but also because the existing Number 10 communication approach was widely viewed as ineffective by prominent officials of New Labour. According to Seldon, Blair’s press spokesman Alastair Campbell ‘had formed a poor opinion of the Government Information Service (GIS) (..) He thought the GIS was insufficiently active in anticipating the demands of a twenty-four-hour news media’ (2007: 301). To this end, the New Labour government set up an inquiry to examine the function of the GIS and formulate proposals for its reorganisation. The Mountfield Committee produced a report that offered the Prime Minister a series of recommendations (which seemed to reflect the communication philosophy and priorities of New Labour):

‘to retain a politically impartial service and to sustain the trusted values of the service embodied in its rules of guidance; to improve co-ordination with and from the Centre, so as to get across consistently the Government’s key policy themes and messages: through a new strategic communications unit serving the whole Government, through a reformed Cab-E-Net system (AGENDA) and through clearer rules on attribution; to improve co-ordination within each Government Department so that Ministers, their special advisers, their Press Offices and their policy civil servants all play their part in the coherent formulation and communication of policy; to bring the practice and procedures of all Government Press Offices up to the standards of the best, geared to quick response round the clock with help from a new central monitoring unit; on the basis that communication is an integral part of policy formulation, to develop closer and better working relations between policy civil servants and Press Offices’ (Mountfield Report, 1997: 1).

In addition, the report suggested that ‘all major interviews and media appearances both print and broadcast should be agreed with the Number 10 Press Office before any

commitments are entered into. The policy content of all major speeches, press releases and new policy initiatives should be cleared in good time with the Number 10 private office as well as the timing and form of announcements should be cleared with the Number 10 Press Office' (Mountfield Report, 1997: 8). The implementation of the report's proposals led to the revamping of the governmental communication machinery. In order to coordinate all government communications the GIS was renamed the Government Information and Communication Service (GICS) and was turned into a more professionalised communication institution, staffed entirely by political advisors and media experts exerting centralised control over government communications (Riddell, 2001: 29; Scammell, 2001: 520).

Moreover, three new communication structures were introduced in Number 10. First, the Strategic Communication Unit (SCU) aimed at 'ensuring that all departments were "on message", in line with centrally produced themes' and at 'coordinating government news announcements across departments so that a clear, focused policy message was distributed to the media on any particular day' (Scammell, 2001: 524). The SCU's weekly schedule of media events, called 'the grid', was presented every Thursday during a meeting of the heads of information from the various departments of Whitehall in order to prevent clashes between them, to highlight positive developments in the government's work and to sometimes 'slip out' any bad news when it had been in general a 'good news' day for the government (Franklin, 2004: 60). Second, a Media Monitoring Unit was set up with the aim of preparing 'a daily digest of news media content and to identify potentially problematic issues for consideration ("rebuttal") at the morning communications meeting held prior to the 11 a.m. lobby briefing' (Franklin, 2004: 60). Third, the Research Information Unit, known as the rebuttal unit, was created in March 1999 to provide information to the Prime Minister and the SCU (Scammell, 2001: 521). In addition, the agency appeared to increase its activities immensely under Tony Blair's administration in order to respond to the growing need for a solid communication strategy for New Labour and

to adapt to the technological advances in the media field with the introduction of web-based services. In 2001 also the Central Office of Information's (established by the Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee in 1946 to supply 'publicity material, services and advice to departments upon their request' [Jacobs, 1992: 215]) advertising income rose to an unprecedented £192,407,000 compared to £59,039,000 during Blair's first year in government (Franklin, 2004: 78-79). Overall as Riddell has put it, 'these innovations are the clearest illustration of how the "permanent campaign" has changed Downing Street' (2001: 30).

The second element of Prime Minister Blair's campaign-to-govern style was that he continued to collaborate with the communication professionals he had been working as party leader while being in the opposition. Among his primeministerial staff was the pollster and strategist Philip Gould, who had previously been a marketing and advertising executive and co-head of a consultancy (Gould, 1998; Kuhn, 2007). Blair also collaborated with President Clinton's strategy and polling aides, James Carville and Stanley Greenberg (Gould, 1998; Scammell, 2001: 527-528). In addition, he appointed the political journalist Alastair Campbell, who had previously worked for the tabloid newspapers *Daily Mirror* and *Today* and had served as party's spokesperson, as primeministerial spokesperson. According to Kuhn, Campbell 'put in place in No. 10 a highly centralised organisation [seeking] to coordinate governmental communications and [to impose] a single message from the top down' (2007: 125).

Blair also appointed media professionals (particularly former political journalists) to act as spokespersons of the Ministries and in particular to be responsible for the effective coordination of the governmental communication strategy, the adoption of extensive spin control as well as the simplification of the governmental message (Franklin 2004: 60; Kuhn 2007: 125; Scammell 2001: 517). For instance, 'former journalists, such as David Bradshaw (*Daily Mirror*) and Philip Basset (*The Times*) were employed to ensure that it was a media rather than a bureaucratic mindset that informed the process' (Kuhn, 2007: 125). Another prominent figure in both the New



Labour Party and Blair's communication staff was Peter Mandelson. According to Scammell, Mandelson 'as Minister without Portfolio, was authorized to put into practice some of his own recommendations (..) and establish clear links between policy and presentation' (2001: 516). His communication skills tend to be attributed to his broadcasting experience, since 'he was part of that talented generation which passed through London Weekend Television in the early 1980s, then fanned out into national politics and the commanding heights of the British media' (Osborne, 1999: 134).

The third element of Blair's permanent campaign was the ongoing use of private polling to steer political strategy, policy and presentation. For example, his pollster, Philip Gould, followed him in office. The Labour Prime Minister held weekly meetings with his private pollster in order to monitor his popularity ratings (Scammell, 2001: 509). Even though all modern prime ministers in the UK had collaboration with pollsters, only Blair had collaborated with pollsters so regularly outside periods of election planning or crisis (Scammell, 2001: 528). Among other things, Philip Gould would use focus group evidence to test budget proposals (Franklin, 2004: 142). For instance in a memo that leaked to the press, Gould used focus group findings to argue that 'the New Labour brand had been badly contaminated, [it had become] an object of constant criticism and had been undermined by a combination of spin, lack of conviction and, apparently, lack of integrity' (Scammell, 2001: 517). However, in fact as Kavanagh points out 'Tony Blair and Philip Gould were exchanging memos about the need for permanent campaigning long before Blair's leaked memo in July 2000 (2001: 15).

The fourth element of the endless campaigning applied by Blair was the formulation and dissemination of political messages in a rigid and coordinated way largely in line with the central message of the first election campaign in 1997 (Nimmo, 1999: 74; Franklin, 2004: 91). For instance, on his first day in office Blair stated that 'we campaigned as New Labour, we will govern as New Labour' (Foley, 2000; Rawnsley,

2000: 15; White & de Chernatony, 2002: 49). Another indication of Blair's emphasis on message was his claim that 'ideas need labels if they are to become popular and widely understood. The Third Way is to my mind the best label for the new politics which the progressive centre left is forging in Britain and beyond' (Richards, 2004: 187). Furthermore, he made an effort to frame the 'modernisation project' polarisedable terms as a means to communicate it effectively:

'The Third Way stands for a modernised social-democracy, passionate in its commitment to social justice and the goals of the center left, but flexible, innovative and forward-looking in the means to achieve them (..) it is a *third* way because of moves decisively beyond an old left preoccupied by state control, high taxation and producer interests; and a new right treating public investment, and often the very notions of "society" and collective endeavour, as evils to be undone' (Richards, 2004: 187–188).

With the general election of 2001 approaching, Blair set as his goal for the second term to develop 'a narrative [according to which] the first term was merely laying the foundations for radical reform to follow after a historic second election victory' (Seldon, 2007: 646).

The fifth component of Blair's permanent campaign was the use of campaign-like tactics to get his message across. In particular, replicating Clinton's town hall meetings, Blair initiated 'a series of regular unscripted "question and answer" sessions around the country (..) to explain government policy and to defend his administration's performance in a televised format that would show members of the public directly engaging with the premier' (Foley, 2000: 190). In addition, the New Labour Prime Minister gave several public speeches, media interviews and penned newspaper opinion articles in order to promote his economic and social reforms (Cockerell, 2001; Franklin, 2004; Gould, 1998; Kuhn, 2007: 127; Scammell, 2001). At this point, it should be noted that he was the first British PM who held regular press conferences. Until 2002, in line with his predecessors in the premiership, he was

giving ‘ad hoc conferences, notably on the petrol blockade in 2000 and the New York attacks in 2001 were broadcast on television and open to a wider clientele’ while from the summer of 2002 onwards, he held regular monthly televised press conferences in Downing Street (Seymour-Ure, 2003: 180).

He also made an effort to communicate his message in an unfiltered way by publishing numerous articles in women’s magazines and ethnic minority publications (Kuhn, 2007: 126). According to Scammell, ‘150 Blair’s by-lined articles were published in his first two years in office’ (2001: 517). Blair was also the first Prime Minister to broadcast regularly on the Internet. He inherited ‘open.gov.uk’ from former PM Major and expanded it significantly. Access to information about government activities and proposals [was] far more readily available, especially via the web, than ever before’ (Scammell, 2001: 526). Additionally, Blair ‘in February 2000 (...) started weekly internet broadcasts on the Number 10 website’ (Seymour-Ure, 2003: 40). At the same time, Blair, carrying out the tradition of his predecessors, made a number of public appearances receiving televised coverage. During his first term, he made several public addresses on issues such as the alcoholism among teenagers, vandalism, the protection of witnesses in criminal trials, public service reform, devolution and the 1998 Budget (Foley, 2000: 191; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 23; Riddell, 2001: 35). He also gave occasional parliamentary speeches participating in the Question Time, though in general he avoided spending time making parliamentary appeals (Scammell, 2001; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 26).

#### **1.4 The contributing factors of the permanent campaign in the UK**

As it has already been illustrated, not all prime ministers of the United Kingdom have undertaken the permanent campaign strategy in order to improve their personal appeal. The phenomenon emerged in full shape from the mid-1990s onwards (Needham, 2005; Norris, 1998; Scammell, 2001). Before then, the government and specifically

the primeministerial communication mainly operated in a different mode, yet the goal remains always the same. According to Seymour-Ure, 'the essential quality and purpose of the prime minister's public communication is its potential to convert his authority into power (..) his ultimate aim will be to protect his reputation, in order to maximize the chances of staying party leader and winning the next election' (2003: 51).

The premiers relied primarily upon the press office and the press secretary, whose responsibilities were expanding over the time (Newton, 2006: 220-221; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 123-127). Moreover, they made public appeals in the House of Commons delivering speeches, making statements, participating in the parliamentary debates, like the annual Queen's Speech, passing important pieces of legislation or dealing with no-confidence debates and the Question Time which receives from 1989 onwards televised coverage (Seymour-Ure, 2001: 24-25). Other opportunities for public communication was the participation in domestic, European and overseas summits as well as visits to hospitals, schools, factories and conferences in order to launch a policy or mark some achievement by making a speech (Seymour-Ure, 2001: 22-23). In the same context, the British premiers also gave occasionally press conferences for domestic and foreign policy issues (Seymour-Ure, 2001: 169).

So what changed? Which factors created the British permanent campaign era? In the United States, political, technological and institutional developments like the decline of political parties, the rise of television and the growth of the industry of new political technologies and communication experts, created the campaigning style of governing. The relevant literature suggests that similar developments have occurred in the UK, in spite of the institutional differences between the presidential and the parliamentary majoritarian system.

The first change, which motivated party leaders and prime ministers to follow the permanent campaign trend, is the decline of political parties and their subsequent inability to mobilise support. This is evident on the membership of British political parties, which has been in decline in recent decades falling from 1.693.156 members in 1980 to 532.000 in 2006 (cited in Negrine, 2008: 61). In particular, the membership of the Labour party under Blair in first place rose significantly from 265.000 in 1994 to 405.000 in 1997, but then fell sharply to 248.294 members in 2002 and 198.026 in 2005 (Heffernan, 2007: 156-157). Moreover, the primaries for the election of party leadership strengthened further party leaders by weakening position of MPs, party officials and trade unions that traditionally dominated the party. In the case of Blair, New Labour were run 'by a parliamentary leader (...) nominated from among the parliamentary party and first elected by an electoral college comprising MPs, party members and members of affiliated organisations' (Heffernan, 2007: 147).

In addition, the decline of political parties in the UK is evident in the ongoing fall of party identification (Dalton, 1999: 66; Schmitt & Holmberg, 1995: 107). In particular, the rising of living standards caused the shrinking of the working class and the respective expansion of the middle class, decreasing the role of class-voting, blurring the ideological cleavages, diminishing partisan ties and increasing the number of the middle-ground, fluid, undecided voters (Clarke et al, 2004: 41; Negrine, 2008: 60). As a result, British political parties, which seek to be electable, have to gain voting support not only of their traditional voters, but also the support of the middle ground, fluid, undecided voters. The latter have shifted their focus from ideology to the role of short-term forces like issues, election campaigns and political leaders (Clarke et al, 2004: 35; Miller & Niemi, 1996: 179).

Leaders, specifically, have seen their political significance to increase because they 'come to symbolise other, more abstract, entities such as their party's issue positions, platform, and performance in the economic and other policy realms' (Clarke et al,

2004: 257). In addition, the media and particularly television have contributed to the increase of the personalisation of the political process by focusing on the leaders' personalities (Foley, 1993; Pryce, 1997; Swanson & Mancini, 1996). The personalisation of politics is evident especially in the changing nature of the election campaigns from a party-centered to a leader-centered mode, not only in presidential but also in parliamentary systems. In particular, 'the media encourage the "personalisation" of electoral politics by focusing heavily on the leaders' policy pronouncements, by conducting in-depth (..) interviews with them, and by monitoring their "comings and doings" on the campaign trail' (Clarke et al, 2004).

In this context, the increasing importance in recent decades of political leadership as influential factor in voting behaviour, not only in presidential systems, but also in parliamentary systems in combination with the emergence and the development of the role of television have given prominence to the notion of presidentialisation (Foley, 2000; Mughan, 1993; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 63). In this notion, as McAllister has described it:

'the institutional arrangements within a country have comparatively little influence on what leaders do and how they behave in office. What matters are changes in the process of political communications and the nature of party organisations. Parliamentary systems were alleged to have become more presidential in style and character (..) by assuming that the fate of the leader and the fate of the government are inextricably linked' (1996: 286).

In the case of Blair, there are two elements that have marked the British Presidency of Blair similar to the US-style presidency as Foley (2000: 230, 293) argues. First, the personal leadership style of Blair, which placed him further at the heart of government. It is characteristic that under Blair the communication entourage in Downing Street 'resembled that of the White House' (Seymour-Ure, 2001: 136). Second, the media-led phenomenon of personalisation increasingly spotlighted Blair while marginalising other political actors to the periphery of public attention.

According to Mazzoleni, ‘the traditional highly personalised premiership assumed new visibility with the victory of Tony Blair, a leader keen to implement shrewd communication tools’ (2000: 327-328). The latter was evident in the adoption of US-style communication activities like the regular primeministerial press conference, in spite of the different institutional context. In the United States, a regular presidential press conference ‘has always included the simple argument that it is needed because the separation of powers removes the president from public scrutiny in the legislature. A press conference is thus the president’s ‘Question Time’ (Seymour-Ure, 2003: 198-199).

However, as Heffernan, argues the concept of presidentialisation of the premiership misleads because between prime ministers and presidents lies a number of differences that imposes limitations on the notion in the majoritarian parliamentary systems (2005: 54). Apart from the fact that the prime minister is the leader of his party while the president is not (Heffernan, 2005), there are also three main distinctions according to Lijphart (1992):

‘First, in presidential systems, the head of government has a fixed term in office. In parliamentary systems, the head of government is dependent on the confidence of the legislature. Second, presidents are elected (directly or via an electoral college), whereas prime ministers are selected by the legislature. Third, presidential systems have one-person, non-collegial executives, whereas parliamentary systems have collective executives’.

Yet the leadership’s image, including popularity, remains an important factor in shaping voting behaviour along with other short-term factors, like popular at the time issues and election campaigns as well as long-term forces, like social class, region, employment status, religion, values and party identification (Dalton, 1996; Fiorina, 1981; Miller & Niemi, 1996). The analysis of the existing data, gathered from empirical researches for more than twenty years shows that, the opinion of voters over

the image of both the governing and opposing party leaders affects to a significant extent their choice upon the elections. A positive or a negative opinion could either favour or reduce the party's support to its leader in inter-election periods (Miller et al 1990; Stewart and Clarke 1992; Clarke et al 1997; 1998). Also leaders tend to use their own high approval ratings, a crucial political capital as it is, as leverage in order to be favoured by the media, to affect to some extent current or future political events and consequently to refuel their approval ratings (Neustadt, 1990: 73; Maltese, 1994: 4; Ostrom and Simon, 1985: 335; Seymour-Ure, 2003). Thus, current British premiers have still the motive to engage in a permanent campaign process to retain their popularity ratings.

Another contributing factor to the emergence of the campaigning style of governing in the United Kingdom is the development of new media technologies. Norris has argued that campaign communication in the United Kingdom has entered the era of the postmodern campaign which is characterised by 'the emergence of a more autonomous and less partisan press, following its own "media logic", the growing fragmentation and diversification of electronic media outlets, programmes and audiences, and, in reaction to all these developments, the attempt by the parties to reassert control through strategic communication and media management during the permanent campaign' (1998: 117). The advent of broadcasting and particularly the advent of television have affected significantly the forms of political communication (Foley, 2000: 149; Seymour-Ure, 2003: 8). As a result, a number of evolutions marked the new media landscape:

'A relatively recent expansion in supply of radio and television services, driven by technological change and a more liberal public policy approach, following many years of highly restricted provision; the dominance of a few free-to-air terrestrial broadcasters up until the last decade of the twentieth century; the comparatively modest impact of cable as a distribution system for programming; strong competition to terrestrial networks from satellite distribution from the late 1980s onwards; the roll-out and popular take-up of digital services on terrestrial, satellite and cable platforms in the early years of the twenty-first century; high



popularity of radio listening and television viewing among audiences; historically a highly regulated system underpinned by public service values; significant marketisation and lighter touch regulation of broadcasting since the late 1980s' (Kuhn, 2007: 11).

In addition, media increasingly concentrate on personalities in order to communicate information more easily and, consequently, cover the political process in a campaign-like mode. Particularly, as McAllister notes, 'the drama of horse-race journalism (who's up, who's down) is more vivid than detailed [policy] debates' (1996, 287). The notion appears to have been reinforced by the televised coverage of parliaments and the parliamentary debates like the Question Time, between the prime minister and the leader of Opposition, which offer the viewers the opportunity to assess the leadership qualities of the two main contenders (Seymour-Ure, 2003; McAllister, 1996: 288). Additionally, the rise of the media has affected almost all public activities given that 'party conferences, visits to schools and hospitals, and even non-governing occasions such as holidays, are fitted with the same tripwire. The opportunities for broadcast public performance are limitless. They extend far beyond overtly political programmes to include such failures as gardening and children's programmes' (Seymour-Ure, 2003: 61).

Furthermore, the media landscape and consequently the political communication environment became even more demanding and pressing during Blair's years. As Kuhn has illustrated:

'the UK political communication environment of the Blair era was characterised by the twenty-four-hour news cycle, an explosion of media outlets, notably rolling news channels and internet websites, a phalanx of journalists hungry for insider information and a broad range of political actors, including parties and pressure groups, functioning in competition with the core executive as sources of the media' (2007: 123).

Moreover, 'at the beginning of the new millennium the internet had a similar effect like the broadcast media' (Seymour-Ure, 2003: 8). To this end the mass media have exerted great influence on traditional party campaigns, weakening party-centered politics not only in presidential but also in parliamentary systems like the British one (McAllister, 1996: 281). Consequently, it is safe to assume that the new media environment has exerted pressures on Prime Minister Blair to adopt the permanent campaign in order to defend himself and promote his policies. In other words, as Seymour-Ure has noted, 'when media change, in short, the premiership changes' (2003: 9).

In parallel, in line with the United States the development of broadcast media has boosted the growth of the industry of communication professionals. As Negrine has illustrated, 'the examples of Philip Gould, Alastair Campbell and Steve Hilton in the British context (..) suggest that there is now a coterie of specialists that are becoming embedded in the political process (..) These are truly professionals and to the extent that they are professionals one could make a case for saying that what we see is a professionalisation of political communication and a realisation that no contemporary election could be conducted without their help' (2008: 92).

## **Conclusion**

The endless campaigning arises as a broadly adopted communication strategy pursued by contemporary political leaders across a number of advanced democracies. The permanent campaign concept emerged primarily in the United States due to institutional, political and technological reasons, the most important being the decline of political parties, the advent of mass media and the growth of new political technologies. Assessing its implementation from the American presidents, five components have been identified including public outreach institutions, collaboration

with communication experts, the use of polling data to steer policy and communication, the use of campaign-like messages as labels throughout the governing term and various public appeals to promote themselves and their policies.

Outside the US, the permanent campaign has been adopted by executive leaders around the world, for example in Latin America, in Australia and Europe. In Europe and specifically in the UK the permanent campaign process has been used from the mid-1990s. Blair is the first premier who adopted in full the campaigning style of governing in the British context motivated, similarly to the US, by developments including the decline of parties, the erosion of party identification, the rise of television and the growth in the industry of communication professionals. The next chapter discusses the implementation of the permanent campaign in another European majoritarian system, the Greek one.

## **Chapter 2**

### **The permanent campaign of Prime Minister Costas Simitis**

As it has already been mentioned in chapter one, there are some indications that Simitis' predecessors in the premiership had already adopted a few aspects of the permanent campaign. In this chapter Simitis' permanent campaign is evaluated against five criteria: institutions, experts, polling, message and public appeals. It becomes apparent when compared to his predecessors that he pursued a fully permanent campaign strategy in order to retain his popularity. In fact, Simitis introduced new government communication units and collaborated systematically with communication professionals, even if some of them had no previous relations with the party. At the same time, he monitored polling figures, making important political decisions based on them. Additionally, the center-left premier formulated his central political message in a campaign-like mode, using a single motto that would encapsulate his political goals throughout his first term in office while he failed to do it in the second term. Furthermore, he adopted campaign-like tactics in governing, mainly using minor addresses and domestic travels to get his message across. Despite all this activity, the impact of Simitis' permanent campaign measured by the number and frequency of his public appearances was weak on his public approval as Prime Minister. This suggests that other factors exerted greater influence on his primeministerial popularity.

In the following sections, the implementation of Simitis' campaigning style is studied. Before undertaking such an analysis, his path to political ascendancy should be examined more closely. To this end, section one discusses the political background of Costas Simitis. Section two examines the communication units operating in the Office of the Prime Minister and in the governmental communication machinery. Section

three considers the role of communication professionals in Simitis' staff. Section four analyses the use and impact of polling on government strategy, policy and presentation. Section five assesses the central message of Simitis' permanent campaign. Section six discusses the public appeals of the former Greek Prime Minister as a mean of delivering his message to the public. Section seven measures and interprets the effect of Simitis' major and minor addresses on his public approval ratings.

## **2.1 The political background of Simitis**

Simitis was one of the most prominent party officials: co-founder of PASOK, co-writer of the party's founding document, member of the senior party committee and member of the Ministerial Council of Papandreou's administrations from 1981 to 1989 and from 1993 to 1996 (Pretenteris, 1996; Simitis, 2005: 20-22). In particular, he served as Minister of Agriculture (1981-1985), Minister of National Economy (1985-1987) and Minister of Industry (1993-1995) (Kazakos, 2001: 375; Simitis, 2005: 24-26).

However, as several authors have pointed out, Simitis was considered an outsider inside his own party. He was managerial and technocratic, representing the pro-European modernising minority within the party, unlike Andreas Papandreou, who advocated anti-European socialist ideas (Featherstone, 2005: 226-227; Kazakos, 2001: 335; Pretenteris, 1996: 80; Voulgaris, 2008: 127). As one of the founding members of the party and partly responsible for the formulation of the party's original programme back in 1979, Simitis attempted to reconcile the party line with the European project. To this end, he published a political advertising poster, which carried the motto 'Yes to Europe of the people, No to Europe of the Monopolies' (Simitis, 2005: 25). Yet, the above initiative stirred significant unrest inside the party, especially from party officials who were arguing that it was deviating strongly from the anti-European party

line. The intra-party reaction led Simitis to resign from the senior party committee in 1979 (Pretenteris, 1996; Simitis, 2005: 26).

In 1985, Simitis was appointed Minister of National Economy with the mandate to implement the economic stabilization programme. However, he handed in his resignation from the cabinet at the end of 1987, after Papandreou decided to shift the economic policy course (Kazakos, 2001; Loulis, 2007: 272; Simitis, 2005: 24-26; Pretenteris, 1996: 31; Voulgaris, 2008: 102-103). During the last Papandreou's government (1993-1996), Simitis served as Minister of Industry and Commerce setting out to modernise state-owned industries. Nonetheless, two years later he again decided to resign from office after clashing with the Prime Minister over the reorganisation of the state owned shipyard (Simitis, 2005: 26). For these reasons, Papandreou and his close associates eventually turned against Simitis, accusing him of being a conservative right wing or neoliberal (Pretenteris, 1996: 35). In other words, Simitis was viewed as a political outsider within PASOK to such an extent (Loulis, 2007: 297) that his election as party leader 'represented a major turning point in Greek politics' (Featherstone, 2005: 226).

In January 1996, Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou resigned from the premiership due to his failing health and the parliamentary group of PASOK elected a new Prime Minister (Nikolacopoulos, 2005; Pretenteris, 1996). On 18 January 1996, Simitis defeated his rivals for the post (Featherstone, 2005: 226; Voulgaris, 2008: 127). In the first electoral round, both Simitis and his main opponent Akis Tsochatzopoulos received 53 votes, with fellow candidates Gerasimos Arsenis and Yiannis Charalambopoulos securing 50 and 11 votes respectively. In the second round, Simitis won with 86 votes against 75 for Tsochatzopoulos (Fouskas, 1998: 134). Tsochatzopoulos and Arsenis essentially represented the traditional populist left-wing faction of the party. As Featherstone has noted, they 'were probably closer to the party's soul than Simitis, at least in recent times' (2005: 226). Tsochatzopoulos

especially was seen as the leader of the 'proedrikoi' (leader's faction), protecting the inheritance of Papandreou' (Featherstone, 2005: 226).

Six months later, in June 1996, Papandreou passed away and almost immediately the party called for a convention, in which the empty seat of the deceased founder and party leader would be filled. Simitis ran for party leader and again defeated Tsochatzopoulos. He became the new leader of PASOK, receiving 53.8 per cent of the votes to Tsochatzopoulos's 45.7 per cent (Featherstone, 2005: 226; Loulis, 2007: 297; Pretenteris, 1996; Voulgaris, 2008: 127). Among Simitis' supporters were the trade union leaders, who exerted great influence on the party (Pretenteris, 1996: 117), but also George Papandreou, 'the ex-Premier's eldest son who [had] courageously distinguished himself from his father's legacy' (Featherstone, 1997: 159).

Although one can argue that the reasons behind Simitis' victory in the elections for both posts - premiership and party leadership - are numerous, Simitis seemed to be elected party leader mainly because he was considered as the most capable candidate in terms of securing PASOK's re-election. According to VPRC polls, published in a time span between January and May 1996, Simitis' popularity was higher than that of his conservative opponent Miltiadis Evert. In January, Simitis' rating was 84.6 per cent over Evert's 38 per cent, in March Simitis enjoyed a popularity of 59.7 per cent in comparison to 32.3 per cent for Evert and in May, a month before the party congress, Simitis secured a 54 per cent over ND's leader (opinion surveys cited in Pretenteris, 1996: 261). Furthermore, in March the VPRC voting intention poll showed that PASOK had a lead over ND taking 29.3 per cent to 28.6 per cent (opinion polls cited in Pretenteris, 1996: 261-263).

However, in spite of being victorious on two occasions, Simitis needed a fresh mandate in order to secure his position. Hence, in September 1996 he called for snap elections to exploit his advantage over his right-wing opponents of New Democracy (Featherstone and Kazamias, 1997: 158). He won the elections by taking 41.5 per cent

of the vote and 162 parliamentary seats, while the conservative party took 38.1 per cent and 108 seats (Featherstone, 2005; Nikolacopoulos, 2005; Pretenteris, 1996). Consequently, as Featherstone has argued, Simitis consolidated his position within the party and government (1997: 160-161).

## **2.2 Government institutions of public outreach**

One of the criteria testifying to the existence of the permanent campaign is the establishment of communication units and this was quite evident within Simitis' communication apparatus. Simitis transferred some functions of his campaign apparatus into the Prime Minister's Office, which is located in Maximos Mansion in Athens, by creating new communication units: the Press Office and the position of Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 130). The Press Office aimed at promoting the primeministerial image, managing relations with the press and the mass media, providing background information to journalists, framing political messages and monitoring and rebutting critical announcements made by the opposition and the media (Fanaras, 2010, interview with the author; Paschalidis, 2010, interview with the author; Pantagias, 2009a, interview with the author; Simitis, 2005: 29).

In contrast, according to Reppas who served as the government spokesperson from 1996 till 2001, the government had no adequate media monitoring mechanism (2010: interview with the author). There were, however, some relevant agencies working inside the Ministry, but these were not adjusted to the developing situation. Furthermore, as documents obtained by the author show, George Pantagias, head of the Press Office from 1996 to 2003, was providing political communication memos to the Prime Minister regarding political strategy, political communication initiatives, the planning of public appeals for the Prime Minister in the short term and proposals for



the improvement of the performance of Simitis and his government in the long term (see Appendix G).

The Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister played a key role as regards communications between the Cabinet and the PASOK's parliamentary group. He 'was responsible for the formulation of the communication strategy, the conduct of social dialogue and handling relations between the Cabinet and the governing MPs' (Sotiropoulos, 2001: 129-130). However in practice, as Pantagias has noted, the Deputy's main contribution to the communication strategy was one of intermediation, liaising between the primeministerial office and socialist parliamentarians, rather than directly shaping the broader strategy (2009a: interview with the author). An indication of the peripheral nature of the post comes from its being abolished altogether following the national elections in 2000, with its incumbent George Paschalidis being appointed Minister of Macedonia-Thrace (Simitis, 2005: 655).

At the same time, Simitis maintained the Ministry of Press and Mass Media established by Andreas Papandreou (Papathanassopoulos, 2001: 138). Moreover, after the elections of 2000 he reinforced the Ministry, introducing the position of Deputy Minister of Press and Mass Media (Simitis, 2005: 655). Unlike the primeministerial Press Office, the Minister of Press and Mass Media focused on government communications rather than the Prime Minister's image. According to Simitis, the head of the Press Office dealt only with the Prime Minister's public relations while the Minister of Press and Media was mainly in charge of the formal briefing procedure and the handling of pressing issues (2011: interview with the author). Simitis also encouraged his ministers to take initiatives, promote policy plans and shape their own communication strategy. Hence, ministers were free to appoint their own associates in the press offices, regardless if the latter were journalists or party officials. According to Protopapas, serving as Minister of Press and Media from 2001 to 2004, 'every minister was in charge of his own communication. I only partially assisted the ministers' (2010: interview with the author).

The separation of the communication policy responsibilities between those of the Prime Minister and those of the government, as well as their allocation to distinct institutions may be attributed to Simitis' need to distance himself (in political communication terms) from his government. After all, he had been elected to the premiership post with the backing of only a marginal 54 per cent of party members and, consequently, he understood that he could not be the 'iron-fist' kind of leader. As Featherstone has argued, Simitis had to accommodate his intraparty opponents, while keeping his own intraparty faction in his side (2010: 12). This was one of the reasons why Simitis, as Pantagias has suggested, 'was obsessed with developing his own structures, to have his own group, which would be politically attached to him and would be responsible for designing and handling major issues' (2009a: interview with the author).

Another reason, as several scholars and close allies of Simitis have suggested, was his inability to modernise PASOK in the same way that he was modernising the country (Fanaras, 2009: interview with the author; Karzis, 2006: 227-229; Kousoulis, 2009: interview with the author; Loulis, 2007: 304; Pantagias, 2009a: interview with the author). Since he became Prime Minister almost at the exact same time that he was elected party leader, Simitis argues, he could not have devoted considerable time to changing the political nature of PASOK, having had different priorities, such as securing Greece's entry into the Eurozone (Simitis, 2005: 510).

### **2.3 The role of communication experts**

The second marker of Simitis' engaging in a permanent campaign was his collaboration with communication professionals, something that was evident judging by the composition of Simitis' permanent campaign machinery. During the election campaign in 1996, Simitis collaborated with the pollster and head of the polling organisation *Metron Analysis*, Stratos Fanaras (Fanaras, 2009: interview with the

author; Spourdalakis & Tassis, 2006: 510; Pantagias, 2009a: interview with the author). Once he became Prime Minister, Simitis continued to cooperate with Fanaras who, as a prominent member of the primeministerial staff from 1996 to 2004, conducted and analysed opinion surveys and focus groups on a regular basis as well as offering advice on government strategy (Lakopoulos, 1999, 2001; Pantagias, 2009a: interview with the author; Papathanassopoulos, 2003: 131). As Fanaras has put it, ‘it was my responsibility to be in charge of polls and to observe the political and social climate, in order to conduct a meta-analysis, make suggestions and offer advice on political and strategic issues’ (2009: interview with the author).

In May 1999, Simitis expanded the advisory staff by hiring Lefteris Kousoulis, strategist and owner of the political communication firm *Saying and Doing* (Kousoulis, 2007: 27; Lakopoulos, 1999, 2001; Papathanassopoulos, 2003: 131). According to Simitis, Kousoulis was in charge of providing him with long term strategic planning (2011: interview with the author). Simitis chose him in spite of the fact that until then Kousoulis had only worked with conservative politicians and candidates (Papathanassopoulos, 2001: 132; Yannas, 2001: 6).

However, Simitis’ associates considered Kousoulis’s professional background as an asset rather than a handicap. As Pantagias suggests, ‘he saw things from a different angle, which was useful to us’ (2009a: interview with the author). It is possible to argue that the timing of Kousoulis’s appointment explains Simitis’ decision to select a professional with conservative links as his close advisor. In May 1999, a month before the elections for the European Parliament and a year before the national elections, Karamanlis and New Democracy had a clear lead in voting intentions in the polls (Loulis, 2011: 156). In an attempt to improve the party’s appeal to the median voters, Karamanlis had projected New Democracy as the party of the ‘middle ground’ (Loulis, 2007: 329), confronting Simitis on a political area, where the former was considered as having the advantage (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 482). Hence, Simitis needed the consultancy of a communication expert who as a party outsider had a clear

view on the most appropriate strategy in order to win over the voters of the ‘middle ground’. Another media expert who joined Simitis’ staff in 1999 was Petros Efthimiou, political journalist of the leading centre-left newspaper *Sunday Vima*. Efthimiou participated in the speech writing team for a year (1999-2000) before being appointed by Simitis as Minister of Education in 2000 (Kousoulis, 2009: interview; Pantagias, 2009a: interview; Papathanassopoulos, 2003: 131; Simitis, 2005: 422).

In spite of the increasing role of communication experts within the primeministerial apparatus of Simitis, communication professionals co-existed with government and party officials who played a significant role. Among them were George Pantagias as press advisor, Dimitris Reppas as Minister of Media and Press, Nikos Themelis as chief of staff in the Prime Minister’s office as well as Kostas Laliotis, Minister of Public Works and Environment (1996-2001) and party secretary (2001-2003) (Pantagias, 2009b: interview with the author; Reppas, 2010: interview with the author; Simitis, 2005). Pantagias and Themelis were close aides of Simitis while Reppas and Laliotis were parliamentarians and prominent figures in the party (Papathanassopoulos, 2001: 131).

## **2.4 The use of polling**

As regards the third component of the permanent campaign, Simitis used private polling on a regular basis in order to monitor public opinion. As it has been mentioned he collaborated with pollsters and monitored opinion surveys and focus group evidence during the election campaign in 1996 and 2000 in order to steer electoral strategy (Papathanassopoulos, 2001; Spourdalakis & Tassis, 2006: 510). Simitis continued, as Prime Minister, to use private polling and qualitative data. Fanaras, Simitis’ pollster, conducted polls on political issues including the political and economic climate, government and opposition popularity, government and opposition popularity across specific policy domains, party preferences and voting intentions, the

leadership standing of the prime minister and the leader of the main opposition party as well as the political image of all party leaders (Fanaras, 2009: interview with the author). Apart from his own surveys Fanaras, as Pantagias has illustrated, was also analysing opinion polls published by the media (2009a: interview with the author).

Polling data seems to have exerted a great amount of influence on the elaboration of the Prime Minister's political strategy. For example, according to associates, Simitis relied on the opinion polls to choose candidates for the 2002 local elections (Fanaras, 2009: interview with the author; Pantagias, 2009a: interview with the author). Furthermore, as Simitis has admitted, in the summer of 2003 based on focus group findings, he decided to reshuffle his government and his party in order to improve their performance (Simitis, 2005: 474-475). Another example that underlines this point was his decision to resign from the party leadership a few months before the parliamentary elections of 2004, handing over to Papandreou. As Simitis has noted, 'I asked for three different polling firms to examine the impact of a prospective party leadership change in public opinion and especially on voting intention' (2005: 592-593). In particular, Simitis appeared to have collaborated not only with the polling firm *Metron Analysis*, but also with the polling company *Kappa Research* and the French opinion survey organisation *Sofres*. As Kroustalli (2007) has pointed out:

'in December 2003, Sofres conducted a poll asking the public 'which candidate do you consider the best for the job of the Greek Prime Minister?', in which Papandreou scored 78 per cent approval, while Simitis received 46 per cent. (...) In a nation-wide survey conducted by *Metron Analysis*, to the question 'with whom of the following leaders do you think PASOK is more likely to win the next election?', Simitis' score was 35.9 per cent and Papandreou's 40 per cent. In the voting intention section, PASOK, led by Papandreou, with a 33.9 per cent score was ahead of ND, which gathered 32.6 per cent (..) In the survey, to the question 'with which of the following leaders do you think PASOK is more likely to win the next election?', Simitis received 31 per cent and Papandreou 39.2 per cent'.

As a result, on January 7 Simitis announced his intention to resign from the post of party leader. In a ‘live’ televised address from the Office of the Prime Minister, he explained the reason for his decision to step down, stating that:

‘A party and a government should be renewed. And the leader of the government and the party should be the bearer of renewal. With the renewal, a party gains force, dynamics, ideas and skills. A modernising party must seek more than any other its renewal and to apply in practice the promise of renewal (..) PASOK has prominent executives. It has executives with the knowledge, experience and ability: Leading executives, which are able to meet the challenges of the new era, to handle difficult situations. Up to now, they have handled difficult situations and have proven that they can do this very well. They have gained recognition in our society, and in the international public opinion. Proof of it is the Greek Presidency of the European Union’ (Simitis, 2004).

Papandreou was finally elected leader of the Socialist party in February 2004, four weeks ahead of the national elections (Papathanasopoulos, 2007: 138; Simitis, 2005: 592-593).

In terms of the impact of opinion polling on policy plans, it seems that Simitis used polling data in order to shape the communication of those major policy initiatives, which he was most interested in. For example, during his first term, *Metron Analysis* conducted opinion surveys on the prospective Greek entry into the EMU framework and, during the second term, conducted polling about the European Presidency of Greece extending from January until June 2003. As Fanaras claims, ‘when [Simitis] took over in 1996, he asked me to conduct a poll on the question whether Greece should enter the EMU or not. The answers given by the public pointed to three different preferred time periods [for Greece to enter the EMU framework] and were classified accordingly’ (2010: interview with the author).

However, Simitis did not use polling evidence to shape other policy reforms. This is because the model of leadership that he exercised was to some extent decentralised. Each minister was responsible for the formulation of his policy and communication

(Simitis, 2005: 455, 600-601; Kousoulis, 2009: interview with the author). As Fanaras has suggested, ‘the government did not operate as a whole entity. I conducted polls for the prime minister, but many other ministers had their own pollsters with whom they collaborated’ (2009: interview with the author). Yet, Fanaras adds that ‘Simitis monitored opinion polls on reform initiatives that caused widespread resistance among public opinion, organised interests, political opposition and rebel deputies of PASOK, because he needed to deal with the political crisis at hand (2009: interview with the author). Such was the case of the educational reform in 1999 or the big strikes organised by the trade unions against the social security reform. In general, as Fanaras claims, ‘in Greece even now pollsters are hired to conduct surveys on political rather than on policy issues. Sometimes, though, in the case of Simitis’ administration policy polls had been asked for. However, most policies would start to be implemented without prior [communicational] preparation’ (2009: interview with the author).

## **2.5 The central motto in Simitis’ permanent campaign**

Simitis sought to modernise PASOK in an effort to formulate the Greek version of the ‘Third Way’ to social democracy combining the seemingly contradictory concepts of social solidarity and market economy. As he stated in 1996:

‘The future of socialism in the next century requires a great synthesis of the principles of equality, social justice and freedom (...) Belonging to the left does not mean to defend privileges. Left policy is all about struggling to modernise the economy in order to ensure that the country will be able to survive in the era of globalization. Left policy means to use market mechanisms in order to achieve social democratic goals like equality, social security and social cohesion’ (Simitis, 2002: 158-159).

In particular, attempting to revise his party’s ideology Simitis sought to draw a line between the party’s present and its past, which was identical to the ideology of its founder Andreas Papandreu. According to Featherstone and Kazamias, ‘Simitis is

now redefining the party's ideology along the lines of its counterparts elsewhere in Europe (...) struggling to reconcile social democracy with economic liberalization and global market challenges' (1997: 163). Practically, Simitis' 'modernisation project' was seen as a 'package of economic, social and political reforms defined by their liberalizing character' (Featherstone, 2005: 225). At the core of the plan was the idea that Greece has to dedicate itself to entering the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and converging with the economic and social standards of the European Union (Kazakos, 2010: 79; Simitis, 2005: 39; Voulgaris, 2008: 128-129).

Simitis expressed his political goal using the motto of a 'Strong Greece which will be treated as an equal by the other European states (...) [and] will be turned into a modern state with sustainable growth, social solidarity and administrative efficiency' (2002: 159). The label of 'Strong Greece' was seen as the key message of Simitis not only during the election campaign of 1996 but also throughout his first term in the premiership (Kazakos, 2010; Reppas, 2010: interview with the author; Pantagias, 2009: interview with the author; Voulgaris, 2008).

Greece's entry into the EMU was regarded as the primary goal during Simitis' first term. As a result, he implemented a series of austerity measures, including spending cuts and tax increases, aimed at reducing the public deficit and inflation and meeting the Maastricht criteria as laid down in the European Treaty (Kazakos, 2010: 79, 83; Nikolacopoulos, 2005: 277). At the same time, he promoted partial privatisation schemes and large-scale reforms in local government and education, in order to modernise public administration and public services (Kazakos, 2010: 85-92; Georgiadis, 2005; Hlepas, 2003).

This kind of innovative government policy caused an unprecedented reaction in its scope by vested interests, powerful social groups, trade unions, the opposition parties and even some parliamentarians of the ruling party. For example, in November 1996



farmers engaged in a four-month strike, accompanied by roadblocks, as they sought tax breaks and a rescheduling of their debt payments (Simitis, 2005: 324 - 329). In 1998, Simitis faced the resistance of mayors, party officials, local organised interests and MPs of the ruling party who had turned against the plan for the restructuring of local government, the so-called 'Capodistrias plan'. The promoted bill anticipated the merger of small municipalities into larger ones and the devolution of power from the central administration to local government institutions (Hlepas, 2003; Kazakos, 2010: 87-88). Moreover, in 1998, teachers of the secondary-level education engaged in a two-month strike against the government's austerity measures, while in 1999 teachers and students demonstrated for months against the upcoming reform of the educational system (Georgiadis, 2005: 8; Rapti, 1999). The social unrest and the political opposition appeared to cause significant political damage to the government. PASOK was defeated in the local government elections in 1998 (Simitis, 2005: 504) and the European elections of June 1999 to Kostas Karamanlis and the New Democracy party (Karakousis, 2006: 34; Loulis, 2007: 307).

However, Simitis did not deviate from his policy course, managing to keep public attention focused on the goal of Greek entry into the Eurozone. For instance, in the case of farmers' demonstrations, as Fouskas has argued, Simitis refused to satisfy their demands, 'since any concession made on debts or taxes would have been at the expense of the state's fiscal performance, and would hence further delay Greek entry into the EMU' (1998: 135). In March 1999, during the fifth convention of PASOK, two months before the European elections, Simitis set the tone for the upcoming electoral debate by repeating that the goal of his party 'is a strong PASOK for a Strong Greece. (...) That goal of ours, to succeed in creating a Strong Greece is being defined around a set of preconditions: A strong economy. A strong society. Social cohesion and social solidarity' (2002c: 176). In addition, he put emphasis once more on the issue of getting Greece into the EMU as a prerequisite for the modernisation of the

country arguing that ‘our entry into the EMU is the first major step towards creating a strong Greece’ (2002c: 182).

Similarly, the national objective of securing Greece’s entry into the Eurozone was regarded as the driving force behind the promotion of the whole reform package as well. For instance, according to Hlepas (2003), ‘modernising forces, supported through processes of Europeanisation, could overcome the resistance of traditionalist elements against territorial restructuring, mainly formed within the lines of conservative and communist parties, but also existing inside the ruling socialist party’. Simitis’ persistence on his policy course in combination with the high growth rate, thanks to public investment and the absorption of the European Structural Funds (Kazakos, 2001: 486; Voulgaris, 2008: 130), the effective management of the earthquake crisis in September 1999 (Loulis, 2004: 24-27) and the premier’s personal public approval, improved government performance. As a result, Simitis called for snap parliamentary elections on the 9<sup>th</sup> of April 2000 (Loulis, 2007: 307).

During the election period, Simitis placed himself at the centre of the campaign while the central slogan of the PASOK’s election campaign was ‘we are creating the new Greece, the future has begun’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 131). PASOK managed to defeat the centre-right party of New Democracy by a margin of 1.1 per cent (Nikolacopoulos, 2005: 277). Simitis was re-elected Prime Minister by taking 43.8 per cent of the votes and 158 seats, while Karamanlis took 42.7 per cent and 125 parliamentary seats (Featherstone, 2005: 227; Nikolacopoulos, 2005: 277).

In the aftermath of the 2000 election, Simitis having achieved the entry of Greece in the EMU initiated a new modernisation plan to reform the labour market, the health care system and the social security in order to achieve the convergence of Greece with the European living standards (Kazakos, 2010: 99). Given the reform priorities, he appointed close associates of his as members of the Council of Ministers (the Greek Cabinet). Tassos Giannitsis, former economic advisor to the Prime Minister, was

appointed Minister of Labour and Social Security. The former Minister of Interior Alekos Papadopoulos, who had promoted the reform of local government, was appointed Minister of Health (Papadimitriou, 2005: 387-388; Simitis, 2005: 654-655). In addition, he attempted to promote the 'Convergence with Europe' (Loulis, 2004: 155) as his new vision as well as his new slogan for the second term stating that after four years of efforts 'Greece is strong, The Greek economy is strong (..) Yet there is a lot to be done' adding that 'our primary goal is to improve the living standards of all Greeks in order to achieve the convergence with the European living standards' (Simitis, 2000).

However, Simitis' government strategy in the second term was seen from most commentators and close associates as one lacking a clear goal and a clear message (Karakousis, 2006: 359; Karzis, 2006: 181; Loulis, 2004: 282-287). One of the reasons was that the reform initiatives were not implemented. There are several explanations for this failure, including: an intra-party rebellion, the resistance of powerful pressure groups which had strong links with PASOK, the reaction of the political parties of the opposition and the discontent of considerable segments of public opinion. All of them, to a more or lesser degree, rejected the proposed reform initiatives as neo-liberal (Kazakos, 2004: 909-912) and thereby achieved the framing of the debate in their favour. The labour market reform 'was widely regarded as failing to address [its] key weaknesses' (Papadimitriou, 2005: 382). The health care reform was modified largely (Mossialos & Allin, 2005: 431-432). The social security reform was completely blocked in the face of large demonstrations organised by the trade unions associated with PASOK (Kazakos, 2010: 98-107; Lyrantzis, 2005: 251; O'Donnell and Tinios, 2003: 268-269). The only area in which governmental policy was considered to be a successful one was in the field of public security, with crime rates reaching a record low and the members of the infamous left-wing terrorist group 'November 17' being arrested after decades of trying (Karakousis, 2006: 399-408; Loulis, 2004: 141).

Nevertheless, in September 2003 a few months ahead of the 2004 national elections Simitis made an effort to reignite his plan to promote the convergence of Greece with the European standards. In a press conference held in Zappeio Mansion, he presented a new, solid political programme called the 'Convergence Charter', which would include specific economic and social policy targets for the next four years like high growth rates 2-3 per cent over the average growth in the European Union and the reduction of the unemployment at the 7 per cent up to 2006 (Kazakos, 2010: 124-125). Yet the 'Convergence Charter' failed to switch the agenda and to send a clear and convincing message to the public opinion, since it was seen as hardly credible (Kazakos, 2010: 125; Loulis, 2007: 313-314).

## **2.6 Simitis' public appeals**

The fifth component of the permanent campaign strategy consists of public appeals. The latter is a key component of the election campaign as well. As Papathanassopoulos has pointed out, 'in the 1996 elections Simitis adopted new forms of campaigning like nationwide "bus-tour", precinct walks, and televised debates with the main opposition leader, TV interviews and only one major rally in Athens (2007: 130). Moreover, nationally televised debates are considered as significant as any other media event. The first, ever, televised debate between the party leaders of PASOK and ND, Simitis and Evert respectively, took place during the 1996 national election campaign, in September 1996. The second debate between Simitis and Karamanlis, Evert's successor in the ND's leadership post, was held during the 2000 general elections (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 62-65). Simitis' campaign tactics and especially his participation in these debates contrasted clearly with the political and communicative style of the late Andreas Papandreou who 'had refused to participate in televised debates with his then opponents, citing personal dislike' (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 133).

Once in office, Simitis continued to use campaign-like tactics in order to get his message across. Following Kernell's approach (1997), Simitis as Prime Minister delivered both major and minor public addresses adopting new forms of campaigning (see Appendix B). He gave two televised interviews that were broadcast 'live' both by the national broadcaster and simultaneously by private television networks. The first television interview was held in March 1997 and was conducted by journalists from the public broadcasting company *EPT* and the private television stations *Mega Channel* and *Ant1 TV*. The second was given in the middle of the second term, in April 2002, to journalists from the public television network *NET* and the private television networks *Mega Channel*, *Ant1 TV*, *Alpha TV* and *Star Channel*. Furthermore, from January to June 1999 Simitis gave four televised interviews. He appeared twice on the political talk show *Time of Truth* on the *Ant1* television network on the 25<sup>th</sup> of January and on the 10<sup>th</sup> of June; he also appeared on *The Black Box* talk show on *Mega Channel* on 25<sup>th</sup> of February and on the public television network *NET* on the 1<sup>st</sup> of June. In addition, Simitis appeared on *The Protagonists* talk show on the public broadcasting network on 5 June 2002. Moreover, among the major addresses of Simitis were interviews to the national press and magazines as well as signed newspaper articles mainly on European policy issues.

Apart from major addresses, Simitis also devoted a considerable amount of time into making public appeals to special audiences and political journeys around the country for the promotion of his government's policy (Mitropoulos, 2000; Simitis, 2005: 511). As Paschalidis notes, Simitis made public appearances at special events, prepared and organised by his communication staff, in order to make specific announcements on government initiatives, such as during the presentation of public works, visits to public services, schools and hospitals (2010: interview with the author). For example, in 2002 Simitis went 24 domestic political tours outside Athens, delivering speeches in front of local audiences (see Appendix B). Some newspaper journalists regarded this tactic as an indication of a permanent campaign approach (Mitropoulos, 2000).

In the election campaign of 2000, Simitis was the first party leader who gave an online interview (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 134). In the aftermath of the election, he was the first Prime Minister to make use of the new media, including the primeministerial website in 2002, in order to communicate his message directly to the people. The website imitated the form of a campaign pamphlet. It offered information on the activities of the prime minister and access to government services. It gave information about the Maximos Mansion where the Office of the Prime Minister is situated. It provided citizens with the ability to communicate directly with the prime minister via e-mail. It published a newsletter for children on the architecture of the primeministerial office and, finally it included a full list of primeministerial speeches, statements, articles, press releases and briefings.

In spite of his frequent communication activity, it must be mentioned that the overall number of his major televised interviews was actually quite low. In the eight years of his tenure, he gave only eleven television interviews, four of which were during the election campaign of 2000, two during the second term and four during the first term (especially during the first half of 1999). The apparent unwillingness of Simitis to give more televised interviews may be attributed to his poor communication style. Simitis was never regarded as a telegenic politician with rhetorical skills (Featherstone, 2005: 227; Loulis, 2007: 298; Pretenteris, 1996; Protopapas, 2010: interview with the author; Reppas, 2010: interview with the author). Another reason, why Simitis gave only few televised interviews is related to his own perception that this communication activity exerts a weak impact on public opinion, because it fails to shift the focus of public attention on the real issues and political substance (Simitis, 2011: interview with the author).

A third reason is related to his intention to distance himself from the every-day process of communication. According to Kousoulis:

‘Simitis preferred to communicate his message in a more structured and complete way, and in my opinion, his preference was correct. He preferred giving speeches in Parliament and at

press conferences, and in general, he wanted to be part of a more elaborate communications frame. He would avoid the drop-in appeals and sound-bites. He wanted to keep his distance from the mass media and he achieved that. I think it was to his benefit' (2009: interview with the author).

Hence Simitis delivered several speeches at party conventions, made numerous parliamentary addresses, especially during the so-called 'Hour of the Prime Minister' when he gave responses to specific questions posed not only from the leaders of the political parties that belonged to the opposition but also from members of all parliamentary groups (Simitis, 2005: 491). All of these public appearances received coverage both by public and private television and radio networks. At this point, it should be noted that from 1999 onwards the official television channel of the Greek Parliament covered the transmission of parliamentary speeches and debates<sup>2</sup> as well.

Simitis also gave several press conferences in several occasions, such as his address to the foreign correspondents corps in Athens, after each of the European Council meetings in Brussels as well as in the context of the annual International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki (Simitis, 2005: 511). Public and private television and radio networks broadcast the latter simultaneously. As Pantagias has pointed out, the press

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<sup>2</sup> The Television Station of the Hellenic Parliament is operating since 1999 as an autonomous television network, a non-profit mass medium. Administratively, it is an organic unit of the Hellenic Parliament placed hierarchically under the Speaker of the Parliament. (...) Within its mission the Station of the Parliament has as the main content of its Program the broadcasting of all the sittings of the Plenum, the Standing Committees (previously recorded), the Recess Section of the Parliament (Summer Session) as well as part of the works of the other parliamentary committees (<http://www.hellenicparliament.gr/Enimerosi/Vouli-Tileorasi>).

conferences gave Simitis the opportunity to explain in plain and convincing words, his policy (Pantagias, 1998: document obtained by the author).

In parallel, most of his advisors shared the view that the domestic political trips or visits (minor addresses) inside and outside Athens were the best tactic for Simitis to deliver his message and communicate his policies (Pantagias, 2009: interview with the author; Protopapas, 2010: interview with the author; Reppas, 2010: interview with the author). The travels across the country were usually planned in response to an event such as opening hospitals, highways and public works in general. In this way, Simitis strengthened his image as the one of an effective leader who produces work while being close to the people, since he even visits them in their homes (Hitiris, 2010: interview with the author; Pantagias, 2009: interview with the author).

## **2.7 The impact of Simitis' permanent campaign**

In terms of the impact of Simitis' campaigning style of governing on his popularity, a review of the primeministerial public appearances demonstrates a considerable and an extensively consistent attempt on his part to woo public opinion. According to empirical evidence (see Table 1), Simitis delivered both major and minor addresses. Yet, it appears to have put more emphasis on minor addresses, including speeches delivered in front of special audiences inside Athens, as well as political trips throughout the country. In this section, the study explores the effect of Simitis' intensive campaigning throughout on his public approval his tenure. It is achieved by examining whether a correlation exists between the number of cumulative major public addresses and the popularity ratings, as well as between the number of minor public addresses and the primeministerial popularity ratings on regular basis. The major and minor primeministerial appearances are considered the independent variables, while the primeministerial popularity is considered the dependent variable. As it has already been mentioned, correlation does not imply causation. Even if very



strong relationships occur between two variables, their observed relationship might be attributed to a third, unknown intervening variable. However, correlation means that changes in one variable are related to changes in another variable or that variables co-vary together and as a result it is possible to infer about the impact between them on a theoretical basis.

In this case, the findings suggest that both major and minor addresses constituted the weakest strategy to persuade the public. In particular, the results indicate that there is a negative and little, if any, association (Pearson: - 0,018) between major addresses and primeministerial approval, which is also statistically insignificant (sig.: 0,927). Yet, between the minor addresses made by Simitis and his popularity there is a weak-moderate positive correlation (Pearson: 0,433) which is also statistically significant (sig.: 0,024). Although there is no relationship between the major appeals and the Simitis' popularity, it can be concluded that there is a relationship between the number of minor public appeals made by Simitis and his public approval ratings and this finding is not just the result of chance alone since it is statistically significant. However, the strength of the relationship is weak - moderate. Furthermore, although the impact of minor addresses appears to have been stronger than the impact of major addresses on Simitis' approval ratings, the overall effect of the permanent campaign on his approval is weak.

Consequently, Simitis' campaign activities mostly failed to influence positively his public approval ratings. Moreover, it failed to sustain public approval given that the latter was not consistent over time. From February to October 1997 Simitis' popularity was over 55 per cent. In February 1998 it dropped to 50 per cent and until May 1999 it remained below 50 per cent. Nevertheless, in September 1999 it started climb again, reaching 58 per cent and remaining close to the level of 60 per cent up to the parliamentary elections of April 2000. From the election day until October 2000 the primeministerial public approval rating showed a slight fall (54 per cent) until its sharp

decline in March 2001 (48 per cent), staying at a level below 50 per cent until September 2001. Yet, as of November 2001, his public approval rating rose again exceeding the 50 per cent and remaining at that level until Simitis' resigned from the party leadership in January 2004. Given the weak effect of primeministerial appeals to the public, the ups and downs of Simitis' personal approval may be attributed to other factors, in line with the relevant empirical studies in the US and UK literature. Hence, it is apparent that other independent variables or other factors affected and predicted the primeministerial popularity. Even though the examination and analysis of other factors influencing the primeministerial popularity exceeds the scope of this study, chapter six discusses to a certain extent possible explanations for the evolution of Simitis' public approval. Among the contributing factors are the issues dominating public agenda, the state of the economy, internal or external crises and government performance.


**Table 1:** Public approval of Simitis and primeministerial major and minor addresses to the public

Date	Overall PM Approval (%)	Major	Minor
Feb '97	55	11	3
Apr '97	59	6	9
June '97	55	3	4
Oct '97	61	8	2
Feb '98	50	8	2
Apr '98	45	3	0
Jun '98	46	8	2
Nov '98	47	9	18
Feb '99	45	6	5
May '99	46	11	2
Sep '99	58	10	16
Nov '99	54	2	6
Feb '00	63	6	14
Mar '00	59	3	8

Apr '00	58	14	14
Jun '00	51	10	6
Oct '00	54	3	3
Mar '01	48	8	5
May '01	42	3	0
Jul '01	45	9	0
Sep '01	48	3	3
Nov '01	54	7	1
Feb '02	52	13	3
Jul '02	49	23	9
Nov '02	52	7	6
Mar '03	52	5	0
Jun '03	51	5	1

Sources: Metron Analysis polls and Prime Minister's webpage

**Table 2:** Simitis' popularity ratings 1996-2004



Sources: Metron Analysis polls

## **Conclusion**

Prime Minister Simitis followed the permanent campaign trend. He expanded the political communication structures of the Prime Minister's Office and collaborated with communication experts, mainly pollsters and strategists, even if some of them were not affiliated to the party. He used polling data in order to shape his political strategy rather than to formulate his government policy and presentation. He used a campaign-like message as a motto of his government policy during his first term; however, he failed to formulate a label for his policy plan in the second term. Apart from the use of traditional public appeals, such as parliamentary addresses and speeches at party events and press conferences, Simitis exploited television and the internet in order to get his message across and mobilise public support, although he did not rely on this kind of communication quite so often. He preferred to give minor addresses while on (numerous) domestic political trips. Finally, despite his continuous effort to woo public opinion, his public appearances hardly affected his primeministerial approval ratings, something that suggests that other factors exerted influence on his popularity.

## **Chapter 3**

### **The permanent campaign of Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis**

Prime Minister Kostas Karamanlis followed the permanent campaign strategy more clearly than his centre-left predecessor did. He sought to enhance the efficiency of the communication machinery in order to ensure the smooth coordination of government communications. Political journalists and strategists dominated not only his election campaign staff, but also his government communication staff. He relied heavily on opinion polls and especially on focus groups in order to make political decisions. He made several direct public appeals, particularly live televised addresses from the Primeministerial Office, to get his message across. During his first term he applied the technique of formulating campaign-like message, which was used repeatedly as a motto to promote his government plan, while he failed to do so during the second term. In addition, as findings suggest, even though he delivered several public addresses in an effort to influence public opinion in his favour, he failed to exert considerable influence on popularity ratings. Consequently, it may be appropriate to consider that other factors affected his primeministerial popularity.

This chapter is structured as follows. Section one discusses Karamanlis' political background. Section two addresses the function of the government's communication apparatus. Section three analyses the role that communication professionals played in the Karamanlis' communication team. Section four examines the use and impact of polling upon governmental strategy and policy. Section five explores the extent in which Karamanlis used campaign-like messages throughout his tenure. Section six outlines the public appeals of Karamanlis. Section seven measures and interprets the impact that Karamanlis' campaigning efforts had upon his public approval.

### **3.1 The political background of Karamanlis**

Karamanlis is a member of a political dynasty. He was the nephew of the founder of the New Democracy party and former Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis, who governed the country for seven years from 1974 to 1980 before being elected President of the Hellenic Republic. Karamanlis junior served in the ideological sectors of the party from 1984 to 1989. In the general election of 1989, he was elected Member of Parliament for the Thessaloniki district. In the aftermath of the second consecutive defeat of ND by PASOK in the parliamentary election of 1996, Karamanlis put forward his candidacy for the party's leadership, backed by the traditional, conservative, right-wing faction of ND, which represented the majority of the party's MPs.

He managed to get elected president of the party, defeating his rivals who were prominent and experienced party cadres, such as the former leader of the party Miltiadis Evert, the moderate George Souflias who was backed by the liberal faction within the party, and the ultra-conservative Byron Poludoras (Loulis, 2011: 148-150). The decision of the party's electorate to vote for Karamanlis was seen as related to his personal image (Loulis, 2011: 152). More specifically, as Pappas and Dinas have noted, 'at election time, Karamanlis was young (in his forties) and inexperienced (never having held any ministerial post); on the other hand, he was not personally burdened by the negative aspects of his party's past' (2006: 421).

On taking over as leader, Karamanlis saw himself confronted with two crucial challenges: to repair the damaged image of New Democracy and to unify the party in order to overcome the divisions brought about by the intra-party election process. Restoring the party's image meant in concrete terms that Karamanlis would embark on an effort to open up New Democracy to the centre of the political spectrum so as to attract the median voter needed to secure victory in a new parliamentary election. At the same time, Karamanlis while being in opposition appeared to have implemented a

form of permanent campaign strategy. First, soon after his rise to the party leadership in 1997, he created ‘a small, in-house team of communication experts and political analysts to whom he entrusted the planning of ND’s future strategy (...) [and] the party’s electoral campaigns in both 2000 and 2004’ (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 489). In addition, in the aftermath of 2000 national elections, Karamanlis appointed the political journalist Rousopoulos as party’s spokesperson who reorganised the whole communication apparatus of the party, setting up a mechanism of media monitoring and a digital archive (Kottakis, 2011: 327). More specifically, as Rousopoulos has put it:

‘I formulated four communication groups. The first group, consisting of 7-8 people, was responsible for the creation, management and function of the digital archive of the party. The archive was filled with statements and speeches of the PASOK’s government officials that could enable the Leader of the New Democracy party and ND’s deputies to counterattack governmental arguments easily. The second group consisted of 7-8 people as well and was acting as the media-monitoring unit of the party’s communication apparatus. It monitored all TV and radio news broadcasts and the collected material was categorized based on specific coding, allowing for the issues to be identified as relating either to the New Democracy party whilst being in Opposition or to the respective Ministries whilst Karamanlis and ND were in power. The third group comprised of speechwriters and former journalists, responsible for the elaboration of communication documents entailing the party’s policy positions on all issues. These documents were written in a journalistic language, yet with a political logic, and were sent to the ND’s deputies in the Greek Parliament, ND’s MEPs, party officials around the country and political journalists. Thus, everyone was aware of the party line. The fourth group, consisting of two people, was placed in the Press Office. These officials were responsible for reading the newspapers early in the morning and writing summaries of the press (press reviews)’ (2012a: interview with the author).

In parallel, Karamanlis sought to exert centralised control over party’s communications, coordinating the message communicated by party officials. As

Rousopoulos explains, during the period of opposition, he organised a seminar in Athens for the party cadres in the region in order to inform them of the communication policy of the party and the way this would work (2012a: interview with the author). According to the new communication policy, all of the party organisations around Greece would receive daily communication material with the positions of New Democracy concerning all possible issues. The material was also given to all MPs and all Members of ND in the European Parliament and to all reporters. In a way he ensured that most, if not all of the party members, were transmitting the same message (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author).

Second, Karamanlis collaborated with communication professionals. A striking example of a communication expert assisting him was the strategist John Loulis, who is perceived as the architect of the middle-ground strategy applied by Karamanlis in order to modernise his party's image (Yannas, 2001: 7). Loulis was political analyst and communication strategist as well as co-owner of the consulting firm *STR* (Chiotis, 2007c; Loulis, 2004: 15). Additionally, Loulis he was a political columnist in the leading Greek economic daily *Imerisia* and centre-right daily *Eleftheros Typos*, while between 1981 and 1996 he published articles in the *Wall Street Journal*. He has also published several books, analysing Greek politics and particularly the political strategies applied by the main Greek parties PASOK and ND as a means to take over and maintain power. He derived the empirical material from opinion surveys and mostly focus groups he had himself conducted.

Even though he had served as director of the centre-right think tank, *Center of Political Research and Information*, which appeared to have links with the New Democracy party, presented himself as an independent expert. In his book *The end of a dominance: How and why PASOK lost the elections* (published in 2004), he states that 'my participation as a technocrat in the strategic communication of ND is well-known. However, it is also well-known that I have never been a party member and I do not seek to involve myself in party politics', adding that he had analysed Greek



politics ‘from a centrist political perspective which represents [my] views’ (2004: 15). Moreover, in a 2007 interview to the newspaper *To Vima*, Loulis noted that ‘I am an independent political analyst and technocrat in the communication sector. I am trying to express my views freely and soberly’ (Chiotis, 2007c).

Another example of communication professional in Karamanlis’ staff was, as it is said, the political journalist Theodoros Rousopoulos serving as party’s spokesperson for four years (2000-2004). Rousopoulos was a prominent and experienced political journalist who had worked for 17 years in leading national newspapers, such as the centre-right *Mesimvrini* and *Sunday Kathimerini* and the left-leaning *Sunday Eleftherotypia*, at the radio station *Athens 98.4*, on the national television network *Mega Channel*, presenting the weekly talk show *7+7*, and on the national television network *Star Channel* (Ravanos, 2008a; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Rousopoulos was also regarded as a party outsider given the fact that he became a party member in 2001, a year after taking over the ND’s press office (Ravanos, 2008a). This is one of the reasons, why his appointment gave rise to widespread criticism from right-wing cadres, partisan press and pro-conservative political journalists. The latter saw him as a ‘foreign body’ within ND, accusing him of having criticised the government of ND in the period 1990-1993 in his capacity as a journalist as well as of having left-leaning affiliations (Kottakis, 2011: 329). Another reason might be related to the fact that Rousopoulos assumed a prominent post within the party, exercising power next to Karamanlis, without being a ND deputy or even a party figure.

However, Karamanlis insisted on his choice. According to George Kurtzos, prominent journalist and editor-in-chief of the conservative newspaper *Eleftheros Typos*, Rousopoulos was in fact a choice of Vardis Vardinogiannis. The latter is a powerful entrepreneur – owner of oil industries, banks, shipping companies and media, such as the national newspaper *Mesimvrini*, the nationwide television network *Star Channel* and main stakeholder of the nationwide television station *Mega Channel*, who

appeared to have close ties to the New Democracy party (2003: 231-233). However, even though Rousopoulos had worked for the media owned by Vardinogiannis, it is hard to claim that he was suggested or selected by the media baron for the position of party's and government's spokesman. The most probable scenario is that Rousopoulos was chosen, as Loulis has suggested, because he fitted in with the middle-ground strategy since he was considered a moderate personality, appealing to the centrist voters who Karamanlis needed in order to increase his electoral prospects (2004: 320). Given that the majority of the Greek media were left-leaning, it could well be assumed that Karamanlis needed a professional journalist with work experience in those media in order to improve ND's relations with media owners and ensure a positive or at least less negative coverage.

The third component of Karamanlis' permanent campaign as opposition leader was the use of opinion polling and focus groups to formulate party strategy. Based on an analysis of opinion polls and focus group findings, Karamanlis' strategist, Loulis argued that from the 1990s onwards a large part of left-leaning voters had abandoned socialist and statist policies and had shifted to the centre of the political spectrum, due to the collapse of 'real socialism', the subsequent erosion of ideologies and the weakening of party identification (2001: 57; 2007: 280). However, as Loulis adds (2007: 344, 349-357), middle-ground voters are not liberals. They are pragmatists who reject traditional ideological cleavages between right and left and/or liberalism and socialism. In addition, they disapprove of partisan polarisation and verbal extremities and they advocate policies that combine free market principles with social cohesion. They put emphasis on the leaders' personality, assessing them according to their efficiency and credibility and favouring a moderate political and rhetorical style. Since that ND was perceived by public opinion as a right-wing and socially insensitive party, it had to radically change its image in order to appeal to the middle-ground voters and become electable after having suffered two consecutive electoral defeats in 1993 and 1996 (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 482). As Loulis put it, 'ND was a faded

product' (2007: 307) that had been tested during the past 20 years and was rejected in most cases.

In line with his consultants' suggestions and the insights obtained through the analysis of polling data, Karamanlis put in place a middle-ground strategy aimed at modernising the party's image and reaching the median voter. He projected ND as the party of the 'middle ground' standing above the left-right cleavage, abandoning the loaded terms 'right-wing' and 'centre-right' and putting emphasis not only on policies of economic efficiency, but also on a number of social issues, such as healthcare, education, social security and public security (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 484). His attempt was to renew ND's political platform and to achieve the necessary synthesis of liberal and socialist policies. According to Loulis:

'Acting strategically, Karamanlis implemented his own triangulation (like Clinton and Blair), at the same time abandoning the Right-Left continuum and moving towards a moderate and pragmatist middle ground. As a result, both the terms 'Center-right' and 'liberal' were abandoned (...) The triangulation of Karamanlis, avoiding all '-isms', allowed him to credibly combine a socially conscious profile with free market principle' (2007: 330-331).

Karamanlis also attempted to deliver a consistent with his strategy message, which was repeated throughout his tenure as opposition leader. At the 7<sup>th</sup> National Convention of ND in December 1998, for the first time he stated that, 'New Democracy is the party of the middle ground (..) having distanced itself from the ideological cleavages of the past and the old-fashioned political labels' (quoted in Bratakos, 2002: 795-795). At the Extraordinary Congress of Principles and Positions of March 2000 he repeated that ND is 'the calm power of the middle ground that represents liberalism with a human face (..), [it] can embrace all citizens and through dialogue, it can produce a synthesis of divergent positions' (Bratakos, 2002: 863). Furthermore, in the run-up to the 2004 general election in an interview with the *Financial Times*, Karamanlis sought to strengthen the centrist image of the party by

making a bold statement that ND is ‘definitely not a right-wing party’ (cited in Loulis, 2004: 316).

Consistent with the ‘middle ground’ strategy and his effort to alter ND’s negative right-wing image were Karamanlis’ public appearances, the fifth element of non-stop campaigning. In particular, he portrayed himself as a human and sensitive leader, who cares about real people and is willing to solve problems related to people’s everyday lives, in order to persuade the electorate that ND is a moderate party more sensitive than PASOK (Loulis, 2004: 317; Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 491). As a result, in his public addresses, Karamanlis focused on issues like healthcare, education, social security, unemployment and public security. Especially, after the 2000 election, he made sudden visits to hospitals and public agencies in order to attract media and public attention to their problems, as a way to dominate the media agenda and thus generate negative publicity for the government (Kottakis, 2011: 327; Loulis, 2004: 131). As Rousopoulos has illustrated:

‘A few months after assuming duties as party spokesman, around December, I realised that whatever we did, whatever political initiative, we were taking, the national TV and radio networks, except for the public broadcasting, did not pay any attention, probably due to the fact that the PASOK’s government enjoyed high popularity. So I suggested an alternative communication strategy to Karamanlis that aimed at bypassing the big media and at promoting our messages. First, we sought to have meetings and contacts with regional media. Second, we planned sudden visits to hospitals, schools and public agencies in order to set the media agenda by focusing public attention on the problems of everyday life, emphasizing the ‘human face’ of both the party and Karamanlis as well as generating negative publicity for the Simitis’ administration’ (2012a: interview with the author).

Another communication tactic applied by Karamanlis, during the 2004 election campaign, involved town hall meetings. As Rousopoulos notes, Karamanlis conducted

meetings with various social groups like youth, women, farmers and entrepreneurs in an attempt to come closer to the citizens (2012a: interview with the author).

At this point, it should be noted that the ‘middle ground’ strategy produced results, given that ND won both the local elections of 1998 and the European elections of 1999. In addition, even though it lost the 2000 general election by 70,000 votes, it managed to increase its vote share by 5 per cent, gaining 7 per cent of the middle-ground voters (Loulis, 2007: 307-308). In the aftermath of the election, Karamanlis, staying true to the same course, altered ND’s image by persuading public opinion – according to opinion surveys and focus groups – that the party had shifted to the centre (Loulis, 2004: 126-127). As a result, ND won the local elections of 2002 and the national election of 2004, taking 45.4 per cent of the vote to 40.5 per cent secured by PASOK and 165 seats compared to 117 for the socialists (Kassimeris, 2004: 943; Nikolacopoulos, 2005).

Once in office in 2004 Karamanlis continued to implement the permanent campaign strategy. As Pappas and Dinas have pointed out:

‘Whereas electoral campaigns were previously seen as last-ditch efforts to enhance an already tarnished party image, now they simply became the peak points of a continuous strategy designed both carefully and a long time ago. Today, with ND in government, the core of the same team is still in place, and coordinates the party strategy with a view to the next elections, and beyond’ (2006: 490).

### **3.2 Government institutions of public outreach**

Once in government, Karamanlis continued to use party’s communication apparatus. The latter continued to function in an auxiliary capacity to government communication including four communication groups: the group of people responsible for the management of the party’s digital archive, the unit of media monitoring, the group

consisted of speech-writers and former journalists responsible for the elaboration of communication documents entailing the government's policies in order to provide all party and government officials with the government line on all issues and the group of former journalists members of the Press Office responsible for the preparation of the daily press reviews (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author).

In parallel, Karamanlis put emphasis on the function of the primeministerial communication apparatus. He retained the Press Office inherited by Simitis while he reorganised the communications machinery aiming to impose a centralised control and coordination across the different ministries resembling the centralised control having imposed in party's communications as opposition leader. An indication of centralised communication was the dissolution of the Ministry of Press and Media and the establishment of the General Secretariat of Information as well as the General Secretariat of Communication under the supervision of the Primeministerial Office and particularly the Minister of State (Law No. 3242/ 2004).

Another indication of centralisation was that the Minister of State, replacing the Minister of Press and Media, acted not only as governmental spokesperson, but also as primeministerial spokesperson taking also responsibilities of the Press Office. He took on activities such as coordinating government communications collaborating with ministers on communication issues, doing the daily media briefings, providing background information to the political correspondents, handling the relations of the Prime Minister with the press and media owners, preparing the major communication initiatives of the Prime Minister, participating in the political planning and acting as the link between the Prime Minister and ministers (Chiotis, 2004a ; 2007a; Kottakis, 2011: 326; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Also, Karamanlis strengthened the primeministerial communication apparatus by creating the position of Deputy Minister of State, who would act as government spokesman towards the

foreign press and media, mainly on European policy issues (Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author; Ravanos, 2007a).

After the 2007 national election, Karamanlis appointed another Deputy Minister of State as second government spokesperson in charge of the daily press briefings on minor governmental issues (Ravanos, 2007a). However, following the autumn 2008 government reshuffle, Karamanlis abolished the posts of Deputy Ministers of State, retaining only the Minister of State in his double capacity as primeministerial and government spokesman (Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author). The competences of the Secretary General of Information and Communication were transferred to the Minister of Interior (Ravanos 2008a). At the same time, Karamanlis kept in place the Press Office, mainly responsible for supporting the communication initiatives of the Prime Minister.

Centralised control over governmental communication was held to be a prerequisite for ensuring the effective coordination of government policy across departments. The effort to achieve this goal was evident in the functioning of the communication machinery. Every day at 07.00 a.m. the Minister of State, the Deputy Minister of State and the Secretary General of Information held a meeting with the heads of the ministerial press offices in order to shape the government communication agenda of the day and to coordinate the public statements of each ministry so as to ensure that none would be off-message.

In addition, government ministers were encouraged to appear on the morning news programmes on television and radio in order to defend the position of the government on issues related to their ministerial responsibilities. According to Rousopoulos, mainly these programmes were influencing the public agenda, so if the government managed to get its own messages into those programmes, it could influence public debate for the rest of the day (2012b: interview with the author). Moreover, Prime Minister Karamanlis had instructed ministers to avoid media appearances that were

irrelevant to their responsibilities in order to ensure that the government transmitted a coherent public message (Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author; Kottakis, 2011: 327; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author).

After this meeting, the Minister of State worked with his own communication advisory team on shaping communication policy and on developing ways of presenting government policy. The team consisted of the Deputy Minister of State, the Secretary General of Information, the Secretary General of Communication, government officials and party cadres with communication experience in day-to-day politics (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Following this meeting, at 10.00 a.m. Prime Minister Karamanlis had a meeting with his communication staff, composed of the Minister of State, the Deputy Minister of State, and the Head of the primeministerial Press Office and the Chief of Staff of the Maximos Mansion. The meeting's goal was to form the communication tactic of the day as well as to plan the long-term communication strategy of the administration.

During the Olympic Games, Karamanlis had established the so-called Crisis Management Committee, which included the Minister of State, the Deputy Minister of State, the Secretary General of Information, the Secretary General of Communication, the press officer of the Foreign Affairs Ministry as well as the aides of the Ministers of State (Ravanos, 2007a). The Crisis Management Committee was summoned one more time during the election period of 2007 in order to handle the Peloponnese forest fires crisis (Ravanos, 2007b).

At this point, it should be noted that the centralisation of government communication seemed to be feasible due to Karamanlis' dominance within his party and the subsequent lack of powerful intra-party opposition (Loulis, 2004: 125). He became party leader at the party congress of 1997, taking almost 70 per cent of the votes, although he faced three strong rivals – Evert (ND party leader up to 1996), Souflias (prominent and experienced party figure backed by the liberal wing of ND) and



Poludoras (representing the ultra-conservative faction within the party) (Kottakis, 2011; Voulgaris, 2008: 248). Moreover, the electoral victories in the 1998 local elections and the 1999 European elections as well as the marginal defeat of 2000 reinforced Karamanlis' position within the party. As a result, he managed to impose not only party discipline, but also communication discipline upon the party cadres (Loulis, 2004: 125).

### **3.3 The role of communication experts**

Turning now to the second element of Karamanlis' permanent campaign, the communication professionals who dominated the Karamanlis' staff in opposition years and the 2004 election campaign, followed him into office dominating the primeministerial staff as well. Loulis, strategist of Karamanlis in opposition, followed him in office conducting and analysing focus groups in order to provide consultancy services on matters of political strategy, policy and presentation (Chiotis, 2007c; Loulis, 2004: 15). According to Karamanlis' close aides, Loulis did not attend the communication staff's meetings, instead had private meetings with Karamanlis on a weekly basis, during which he mainly presented focus group findings and suggested political initiatives (Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Apart from Loulis, Dimitris Mavros, pollster and general director of the polling organisation *MRB*, continued to provide Karamanlis with opinion surveys and analysis of focus group throughout the primeministerial tenure (Kottakis, 2011: 176, 304).

Rousopoulos, who was appointed as Minister of State and government spokesperson in March 2004, was forced to resign from his ministerial post in October 2008. The reason was that he appeared to have been involved in a scandal over a shady land-swap deal between a Mount Athos monastery, called Vatopedi, and the Greek state (Rousopoulos seems to have been somehow connected to the head of the monastery

Mr. Efraim) (Chiotis, 2009a ; Ravanos, 2008a). Other former political journalists who joined the primeministerial communication apparatus were Evangelos Antonaros serving as Deputy Minister of State (2004-2008) and Minister of State (October 2008-September 2009) as well as Kostas Gioulekas, Deputy Minister of State (September 2007-October 2008) and Deputy Minister of Interior responsible for the media issues (October 2008-September 2009) (Chiotis, 2009a). Antonaros was employed for many years as a foreign correspondent in Europe, the Balkans and the Middle East on behalf of the media organisation *Axel Springer Verlag AG*. In addition, he served as President of the Correspondents of Foreign Press from 1994 to 2004. Gioulekas was a political journalist for 27 years working for the newspapers *Vradini*, *Macedonia*, *Thessaloniki*, the local radio station *FM 100* and the local television network *TV 100* (Ravanos, 2007a).

Rousopoulos, in his capacity as Minister of State, was considered to have been highly valuable to Karamanlis. The communication management of an environmental and state crisis, which occurred during the election campaign of 2007, serves as an indication of the significant role Rousopoulos played within the primeministerial staff. On the 24<sup>th</sup> of August, seven days after Karamanlis had called early elections, protracted forest fires broke out in the Peloponnese (Southwestern Greece), burning half-a-million acres of land, destroying numerous villages and causing more than 70 deaths (Dinas, 2008: 603; Gemenis, 2008: 97). Not surprisingly, the Prime Minister faced heavy criticism and came under scrutiny over his response to the fires, given that the public discussion focused on the state's incapacity to reduce the extent of the catastrophe, something that brought about fury and disappointment among the electorate.

At the time of the crisis, Rousopoulos was not in charge of the election campaign as he had been back in 2004, having resigned from the spokesperson's post. His resignation was attributed to the electoral law, according to which election candidates are allowed to make only a limited number of media appearances, and unlike in 2004 Rousopoulos

was now putting himself forward as a candidate for the Greek Parliament. However, once the crisis occurred, Karamanlis asked Rousopoulos to resume his position as government spokesman, asking him to take over news management and shifting him to the so called ‘ballot of State’ in which, under the electoral law, candidates are allowed to make an unrestricted number of media appearances (Kottakis, 2011: 180).

Once back in office, Rousopoulos replicated the model of the Olympic Games, doing daily press briefings and calling all the heads of the ministerial press offices to attend them (Ravanos, 2007b; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). In addition, he convened on a daily basis the Crisis Management Committee in order to coordinate government communications across ministerial departments. The daily briefing received ‘live’ coverage from national television networks, radio stations and websites, dominating the news agenda. Moreover, Rousopoulos made numerous public appearances on television channels and radio talk shows, defending the government’s management of the crisis, promoting policy initiatives aimed at helping the victims of the forest fires and contributing to the improvement of the government’s performance. Consequently, it is safe to assume that he managed to improve the government’s image after the chaos that followed the forest fires (Kottakis, 2011: 180).

Loulis has also been considered as exerting significant influence on Karamanlis’ political strategy. For instance, at the beginning of Karamanlis’ first term in 2004, Loulis came to realise that prime ministers should form their governments very carefully in order to avoid frequent and sweeping reshuffles, which would damage rather than improve the government’s image (2004: 327). Moreover, Loulis argued that ‘in case one or more ministers perform poorly, they must be replaced without an overall reshuffle taking place. We know that, every reshuffle confirms to the public that the government has failed in bringing about “impressive changes” and “new beginnings” ’ (2004: 328).

Karamanlis appeared to have followed Loulis' advice, since he reshuffled his government only twice during his five-year tenure (2004-2009). The first reshuffle happened in February 2006, introducing changes to the top echelons of five departments, including Foreign Affairs, Defence, Labour, Public Order and Macedonia-Thrace, leaving, however, the rest of the ministerial posts unchanged. The second reshuffle took place in January 2009 and even though it was more extensive than the previous one, it was marked by targeted changes in the Ministries of Finance, Development, Education and Public Order (Loulis, 2011; Triantafillou, 2009). In addition, even in the Karamanlis' administration, which was formed after the 2007 elections, ministerial changes were limited and targeted at particular departments, while retaining the same political executives in the Ministries of Finance, Interior, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Public Works.

Another example of Loulis exerting considerable influence is related to the decision of Karamanlis to call snap elections in 2007. In an interview with the newspaper *To Vima* on 22<sup>nd</sup> of April 2007, a year before the scheduled national elections of 2008, Loulis pointed out that:

‘the upcoming elections must be related to the state of the economy in which public opinion is mainly interested. Thus, it is the PM's responsibility to decide to call for elections before or after the budget's approval by Parliament [according to the Greek Constitution, the government budget receives parliamentary approval in December] (...) yet I have to stress that if the elections are taking place in October or November, this will not be seen as a sign of early elections by public opinion’ (Chiotis, 2007a).

After all, on the 17<sup>th</sup> of August 2007 in a live televised address from the Maximos Mansion Karamanlis stated that ‘formulating the new budget (...) requires a fresh and strong mandate, a strong parliamentary majority’ (Karamanlis, 2007). As a result, the early elections were set for the 16<sup>th</sup> of September 2007, ahead of the budget approval vote (Gemenis, 2008: 96).

### 3.4 The use of polling

Just as Simitis had done, Karamanlis monitored and used opinion surveys extensively, not only in Opposition and the election campaigns, but also during his governing tenures, in order to steer strategy, policy and presentation. Monitoring included not only polls published in the media, but also private polling. In collaboration with the polling firm *MRB* and the pollster Mavros, Karamanlis was informed in a systematic and regular way about the polling figures regarding voting intentions, expected electoral outcomes, views on current affairs, the preferences of the electorate and which leader would make the best Prime Minister (Chiotis, 2004b; 2006a; 2009b; Kottakis, 2011: 304). Karamanlis and his aides appeared to put great emphasis on the polling figures for primeministerial popularity, primeministerial job approval and suitability for the premiership post. The focus on those particular aspects was connected to the belief of Karamanlis' advisors that the Prime Minister was the most important political asset of New Democracy. As Loulis has suggested, voters make their decisions based mainly on leaders' personalities and Karamanlis had been evaluated as better qualified for the job than Papandreou, according to the leadership assessment poll figures as well as polls regarding the performance of the economy (Chiotis, 2007c; Loulis, 2007: 342-344).

Yet, unlike Simitis, Karamanlis also relied heavily on focus groups. In cooperation with the polling firm *MRB*, the consulting firm *STR* and the strategist Loulis, Karamanlis monitored on a weekly basis the focus group data as well as analysis concerning government image, primeministerial image, policy initiatives and particular issues like the impact of scandals on government's image (Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author; Kottakis, 2011: 148, 176). Furthermore, as Rousopoulos has noted, Karamanlis used polling evidence to assess of the candidates for the post of the President of the Hellenic Republic. In addition, Karamanlis appears to have used focus groups in order to shape political strategy, to make policy decisions and to decide the timing of political initiatives and public statements as well as to

frame messages to be communicated to the public (Chiotis, 2007b; Kottakis, 2011: 304). For example, as Rousopoulos has put it ‘we often use the findings of the focus groups in order to create policies, especially for those social groups where New Democracy had a low popularity rate, for example women’ (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author).

The emphasis placed on focus groups dated back to the opposition years. As it has been previously stated, Karamanlis attempted to modernise his party’s image by shifting it to the centre of the political spectrum in order to make it electable. The centrist strategy was largely based on the analysis of the undecided voters’ electoral behaviour through the conduct of focus groups (Loulis, 2001: 2007). It is therefore reasonable to claim that, given Karamanlis’ intention to follow the same centrist strategy once in office with the aim of increasing his prospects of re-election, he had to rely on the focus group mechanism. Furthermore, it is possible to argue that the Karamanlis administration, more clearly than any of its predecessors, was a poll-driven government. As Dinas has put it, ‘ND under Karamanlis’ leadership was probably the only government in the Third Greek Republic that systematically devoted so much of its resources to retaining its primacy in public opinion (..) this was a government that was more concerned with getting re-elected than with governing. Although this might seem a somewhat cynical argument, it is based on ND’s excessive use of opinion polls during all this period’ (2010: 397).

The impact of polls and focus groups was evident in various cases of government policy and presentation. First, the selection of candidates for the local elections of 2006 was based on voters’ preferences as indicated by various polls. Second, the selection of the next President of the Hellenic Republic was based on opinion surveys as well. Karamanlis tested the appeal of potential candidates from the centre-right and the centre-left of the political spectrum by exploring the features that the suitable nominee should possess (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Opinion polls indicated that Karolos Papoulias, senior party figure in PASOK, former Foreign

Affairs Minister and close ally of PASOK's founder Andreas Papandreou, enjoyed high public approval ratings (Chiotis, 2004b). At the same time, focus group data suggested that Karamanlis had to insist on the middle ground strategy and for this reason to avoid a partisan nomination. Instead, he should opt for a politician that would represent national unity. In the end, Karamanlis chose Papoulias as his nominee, gaining the support of the main opposition party PASOK in the process (Loulis, 2008: 83-85). Third, it seems that Karamanlis, taking the focus group analysis into consideration, decided to put forward the economic policy applied in 2004 in order to reduce the fiscal deficit in the form of a 'mild fiscal consolidation', since voters of the middle ground who had backed New Democracy in the previous elections disliked harsh austerity policies (Loulis, 2007).

Fourth, according to Kottakis, in the case of the reform of universities during the first term of Karamanlis' government, the National Council of Education initiated the discussions on the reform plan in January 2005. Giannakou, Minister of Education, promoted the policy plan in Parliament in July 2006, which brought reactions from students' unions and, to some extent, university staff unions (2011: 142). At that point, Karamanlis decided to postpone the plan until March 2007, not only because of the reactions, but also due to the fact that the focus group data indicated that public opinion did not think that a broad exchange of views between government, political parties, academics and students had taken place. Therefore, the necessary societal consensus on carrying out the reforms was lacking (Loulis, 2008: 186-187).

However, it should be noted that poll findings and focus groups did not always determine governmental policy. For example, towards the end of 2005, at a time when the government sought to privatise public corporations, over 60 per cent of public opinion backed the privatisation scheme. Yet, privatisations were not carried out in large part. As Loulis has suggested, most of the government officials and party cadres claimed that trade unions in the state-owned companies were well-organised

coalitions, controlling large groups of voters that would act according to their interests; therefore, if ND were to turn against them, it would lose thousands of votes (2007: 262). Even if this is true, the majority of public opinion was still polarised of privatisations. Thus, the expected electoral benefits of carrying out the reforms could compensate by far the anticipated electoral losses. Consequently, Karamanlis had good reasons to stick to it.

Nonetheless, he did not proceed with the reforms, due to six particular reasons. First, the political cost of clashing with organised interests, like public employees' unions, was highly certain and immediate. On the contrary, the potential political benefits in the long term appeared, according to the opinion polls, to be uncertain. The majority of public opinion, which may favoured the reforms, does not form a solid pressure group or, to put it in Olsonian (1982) terms, constitutes a poorly organised majority. The second reason is related to the nature of trade unions, which, as it is said, are powerful, and well-organised pressure groups, able to organise demonstrations, resort to strike action and disrupt everyday life. In addition, unions tend to deliver a populist left-leaning rhetoric in order to defend their interests. A populist left-leaning rhetoric in a populist left-leaning country is quite popular. Trade unions are, therefore, capable of influencing or changing voters' views about privatisations once a government decides to promote such schemes. Third, the former New Democracy administration (1990-1993) under Prime Minister Mitsotakis had attempted to promote privatisations, but had come up against widespread resistance from interest groups in the public sector, trade union leaders associated with PASOK and the majority of the Greek press (Kazakos, 2001: 473; Pagoulatos, 1994). The political costs suffered due to this struggle were largely perceived to have been one of the main reasons for the political defeat of ND in the national elections of 1993, with the party staying out of office for 11 consecutive years until 2004 (Loulis, 2007: 282-284). Thus, the party's past suggested the avoidance of a confrontational strategy against trade unions.



Fourth, New Democracy, in spite of being a centre-right party, had cultivated strong links to the trade union movement. Many MPs had secured their election thanks to the support of trade union members. They therefore had a stake in defending their constituencies. Fifth, the conservative, populist and statist wing of ND was majoritarian within the party, as compared with the liberal minority. Finally, as Antonaros noted, several party and government figures questioned the poll findings, expressing doubts over their credibility (2012b: interview with the author). Sometimes, as Wenzelburger has put it, ‘what counts instead is the way political actors perceive the risk of being punished and this perception might well be irrational’ (2011: 1156).

### **3.5 The central motto of Karamanlis’ permanent campaign**

During the 2004 national elections, Karamanlis communicated messages, which were used as labels in a repeated way throughout his campaign. For example, the central slogan of his advertising campaign was ‘the country needs political change’ (Alexandrou, 2007:10). Similarly, Karamanlis as Prime Minister sought to use messages, which had been formulated in campaign-like style, in order to symbolise his policy initiatives. The view of his close advisors was that he should communicate simple and short messages, which would be understood by all citizens (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). For the same reason obviously, according to Antonaros, Karamanlis’ speeches consisted of short sentences (2012b: interview with the author).

In particular, in the aftermath of the election, he announced that he intended to reexamine the public finance figures. The move was seen as an effort by Karamanlis to reveal hidden spending, which added to the fiscal deficit and the public debt; but at the same time, he seemed to abandon some of his electoral promises (Dinas, 2008: 602). In addition, it is safe to assume that by implementing the review on public

finances, the new government attempted to undermine the argument of the previous government, which had projected the country as a 'Strong Greece' (Kazakos, 2010: 137). The financial audit revealed that the previous Simitis' government had underestimated the fiscal deficit and the public debt. The deficit in 2003 had reached to 5.7 per cent and in 2004 had climbed to 7.5 per cent instead of the 1.7 per cent and 1.2 per cent estimated by the previous government respectively (Kazakos, 2010: 138). As a result, the European Commission activated the process of excessive deficit supervision, coercing the Greek government to take fiscal measures in order to bring down the deficit to 3 per cent of GDP (Gemenis, 2008: 95). Karamanlis then sought to formulate a plan of gradual fiscal consolidation, avoiding fierce austerity measures, which would generate acute social discontent. To this end, he promoted his policy by using the label 'mild fiscal adjustment', which marked his first term (Kazakos, 2010: 140-141; Loulis, 2008: 94-95).

However, Karamanlis' government was seen as lacking political direction. Opinion polls showed that he needed to define a coherent policy agenda and set a clear political goal beyond that of the consolidation of public finances (Loulis, 2008: 101). To this end, Karamanlis needed to promote a plan of widespread changes in the state and the economy. Based on polling data and focus groups evidence, Karamanlis used the term 'reforms' in order to label his new policy plan. According to Loulis:

'Karamanlis needed a motto that would give him the advantage in political communications terms (...) Focus groups suggested that public opinion was in favour of changes yet with the minimum social cost (...) Public opinion wanted moderate and sensible changes (...) [In this context] the term 'reforms' was regarded as the most suitable instead of the term 'structural changes' or the term 'cuts' (2008: 108-109).

Using this motto throughout his first term in office, Karamanlis put in place a reform plan. The latter included tax policy reform to reduce corporation taxes, tax breaks for

employees and pensioners, the privatisation of public corporations, the restructuring of public organisations, the deregulation of the labour market so as to encourage flexibility and reduce labour costs as well as the reduction of bureaucracy to ensure the efficient operation of public administration (Kazakos, 2010: 146-149). Moreover, at the beginning of 2006 Karamanlis began the process for reforming particular articles of the Greek Constitution in areas such as education, the judicial process, the protection of the environment, the protection of ownership and the quality of public services and finally transparency in public life. The cornerstone of the plan was the amendment of article 16, which prevented the foundation of private universities in Greece<sup>3</sup> (Kottakis, 2011). In the aftermath of the local elections, Karamanlis sought to keep public opinion focused on his reform initiatives. Hence, at the beginning of 2007 he put forward to parliament the plan for the reform of Greek universities, which was passed in March 2007 amidst widespread student demonstrations (Loulis, 2008: 192-193). Overall, Karamanlis managed to a certain extent to promote his reform initiatives and stick to his message, in spite of various corruption scandals that broke out throughout his first term generating negative publicity for the government and himself. (Dinas, 2008: 602; Gemenis, 2008: 95; Loulis, 2008: 133, 159-160). Therefore, towards the summer of 2007 he was about to set the terms of the election campaign by focusing public attention on the issue of reforms which was seen by his advisors as the strong card of the governing party (Loulis, 2008: 232).

However, a few days after Karamanlis had decided to call early elections, an environmental crisis broke out with fires raging in the Peloponnese, devastating forests and villages and causing more than 70 human casualties. The immense environmental, financial and human devastation dominated the agenda and forced

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<sup>3</sup> Karamanlis promoted the idea of setting up and running under the supervision of the State- non-governmental and non-profit universities as well as the establishment and operation of branches or departments of foreign State Universities or other recognized foreign institutions, in the same context and with exactly the same conditions (Kazakos, 2010: 150).

political parties to postpone their campaign activities (Dinas, 2008: 603). Initially it seemed that the political consequences of the crisis would be a fatal blow on government's re-election prospects. Yet, the implementation of the restoration plan helped Karamanlis to switch the agenda, maintaining the lead of ND over PASOK. Eventually, he managed to win his second consecutive election by taking 42 per cent, 4 percentage points ahead of PASOK. Due to the electoral system, ND enjoyed a marginal parliamentary majority of 152 out of 300 seats (Pappas, 2010).

In the aftermath of his electoral victory, Karamanlis sought to continue the promotion of reforms using the same motto as the first term. In particular, he concentrated on the promotion of reform initiatives like the privatisations of state-owned corporations and the social security reform (Loulis, 2011: 208). Yet, he failed to keep his policy direction and stick to his core message due to a series of corruption scandals which attracted public attention and the need to take new austerity measures to bring down the deficit since the gradual fiscal consolidation strategy proved to be as unsustainable (Kazakos, 2010: 163; Loulis, 2008: 209-213).

In addition, the breakout of the international financial crisis generated negative effects for the Greek economy deteriorating the banking system and consequently leading the economy into recession. In an effort to avert the deeper economic downturn, the ND government increased public spending (Kazakos, 2010: 165). Moreover, apart from the scandals and the financial crisis, the shooting and killing of a schoolboy in downtown Athens by a police officer initiated widespread riots throughout December 2008. Quickly, riots spread to cities all over Greece and caused the destruction of public buildings, banks and retail shops while there were also extensive looting and violence against police officers.

As a result, Karamanlis lost by 4 per cent the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009. On 3 September, Karamanlis called again for snap elections. He justified this action on two counts: the ongoing financial crisis and PASOK's public pledge that

it would cause automatic elections in early 2010 by blocking the re-election of Karolos Papoulias as President of the Republic (Dinas, 2010: 390; Loulis, 2011: 230-232). Although these two reasons were plausible, it is safe to assume that another reason why Karamanlis pursued early elections was that his administration lacked the political capital to apply painful austerity measures and bold structural changes and furthermore he was afraid of causing huge political damage on his party.

Karamanlis presented himself as the only one capable of dealing with the economic crisis by committing his government to three initiatives. Firstly, drastic reduction in public expenditure which included (among others) freezing the hiring of public employees for 2010, strict limitation of hiring for additional 2 years, freezing pensions and public sector wages, trimming for 2 years of the paid-overtime by 30 per cent. Secondly, the limitation of tax evasion and thirdly the application of large-scale structural changes (Pappas, 2010: 277). Karamanlis, eventually, lost the elections to PASOK and Papandreou by a wide margin of 10 per cent, taking only 33.5 per cent of the vote, the lowest in the party's history in national elections. He thereafter resigned from the post of party leader (Dinas, 2010: 394; Loulis, 2011).

### **3.6 Karamanlis' public appeals**

During the election campaign of 2004, Karamanlis participated in the televised debate with his rival, leader of PASOK George Papandreou. Also, he gave TV and radio interviews, press conferences, campaigned around the country delivering speeches and he participated in town meetings, receiving media coverage (Alexandrou, 2007: 10-15; Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 133; Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). However, as Prime Minister, Karamanlis gave few media interviews and press conferences to get his message across with the exception of the campaigns in the national, local and European elections.

Rather he focused mainly on the use of unfiltered public appeals. Karamanlis preferred the live televised addresses, mainly on crucial domestic and foreign policy issues, from the Maximos Mansion to contact the Greek people. The live televised addresses were transmitted at 8 pm at a time that all television broadcast news in Greece is programmed and thus he could reach the largest possible audience. As Antonaros has put it, ‘the properly prepared statements from the Prime Minister’s Office can highlight the leader’s specific weight’ (2012b: interview with the author). Additionally, he delivered speeches in parliament, to the parliamentary group of the New Democracy party and the various party conventions, which received ‘live’ coverage from the television network of the Greek Parliament, from the public broadcasters as well as by the national television networks of the private sector.

On the other hand, Karamanlis gave only those interviews that were imposed by institutional rules or political tradition. For example, the press conferences that European Heads of State and prime ministers usually give after the summits of the European Council or those that are given after the meetings of the Greek Prime Minister with other leaders during foreign travel. Another example is the annual press conference that traditionally follows the speech of the prime minister at the annual International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki. In terms of media interviews, Karamanlis gave very few, most of them during the election campaigns in the national and European elections (see Appendix C).

One reason why Karamanlis preferred to make direct appeals to the electorate rather than mediated addresses to the public is based on two assumptions that he and his advisors shared. First, the political capital of government was dependent on Karamanlis’ image. As long as Karamanlis maintained his positive image, the New Democracy party could improve its chance to win re-election. As a result, the main goal of the government’s communication strategy was to protect the image of Karamanlis. Thus, he had to avoid media interviews and journalists’ pressing questions, while at the same time pursuing well-prepared and targeted public

appearances (Dinas, 2010: 397). As Antonaros has claimed, ‘appearing relatively infrequently helped Karamanlis to protect his credibility. Moreover, a prime minister expresses his views via his spokesman or through speeches in Parliament or through a handful of targeted public addresses because in that way he can better amplify his message’ (2012b: interview with the author).

The second assumption was that some of his aides were seeing the political communication environment as centre-left leaning and thus hostile for a centre-right administration (Rousopoulos, 2012a: interview with the author). Therefore, following this communication tactic Karamanlis was able to control better the public agenda, avoiding the questions of political journalists who put more emphasis on politics and personalities rather than on policies and arguments. Thus, given the emphasis of Karamanlis on his public addresses to influence public opinion, a question is raised about the effectiveness of such strategy and more specifically the impact upon his own popularity.

### **3.7 The impact of Karamanlis’ permanent campaign**

Similarly with Simitis, Karamanlis devoted great amount of time and energy to influence public opinion. Empirical evidence indicates that he did both major and minor addresses to get his message across, though data suggests he relied more on the former than the latter (see Table 3). As it is said, parliamentary speeches, public addresses to party conventions, press conferences, media interviews and public appearances to special and local audiences were among primeministerial public appeals. In this section, the research considers the public appearances of Karamanlis as an indicator of his permanent campaign strategy and compares the number of his public appeals with his popularity ratings on a regular basis. Therefore, the study particularly explores whether a correlation exists between the permanent campaign

and the primeministerial public approval. Certainly, the correlation does not indicate necessarily causation. Yet in the case of a weak correlation between the two variables, it would be apparent that other factors have exerted influence on the primeministerial popularity.

The results from the analysis indicate that the continuing and consistent efforts of Karamanlis to affect public opinion through major and minor addresses failed to exert significant influence on his popularity. In particular, the findings show that there is a little negative, if any, relationship (Pearson: - 0,062) between the major addresses and Karamanlis' public approval which is also statistically insignificant (sig.: 0,813). In parallel, there is a negative weak association (Pearson: - 0,296) between the minor addresses made by the centre-right premier and his popularity. The latter indicates that there is a relationship between the number of minor addresses and Karamanlis' popularity ratings, yet this association is weak and statistically insignificant (sig.: 0,248), namely it occurred by chance.

As a result, Karamanlis' permanent campaign mainly failed to sustain public approval, given that the latter was not steady over the years. From May 2004 to February 2005 Karamanlis' public approval was between 60 and 69 per cent. In June of 2005 it declined to 57 per cent and remained below 60 per cent for six months. In March 2008 primeministerial approval ratings decreased to 48 percent, while by the end of 2008 they rose again to 52 per cent. However, from November 2008 to July 2009 they dropped sharply to 43 per cent before increasing again at the beginning of the election campaign of September 2009.

Since the permanent campaign has hardly affected the primeministerial popularity of Karamanlis, it is likely to claim that other forces shaped the premier's approval ratings. As stated, exploring these forces is beyond the goal of this study, despite an effort to examine the case of Karamanlis from this point of view. Assuming that the




popularity of Karamanlis was affected more by the content of his communication activities, the issues on which he made statements and the frame he used rather than his communication activities themselves, it is possible to offer some explanations related to the government initiatives and the issues, which dominated the public agenda.

**Table 3:** Public approval of Karamanlis and primeministerial major and minor addresses to the public

Date	Overall Approval (%)	PM	Major	Minor
May '04		69	12	0
Nov '04		66	19	12
Feb '05		60	16	8
Jun '05		57	16	9
Nov '05		55	21	5
Mar '06		55	11	5
June '06		54	10	8
Dec '06		57	20	5
Mar '07		53	3	4
Jun '07		52	8	11
Dec '07		52	25	22
Mar '08		48	9	3
Jul '08		48	21	9
Nov '08		52	11	3
Mar '09		42	26	7
Jul '09		43	15	23
Sep '09		51	1	1

*Sources: Metron Analysis polls – Webpage of ND*

**Table 4:** Karamanlis' popularity ratings 2004 -2009



*Source: Metron Analysis and ND's webpage*

## Conclusion

In line with his predecessor in the premiership, Karamanlis pursued the permanent campaign strategy. He sought to restructure the communication apparatus in order to ensure centralised control over government communication and to impose coherence in the content of messages across government departments. He appointed communication professionals to the posts of press spokespersons and consulted frequently with strategists and pollsters. Karamanlis also relied on polls and particularly focus groups to make important political decisions. He successfully labeled his government policy during his first term, yet he failed to do so in the second term. Finally, Karamanlis delivered public addresses to get his message across, mainly through 'live' televised appeals and unfiltered major and minor appearances rather than media interviews. However, as findings indicate, the primeministerial public addresses barely affected primeministerial popularity, which suggests that other

factors exerted influence on his popularity. Next chapter analyses the permanent campaign of the center-left premier George Papandreou.

## **Chapter 4**

### **The permanent campaign of George Papandreou**

In line with his predecessors, George Papandreou, who served as Prime Minister for two years from October 2009 until his resignation in November 2011, adopted the permanent campaign strategy with the intention of sustaining his personal popularity. Papandreou attempted to reorganise the communication units of the Primeministerial Office in order to improve the coordination of government communications. He collaborated with communication professionals like journalists and pollsters who had strong political affiliations with PASOK. He used private polling to steer government policy and its presentation, which was conducted by the party apparatus. He made a modest attempt to formulate and use campaign-like messages as mottos throughout his tenure. In the beginning of his tenure, he continued to use his election campaign motto and even though from February onwards he diverted into a complete different policy course, he still made an effort to use the same communication technique. Papandreou also made numerous public appeals, especially major ‘live’ televised addresses and he gave several interviews to foreign media. However, his public appeals failed to exert significant influence on his popularity ratings meaning that other factors may have affected the primeministerial approval figures.

The structure of this chapter is as follows. Section one discusses the political background of Papandreou. Section two examines the communication institutions of the PASOK government. Section three addresses the role of communication experts. Section four focuses on the use of private polling as a means to shape government strategy, policy and communication. Section five analyses Papandreou’s effort to communicate his message in a campaign-like mode. Section six outlines the public

appearances of Papandreou as means to vindicate his policy approach. Section seven assesses and interprets the impact of Papandreou's permanent campaign on his public approval ratings.

#### **4.1 The political background of George Papandreou**

As in the case of Kostas Karamanlis, George Papandreou is a member of a political dynasty. His father, Andreas Papandreou, was the founder of PASOK and Greece's Prime Minister for eleven years, from 1981 until 1989 and from 1993 up to his resignation in 1996. Moreover, the grandfather of George Papandreou, Georgios Papandreou, also served as Prime Minister in 1944 and from 1963 until 1965. George Papandreou entered Greek politics in 1981 as a PASOK deputy in the Achaia district. From 1981 onwards, he held several ministerial posts. He served as Deputy Minister of Culture in 1985, as Minister of Education in 1988, as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, as Minister of Education in 1994, as Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs (for the second time in 1996) and, finally, as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1999 to 2004.

Although a son of the founder of PASOK, on more than one occasion he expressed opinions deviating from and sometimes being even at odds with the party line. For example, Papandreou declared himself polarised of private radio stations and non-public universities that would operate on a non-profit basis. He also defended minority rights, he was polarised of the decriminalization of the use of soft drugs and supported the rapprochement between Greece and Turkey as the only viable route towards securing peace and prosperity (Pappas, 2010: 77; Lakopoulos, 1999). Another example of Papandreou distancing himself from his father's legacy is related to his stance in the party congress of 1996, which elected the new leader of PASOK after the death of Andreas Papandreou. Papandreou backed Costas Simitis, even though the

latter was largely perceived as being the most prominent intra-party rival of his father (Featherstone, 1997: 159; Pretenteris, 1996: 117).

In January 2004, Simitis resigned from his post as party leader announcing that he would not run for Prime Minister for a third consecutive term, backing instead George Papandreou as the new president of PASOK (Kassimeris, 2010: 944). Although Papandreou faced no internal rivals during the intra-party election process, which took place in February 2004, he introduced the process of open primaries for the election of party leader. One million people, members and friends of the party, participated in the process that would culminate in the election of the new leader of PASOK (Pappas, 2008: 181; Spourdalakis & Tassis, 2006: 503). In the election campaign, Papandreou sought to project himself as a new leader, not hesitating to clash with the negative aspects of the recent past, to transform his party and to promote radical changes in the whole country (Kassimeris, 2010: 945).

However, a combination of reasons weakened the image of Papandreou and PASOK, including financial scandals that occurred at the beginning of the election race, accompanied by the apparent failure of Papandreou to send a clear message to the electorate regarding his policy plans (Loulis, 2004: 240-253). Moreover, the structure of the ballots added to the notion of confusion within the electorate. The reason was they included politicians originating from the neoliberal right like Stefanos Manos and Andreas Andrianopoulos (former Ministers of ND's governments under Mitsotakis' premiership) as well as the post-communist Left such as Mimis Androulakis and Maria Damanaki (fierce opponents of Papandreou's father, Andreas Papandreou in the past) (Loulis, 2008: 265-270). The image of the party was largely negative due to the eleven years in government, marred by persistently high unemployment and inflation. As a result, the personal appeal of Papandreou was undermined (Kassimeris 2010: 946-950) and he did not manage to reverse the nationwide electoral trend. He lost the general elections to the New Democracy party under the leadership of Kostas Karamanlis by approximately 5 per cent (ND: 45.4 per cent; PASOK: 40.4 per cent).

In the aftermath of the election, Papandreou continued to lack a clear political strategy to deal with the ND government and Karamanlis. As Dinas has suggested:

‘from an early period of ‘friendly opposition’, combined with the appointment of new people in the party’s key positions, he gradually resorted to a polarising strategy which needed the old generation of the party’s political staff in order to be implemented properly. Neither strategy was very successful, and in combination with his rather evident deficiency in rhetorical skills, especially by comparison with his relatively charismatic, in these terms, opponent, it comes to no surprise that during the whole inter-election period the lead of ND was never seriously challenged’ (2008: 602-603).

Hence, on the 16<sup>th</sup> of September 2007, Papandreou was defeated for the second consecutive time by Karamanlis taking 38.1 per cent of the vote to 41.8 per cent for ND. On the night of the elections, Papandreou accepted responsibility for the second consecutive electoral defeat, though preparing the ground for the organising of an open primary and going public with his intention to ask the members of the party to renew their mandate for him. A few minutes after Papandreou’s statement, Evaggelos Venizelos, prominent party figure as well as former Minister in Andreas Papandreou’s and Costas Simitis’ governments, immediately declared that he would put forward his candidacy, thereby challenging Papandreou’s leadership. Two weeks later, another prominent party figure and former Secretary of PASOK, Kostas Skandalidis, also put forward his candidacy for the post of party leader (Gemenis, 2008; Loulis, 2011: 223-226).

As Dinas has noted, ‘early opinion polls among PASOK voters showed that Venizelos was in an advantageous position. Initially, important members of the party, who had been marginalised during the previous period, declared their support for the new candidate. Venizelos had also secured the support of almost all party-friendly media as well as the discreet but meaningful backing of the previous PASOK leader, Kostas Simitis (2008: 606). However, Papandreou reversed the trend and managed to be re-

elected as party leader. In the intra-party election set for 11 November 2007, Papandreou took 55.9 per cent of the votes, while Venizelos stood at 38.2 per cent and Skandalidis at 5.7 per cent (Dinas, 2008: 607-607; Gemenis, 2008: 99-100; Loulis, 2011: 222-224).

One factor accounting for Papandreou's victory was related to the existing model of party leadership selection. In a recent study, Lehrer (2012) claims that political parties respond to the median voter when office-motivated party members dominate the leadership selection, while they respond to the core supporters when the policy-motivated rank-and-file members dominate the leadership selection. Therefore, it is possible to argue that office-motivated members tend to vote for the candidate who appears to be the most capable of winning elections while the policy-motivated core supporters tend to vote for the candidate who appears to be the most capable of securing party unity and ideological clarity as preconditions for the return to power.

In the case of the intra-party elections of 2007, PASOK had run open primaries; the members and friends of the party had directly selected i.e. the leader of PASOK (Gemenis, 2008: 99). During the intra-party election campaign, the demarcation line between the two main candidates was clear. Venizelos projected himself as the most able to beat Prime Minister Karamanlis and bring PASOK back to power, while Papandreou set as a precondition for PASOK's return to power the ideological renewal of the party (Dinas, 2008: 607). Bearing in mind what has been previously stated, it may be appropriate to consider that Papandreou's plan rather than Venizelos' better reflected the intra-party electorate's priorities. As Simitis has pointed out, the election process of the leader straight from the party-base always works polarised of the populist faction inside the party and polarised of its representatives, such as Papandreou; having that in mind, if your name is Venizelos then you have no chance of winning (2010: interview with the author).



In the case of PASOK, the party had been out of power for only three years. Yet, its percentage vote share had not only fallen since the 2004 national elections, but had been the lowest since 1989 (Nikolacopoulos, 2005). Thus, in spite of the particularity of the leadership selection procedure, Venizelos could have won the intraparty election given that, as opinion polls suggested, at the beginning of the race, he had a clear lead over Papandreou and he was seen as the most capable of defeating Karamanlis and restoring PASOK to power (Gemenis, 2008: 99). Venizelos failed, because Papandreou's main argument in defence of his candidacy was that the causes of PASOK's electoral defeat lay with certain party officials and the left-leaning media that had undermined his leadership.

This approach was regarded as credible due to three reasons. First, Venizelos went public with his intention to be a nominee right after Papandreou announced his decision to renew his leadership mandate. Venizelos's move, as well as the fact that on the same night certain prominent party cadres announced that they would back him, was seen as a premeditated act. Second, on 17 September, a day after the announcement of the nominations, the nationwide television network *Mega Channel* and the *GPO* survey organisation published an opinion poll showing that Venizelos trailed Papandreou by 20 per cent in the intra-party race. Papandreou and his aides disputed the poll as unreliable, because it was conducted only one day after the announcement of the candidacies for the leadership of the party. Third, on September 18 the leading centre-left newspaper *To Vima* openly called in its front page for Papandreou to resign from the party leadership (To Vima, 2007).

In response to this, Papandreou in a televised address on 18 September turned against the newspaper and the media, arguing that:

‘We are on a collision course with those who want to dictate policies or enforce certain persons, as if they can bypass the will of the Greek people. We aspire to be politically independent. I will be loud and clear. No one can manipulate PASOK’ (Papandreou, 2007).

A few days later, the leading columnist of the newspaper *To Vima*, John Pretenteris, answered Papandreou’s accusations in his article:

‘Journalists, newspapers and the media in general are obviously not political parties in order to be able to elect leaders or to choose the type of the election process. Our obligation is to publish our opinions, our views, our analysis, our comments, with which each reader or viewer or listener could agree or disagree, but the content of these statements cannot always be in agreement with each reader/viewer/listener’ (Pretenteris, 2007).

However, Papandreou managed to set the terms of the debate in his favour. As Dinas has put it, this incident seemed to offer Papandreou the opportunity to project himself ‘as the candidate who will eventually reduce the influence of powerful media owners on the party’ (Dinas, 2008: 606).

Having renewed his party leadership, Papandreou began to apply strong opposition to Karamanlis’ government concentrating on corruption scandals, economic mismanagement and the incapacity of Karamanlis to deal with the implications of the international financial crisis on the Greek economy (Loulis, 2011; Pappas, 2010; Dinas, 2010). He won the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009 and a few months later, he won the early national elections of October 2009 by taking 43.9 per cent of the votes and enjoying a solid majority of 160 parliamentary seats. On the contrary, the New Democracy party suffered electoral defeat taking 33.5 per cent and only 91 seats in Parliament (Dinas, 2010: 394; Mavrogordatos and Marantzidis, 2010).

In parallel, Papandreou had to improve his party’s communications. There are some indications that, while being in Opposition, he engaged in a permanent campaign

process. First, he set up a media-monitoring unit within the party. In addition, Papandreou is the first party leader to create a mechanism within the party for the conduct and analysis of opinion surveys. In 2008, Papandreou decided that PASOK should have its own polling unit and should conduct its own opinion surveys (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author; Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). As a result, he asked the pollster Maria Karaklioumi to organise the whole operation. As she claims:

‘we used the call center of PASOK and we trained people in order to conduct telephone opinion polls. In addition, we established the appropriate mechanism to analyse the data. We were conducting two opinion surveys per week in order to monitor the trends of public opinion using samples of 300-400 people around the country. Under extreme circumstances, for example, in the case of the Head of Governments Summits where important decisions about Greece were imminent, we would conduct extraordinary telephone polls’ (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author).

One of the reasons why Papandreou decided to create his own polling mechanism inside the party’s headquarters was his apparent lack of trust in the polling companies and professional pollsters. For example, PASOK had a strong dispute with Karaklioumi's former employer, the *RASS* polling company, but Karaklioumi was salvaged due to her partisanship. A second reason is related to the incidents that took place during the general election of 2007. His aides had convinced Papandreou that PASOK would win the election, so they disputed the poll findings, which showed that PASOK was 3-4 per cent behind ND a few weeks before Election Day. For instance, Nikos Athanasakis, the party General Secretary, had a fierce dispute with the pollster Dimitris Mavros, head of the polling firm *MRB*, because the latter published polls showing that Karamanlis would win, gaining an outright majority in parliament and forming a single-party government (Hasapopoulos, 2007; Kottakis, 2011: 181-182).

As the close aide of Papandreou, George Elenopoulos argues, the incident seemed to reinforce the notion that pollsters in Greece are easily influenced by political opponents, media owners and governments since they are financially dependent on the state (2012: interview with the author). Although the private sector and consequently the polling companies in Greece are financially dependent on the state (namely they may need to receive government contracts in order to survive), the polling data regarding the national elections and the intra-party elections was credible. For instance, in the case of the intra-party election, all the polling firms indicated that Karamanlis trailed Papandreou at the beginning of the campaign, while Papandreou took the lead over Karamanlis around a month before the poll took place (Loulis, 2011: 224).

The second indication of Papandreou's permanent campaign was his collaboration with communication experts like the political journalist George Elenopoulos head of the press office and the pollster Maria Karaklioumi responsible for the functioning of the party's polling apparatus. Elenopoulos had worked for twenty years in various newspapers and at the radio station *Flash 96*, with the job of covering PASOK (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author; Kroustalli, 2009). For this reason, he was seen as capable of managing journalists and the press. A third indication was that Papandreou closely monitored public opinion trends and seemed to be influenced by them. For example, he selected the candidates for the local elections of 2006 relying on polling data (Tziovaras, 2010). Fourth, he made several public appeals, visited public agencies, hospitals and schools and participated in anti-government demonstrations aiming to highlight the problems of daily life and generate negative publicity for the government.

## **4.2 Government institutions of public outreach**

One of the indications of Papandreou's permanent campaign as Prime Minister is that he retained the party's communication apparatus. In particular, he continued to use the media monitoring unit and the opinion polling unit established in PASOK's headquarters in the opposition period (Karaklioumi 2012: interview with the author). As Elenopoulos has illustrated, an online media monitoring unit which would immediately issue statements throughout the day answering on any given topic on behalf of the government (2012: interview with the author).

In terms of the primeministerial communication institutions, Papandreou maintained the Press Office yet, in contrast with Karamanlis, he reinforced it by assigning the responsibility of handling the relations between the Prime Minister and the press (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author). Additionally, Papandreou retained the post of Minister of State and his deputy, yet the role of government spokesman was exercised by the Deputy Minister of State while the Minister of State was responsible for coordinating the members of the Council of Ministers. Moreover, the Deputy Minister of State had under his supervision the Secretariat General of Information and Communication (which resulted from the consolidation of the General Secretariat of Information and the General Secretariat of Communication) monitoring media content and updated all Ministries on issues that would occur (Koveos, 2009).

The communication staff of the Prime Minister held meetings on a daily basis, focusing on the agenda-setting procedure and the communication tactics of the day. The team consisted of the Head of the political planning office and the press office, the Government spokesperson, the General Secretary of Information and Communication, the Minister of State who acted as a mediator between the premier and the ministers, the Head of the Political office of the Prime Minister, the Head of the Political Office of PASOK, the General Secretary of the parliamentary group of PASOK and the Director of the parliamentary group of PASOK (Elenopoulos, 2012:

interview with the author; Koveos, 2009). The fact that several government officials and party figures participated in the primeministerial communication staff suggests that Papandreou sought to improve the coordination of government communication.

However, a year after the establishment and functioning of this communication group, Papandreou admitted that government communication needed to be further improved (Guardian, 2010). This was one of the reasons, why Papandreou reshuffled his government in September 2010 aiming to ensure better coordination of the communication apparatus. To this end, he created the ‘Group of Political and Communicative Planning’ comprising certain members of the Council of Ministers (the Greek Cabinet). More specifically, the members of the Group were: the Minister of the Interior, Decentralisation and e-Government, the Finance Minister, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Culture, the Government spokesperson and the Director of the PASOK’s parliamentary group (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author; Kroustalli, 2010). The Minister of the Interior was appointed Head of the Group, taking up the following responsibilities:

‘a. to plan the central, strategic, political and communicational tactics in order to promote the government affairs, which the Group is appointed with, and to observe their implementation, b. to call and participate, according to the PM’s order, in meetings between members of the government and Deputy Ministers and to committees and work groups which function under the PM’s supervision, c. along with the responsibilities mentioned above, the Minister of Interior, Decentralisation and e-Governance is also responsible for forming legislation, individually or in collaboration with other Ministers or Deputy Ministers, and participating in all parliamentary processes’ (Primeministerial Decision, 2010).

Another reason for the creation of the Group was that its members were regarded as experienced and efficient in the political communication field, since they had planned and executed two successful election campaigns for the European elections in June 2009 and the parliamentary elections in October 2009. More specifically, the Minister of the Interior, John Ragousis, had served as the party’s spokesman in the national

elections of 2007, as Papandreou's spokesperson in the intra-party elections of 2007 and as party secretary from 2007 to 2009; the Finance Minister, George Papakonstantinou, had served as press spokesman of PASOK between 2007 and 2009; the Minister of Culture, Paul Geroulanos, had held the post of Director of Communications of PASOK from 2007 to 2009; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dimitris Droutsas, had held the post of the Director of Public Relations of PASOK and was responsible for the foreign media. Even though PASOK won the local elections of 2010, the Group of the Political and Communication Planning was gradually weakened due to disputes between the Minister of the Interior and the Finance Minister over the control of economic policy, which undermined the coordination and the effectiveness of the government's communication policy.

The weakening of the Group accelerated not only the revamping of the communication machinery, but also of the whole structure and function of the primeministerial office. The reforms relied on propositions made by the Committee for the Reform of the Government, which Papandreou had formed at the beginning of 2010 and which comprised foreign experts, specialists, politicians and academics (Ta Nea, 2010). In particular, members of the Committee included: Kevin Featherstone, professor of Modern Greek Studies, holder of the 'Eleftherios Venizelos' chair and Director of LSE's Hellenic Observatory; Richard Parker, assistant professor of Public Policy in Harvard's Governance School; Roger Wilkins, general secretary of the General Attorney's Office of Australia and Special Advisor to the Australian premier; Leaf Pagrotsky, MP and former Minister of Industry and Commerce of Sweden and Jeff Malgan, former head of Strategic Planning of the British Prime Minister's Office. The issues on which the Commission would deliberate were: the introduction of structural reforms concerning the functioning of the office of the Prime Minister and the government; changing the legislation on the functioning of the government; changing the decision-making process and consolidating the public debate process; increasing the efficiency of government institutions; introducing a transition model for

the succession between administrations; introducing a code of conduct for the Council of Ministers; altering the Council of Ministers' regulation; evaluating and introducing processes concerning the placement of executives in political posts (Ta Nea, 2010).

Acting on the suggestions of the Committee, Papandreou created the post of General Secretary to the Prime Minister. According to the respective Primeministerial Decision (2010), the General Secretary would have three responsibilities: first, he would be the immediate assistant to the Prime Minister on issues that apply to the General Secretariat; second, he would supervise all units and services of the Office of the General Secretary and execute the orders of the Prime Minister concerning these departments; third he would perform any other task according to the laws on the responsibilities of the Head of the General Secretariat in a Ministry. Within the Political Office of the Prime Minister and in order to assist him in his work and execute his orders, the following units were assembled: a) the Policy Making Unit; b) the Political and Communicational Planning Unit; c) the Unit for Observing the Performance of the Government and Assessing Policies; d) the Innovative Policies Unit; e) the Relations with Society Unit; f) the Management and Organisation Unit; and g) the Special Priorities Handling Unit.

More specifically, the Political and Communicational Planning Unit would deal with: a) the Political Planning which would elaborate on initiatives on the promotion of the strategic goals of the government; it would submit these initiatives to the PM and it would handle its execution; b) the Communicational Planning which would elaborate on and execute initiatives concerning the political communication, the planning and promotion of the message and the communicational handling of the affairs of the government under the approval of the Prime Minister; c) the Programming, that would elaborate and submit to the Prime Minister suggestions on planning his schedule, having the responsibility to run it in collaboration with the implicated Units and Offices, according to the orders of the Prime Minister; d) the Parliamentary Affairs



which track the course of government's legislative action and the parliamentary action in general and it functions as the link between the Political Office of the Prime Minister and the Parliamentary Group and e) the Crisis Management which would elaborate and submit suggestions to the Prime Minister on crisis management, on preventive actions, on the creation of a strategic plan to face a crisis and would calculate its ramifications putting these suggestions into action.

However, it seems that none of the communications structures that were created during the Papandreou administration functioned effectively. As Karaklioumi explains, 'essentially there was no such thing as a communications command centre. Everybody wanted to talk to everybody, everybody wanted to have a major part and consequently this led to the absence of a common message' (2012: interview with the author).

#### **4.3 The role of communication experts**

The second component of Papandreou's permanent campaign involved cooperation with two communication experts who followed him in office. The first was the former political journalist George Elenopoulos, who served as head of the primeministerial Press Office. As head of the press office, he attended all the important meetings, enjoyed the trust of the Prime Minister and had an exceptional cooperation with all top executives. As Elenopoulos claims, on a daily basis, he would communicate, exchange notes and consult with the General Secretary of Briefing and with the spokesperson of the Government (2012: interview with the author). In parallel, he oversaw the unit of media monitoring on behalf of the government, which was established in the party's headquarters (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author).

The other communication professional who joined Papandreou's staff was the pollster Maria Karaklioumi who became the official pollster of PASOK in 2008 and from

2009 onwards she was acting as the pollster of Papandreou's government (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). Karaklioumi had studied statistics at the University of Athens and later Mathematics at Trinity College Dublin. She also completed a Masters in Quantitative Political Science in the School of Government of the University of Essex and on European Affairs at Panteion University (Athens). She specialised on sampling and on methods of exploring public opinion at the University of Michigan. Since 2001, Karaklioumi had been an active executive in political analysis and polling. For example, she worked for the polling company RASS from 2006 to 2008 conducting opinion surveys and exit polls. In 2008, Karaklioumi became the official pollster of PASOK and from 2009 onwards, she was acting as the pollster of Papandreou's government (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). In addition, Karaklioumi had the main responsibility of analysing and interpreting the polling data, as well as acting as an advisor to the Prime Minister on government strategy, policy and presentation.

Unlike the aides of Simitis and Karamanlis, both of Papandreou's communication advisors had strong political affiliations with the party. Elenopoulos was considered a member of the 'traditional PASOK', a strong supporter of the so-called 'straight collision' with the right and with intra-party opponents (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author). Karaklioumi had been a registered member of PASOK since her pre-graduate years. She held the post of the Secretary of Youth of AUEB (Athens University of Economics and Business). She was a member of the Institute of Education of PASOK and of the scientific team, which conducted the cross-partisan debate in the City of Amarousio. She was an active member on the board of directors of the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies-Andreas Papandreou (ISTAME). In 2008, she took on the role of Deputy Spokesperson of PASOK, which she held until 2010 when she became the Secretary of Press and Media of the party (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author).

#### **4.4 The use of polling**

Once in power, Papandreou continued to use private polling, both opinion surveys and focus groups, aimed at devising strategy, policy and presentation. However, as Karaklioumi claims, Papandreou put more emphasis on quantitative opinion polls rather than focus groups (2012: interview with the author). As head of the party's polling unit, she conducted opinion surveys for the PASOK government, providing Papandreou with evidence on various polling figures. In particular, opinion surveys measured the government's performance, the opposition's performance, primeministerial approval, the leaders' popularity ratings, voting intentions, the state of the economy, the impact of government initiatives and reforms on the image of the premier and the government, the number of viewers and the interest of people concerning the public appeals of Papandreou, as well as the impact of Papandreou's political messages on public opinion (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author; Kroustalli, 2010).

One example of the impact the opinion polls had upon Papandreou's strategy was the selection of candidates for municipalities and prefectures in the local elections of November 2010. Karaklioumi conducted various polls measuring the performance of different nominees in different areas around the country and Papandreou appeared to choose candidates based on these findings (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). Another example of the polling effect was identified in the electoral strategy of PASOK in the local elections of 2010. At the beginning of the campaign for the local elections, Papandreou sought to set the political agenda, arguing that what is at stake is to select the most suitable candidates to manage the municipalities and the new regional local institutions created under the Kallikratis plan (Verney, 2012: 204).

Initially the governing party, according to the polls, seemed to win most of the municipalities and prefectures across the country. In an effort to reverse the negative polls, New Democracy (the main opposition party) and its leader Antonis Samaras

sought to reframe the electoral battle as a referendum on the government's economic policy and particularly on the Memorandum (the bailout package) in which Papandreou had agreed with the so called Troika<sup>4</sup> (Verney, 2012: 204). In parallel, all the opposition parties adopted the same anti-Memorandum platform.

The result was that PASOK's candidates, in the run-up to Election Day in November, were losing ground in the opinion surveys by the anti-Memorandum candidates. For example, in the region of Attica, which is seen as electoral and political barometer for the whole country (Nikolacopoulos, 2010) and whose registered voters are 2.7 million representing the 27 per cent of the total, the candidate of PASOK was trailing in the polls the independent anti-Memorandum candidate (Verney, 2012: 203). According to Karaklioumi, polling analysis suggested that PASOK should set the terms of the debate in a different way (2012: interview with the author). Hence, Papandreou, on the 25<sup>th</sup> of October two weeks ahead of the local elections of November 7, modified his party strategy. In a 'live' television interview, which received simultaneous coverage on all national television networks, he attempted to reframe the electoral battle by linking the support to the socialist candidates with the possibility of calling early national elections if the result of the local elections proved unsatisfactory (Verney, 2012: 205). The dilemma was crucial, as a snap election would lead to political instability, increasing the likelihood of disorderly default, since the country's salvation was dependent upon the disbursement of the next loan tranche as was foreseen in the EU-IMF bailout package. Eventually, in spite of the unprecedented percentage of abstention from the polls, PASOK remained the dominant party gaining the majority of big municipalities and 8 in 13 regions in the first round of the 2010 regional elections including the Attica region (Verney, 2012: 211).

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<sup>4</sup> The Troika consisted of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

Although the impact of polls was evident in these cases, it was not so influential in all cases. For instance, in the case of the privatisations or the policy of the opening-up of closed-shop professions, the government hesitated to carry these through, though public opinion in large part backed the government (Loulis, 2011). This kind of political behaviour can be attributed to three reasons. The first is ideological. Socialist deputies were traditionally against liberal policies such as privatisations and liberalisation of the markets. The second reason is political. Trade unions and those powerful pressure groups that were closely affiliated with PASOK opposed privatisations and liberalisation. Therefore, even though the majority of public opinion in general backed these reforms, political benefits from the implementation of the reforms were highly uncertain, while the political cost of the struggle with powerful and well organised social groups was certain and immediate.

The third reason is related to the Greek electoral system. This system is termed preferential because voters alone decide which candidates are elected. Under such a system, there is an intra-party electoral competition, because candidates of the same party compete with each other for personal votes. In particular, voters choose the ballot of the party with all the candidates of the party and then vote for the candidate of their preference putting a cross next to their name. Thus, parliamentarians are electorally dependent upon their local constituencies and, as Karaklioumi observes, if the interests of their constituencies contradict with the interest of public opinion, then they will not hesitate to turn against the policy of their own government (2012: interview with the author).

#### **4.5 The central message of Papandreou's permanent campaign**

In the national elections of October 2009, the dominant issue was the handling of the economic crisis. The origins of the Greek crisis lay in the international financial crisis of 2007/2008. The deterioration of the international banking system had influenced the function of the Greek banking system, limiting the financing of households and corporations and causing a fall in economic output. In an effort to prevent the total collapse of the economic system, to protect the banking sector and help the economy to escape recession, the Greek government put in place Keynesian expansionary policies including spending increases and tax cuts. The latter averted the total collapse of the economy and prevented a sharp fall in output, but increased the fiscal deficit, the public debt as well as the country's borrowing interest rates (Kazakos, 2010: 166-168).

In this context, the two main parties offered the electorate two completely different policy plans. Karamanlis claimed that dealing with public debt and the fiscal deficit must be the primary governmental priority and consequently the next government needed to implement austerity measures and structural reforms (Kazakos, 2010: 171-172). In contrast, Papandreou offered a radically different policy mix, prioritising the stimulation of the economy rather than deficit reduction. He stressed the need to implement expansionary policies of spending increases and tax cuts to stimulate the economy and reverse the recession, combined with an aggressive tax reform that would enable income redistribution. All of this, it was claimed at the time, would be adequate to restrain the deficit and keep Greece's public debt viable (Kazakos, 2010: 172-173).

Papandreou was asked repeatedly where the funds needed for the success of such a plan would come from. He responded that the funding of the expansionary policy would not add to the fiscal deficit because it would be funded by the limitation of public spending waste, the fight against corruption and the fight against tax evasion.

Papandreou framed the whole concept with the motto ‘there is money’, which was being used throughout his election campaign as well as the first months of his tenure (Loulis, 2011; Pretenteris, 2012: 39). It appears that this motto was so targeted to the pressing issues of Greek society and arguably to its deepest wishes, that it was enough to win him the elections. Eventually Papandreou managed to win by taking 44 per cent of the vote; having a 10 per cent lead over Karamanlis and gaining a solid majority of 160 parliamentary seats (Loulis, 2011).

In the aftermath of the elections, the new PASOK government revealed that public finances were far worse than previously announced (Kazakos, 2011: 17; Verney, 2012: 212-213). The revelation gave rise to fierce criticism from the European Commission and the Eurogroup for the false statistics and attracted the attention of the international financial markets, which worried about the capacity of Greece to repay its debts and the willingness of the government to put its public finances in order. As a result, the Eurozone and the European Commission urged Greece to change its course by formulating a credible plan of fiscal consolidation and structural reform in order to bring the deficit down (Kazakos, 2010: 189-191).

However, Papandreou insisted that he would fulfil the promises he had made during the election campaign and hence in the budget plan anticipated substantial spending increases on education, on the wages of public employees as well as the distribution of various allowances to more than 2.5 million people (Kazakos, 2010: 201). To this end, in a press conference in January 2010 Papandreou repeated once again, his central election campaign motto by saying that ‘there is money’ adding that ‘when it was needed, we found it’ (Pretenteris, 2012: 59).

On the 19<sup>th</sup> of January, the European Council identified that Greece had not taken effective steps to reduce the deficit (Kazakos, 2011: 26). In parallel, the spreads of the Greek bonds kept climbing, while the rating agencies continued to downgrade the Greek economy. As pressure mounted on the Greek government, Papandreou decided

to change course, announcing tough austerity measures in February and a second wave of measures in March. As a result, he abandoned the message of expansionary policies delivering a new message of the need to promote a package of austerity measures to avoid a disorderly sovereign default. In order to promote his policy he expressed his message with the motto ‘we save the country’ which was being used throughout the rest of his tenure. More specifically, Papandreou declared that, ‘if we do not do what is needed to be done in order to save our economy, and the very existence of our future (..) if our country is unable to borrow on similar terms as those that usually an EU country borrows, then the consequences will be much more devastating’ (cited in Kazakos, 2010: 220-221).

Nevertheless, the government was still failing to convince the markets, thus increasing the risk of downgrading Greek bonds to ‘junk’ status, which in turn would lead to the country declaring a default (Loulis, 2011: 278). Hence, the Greek government urged its European partners to create a bailout mechanism for those member-states, which are unable to borrow funds at reasonable interest rates from international markets. Eventually, the European Union launched the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) due to economic and political reasons. EFSF would be financed by the member states of the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and it was set to provide loans at low interest rates for Eurozone member-states being in trouble in return for the implementation of a credible policy plan of fiscal consolidation and structural changes (Kazakos, 2011: 29).

As a result, Papandreou issued a statement to the press that he had instructed the Finance Minister to officially ask Greece’s EU partners to activate the support mechanism in order to avert a disorderly default. The Greek government managed to receive a loan of 110 billion euros in exchange for the application of the so-called ‘Memorandum of Financial and Economic Policies’ and the ‘Memorandum of Understanding Specific Economic Policy Conditionality’ under the supervision of the



Troika of the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Memorandum was a policy package, which included austerity measures aimed at reducing the fiscal deficit and structural reforms aimed at increasing economic competitiveness (Kazakos, 2011: 33). On May 5, Papandreou introduced the Memorandum in Parliament repeating the message of the need to implement the Memorandum in order to ensure Greece would avoid default. In particular, Papandreou continued to use the same motto stating that ‘under the burden of the difficult living conditions of our country, we took responsible decisions, to save the country to save the wages and pensions (..) to save jobs, deposits, labor years, families, households [and] workers’ (Papandreou, 2010).

#### **4.6 Papandreou’s public appearances**

During the 2009 election campaign, Papandreou made tens of public appearances around the country; he gave numerous press conferences, press, media and web interviews while he also put emphasis on the use of the social media (Deligiaouri, 2011: 65-66). After his electoral victory, hardly a day went by without Papandreou makes a public appearance on television, radio or in a website in Greece or abroad. He delivered numerous speeches in parliament, at the party convention and to special audiences inside or outside Athens. In addition, he put emphasis on making unedited appeals to the national electorate through ‘live’ televised addresses delivered from parliament, party events and the office of the Prime Minister.

Moreover, Papandreou was the Prime Minister who introduced the innovation of the televising of Council of Ministers meetings. In particular, the speech delivered by the Prime Minister in the Council of Ministers was transmitted ‘live’ by the public broadcasting network (EPT) and most of the time by the private television networks. According to Elenopoulos, Papandreou intended to symbolise the openness of his government to the citizenry (2012: interview with the author). Papandreou also tried to

highlight on the agenda a number of issues for which he was willing to undertake serious reform initiatives. For example, during the first session of the Council of Ministers, he invited the Greek Ombudsman, George Kaminis, to inform the members of the government about the persistent problems of Public Administration (To Vima, 2009). In another Cabinet a few months later, on the 9<sup>th</sup> of December 2009, on the occasion of the International Day against Corruption Papandreou invited to attend the session the president of the organisation 'Transparency International-Greece' Kostas Bakouris in order to highlight the need to address the phenomenon of corruption through the reform of the state.

A few days later Papandreou invited to a meeting of the Cabinet for the first time in the political history of the country the Archbishop of the Church of Greece to underscore the need for cooperation between the state and the Church (Papachristos, 2009). In addition, in March 2010 Papandreou invited to the Cabinet for the first time in the political history of the country the Head Justices of the Supreme Courts to discuss issues related to the functioning of the judiciary. At the same time, as noted by Karaklioumi, Papandreou could better control the message he wanted to send to the public (2012: interview with the author). In contrast, some authors saw Papandreou's tactic as a sign of populism. According to Kazakos, 'the Prime Minister and his close aides disliked the intermediary structures and gave the impression that there was a direct communication between the leader and the people' (2010: 207). Another reason for Papandreou's tactic, as Karaklioumi argues, was that he sought to appeal directly to the public, transmitting his political messages in an unfiltered way (2012: interview with the author). However, after the introduction of the Memorandum both the 'live' television coverage of the Cabinet meetings and the participation in them of non-political actors stopped. This decision might be explained by the severity of the problems and the limited impact of this particular communication tactic.

Apart from appeals directly to the public, Papandreou gave several interviews to the Greek media, though most of them were given to the newspapers rather than the

broadcast media, probably because the interviewee more easily controls newspapers interviews. In parallel, he avoided giving interviews during the regular governing period to the Greek television and radio networks for two reasons. The first is that Papandreou and his aides shared the assumption that the media, following the general trend of populism, were particularly critical and hostile to his administration (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author). As Psycharis<sup>5</sup> notes, in a meeting he had with Papandreou in Maximos Mansion, the Prime Minister expressed his intense discomfort about the political stance of the TV network *Mega Channel* and the criticism, which the network had directed against his government (cited in Pretenteris, 2012: 129-132).

The second reason is, as Papandreou's associates have claimed, that political journalists in general seek to concentrate on political gossip, political fights between government figures, personalities and political horse races rather than policies, ideas and the real problems that citizens face in everyday life (Elenopoulos, 2012: interview with the author; Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). The only exception was towards the end of October 2010, a few days ahead of the local Election Day, when Papandreou gave a televised interview from the Maximos Mansion, which was broadcasted simultaneously on all national television networks, public and private, with one journalist from each television channel participating in the interview (Kroustalli, 2010). Through the 'live' interview, Papandreou wanted to stress his willingness to call an early general election if the outcome of the local elections was negative for the government and in parallel to ensure that, his message would receive maximum media coverage.

At the same time, Papandreou appeared to put emphasis on the use of new technologies and particularly on the use of social media to amplify the effectiveness of

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<sup>5</sup> The publisher of the major centre-left newspapers *To Vima* and *Ta Nea* and co-owner of the private national broadcasting network *Mega Channel*.

his communication with the public, especially the youth. He created a department within the Office of the Prime Minister that was assigned to handle his Facebook and Twitter accounts and the uploading of YouTube videos with his speeches and statements (Hasapopoulos, 2011). In addition, he used YouTube videos in order to attack the opposition concerning the state of the economy, which PASOK had inherited from New Democracy after ND had left power (Koveos, 2010).

In parallel, Papandreou engaged in a constant campaign process to woo European and international public opinion. He showed communication hyperactivity making numerous public appearances in the foreign media. For example, in 2010 Papandreou gave several interviews in foreign media, including the most well known leading newspapers such as the *Financial Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *Guardian*, *Le Monde*, radio stations, television networks such as *CNBC*, *CNN*, *NBC*, *CBS*, *BBC* and media outlets like *Bloomberg* and *Reuters* ([www.papandreou.gr](http://www.papandreou.gr)). This hyperactivity, of course, was the result of Greece being at the time in the spotlight of the international economic crisis and particularly of the Eurozone debt crisis (Karaklioumi, 2012: interview with the author). Moreover, as Elenopoulos has suggested, Papandreou needed to explain the Greek view on the crisis to the citizens of other countries, given that the latter provided loans to Greece in order to avoid a disorderly default (2012: interview with the author). This would provide him with sufficient time to put Greece's public finance in order and promote the structural reforms aiming to boost competitiveness.

Another explanation for Papandreou's tactic to appear on foreign media rather than national ones might be that foreign journalists were interested in concentrating almost exclusively on the economic issues rather than on the intra-party or intra-government struggles. Given that Greek media transmitted parts of Papandreou's interviews, the centre-left Prime Minister also had the opportunity to focus the attention of the Greek electorate on his own agenda, bypassing to some extent the critical national media. A third explanation can be found in the relations between Papandreou and the centre-left

media. Even though Greek media are for the most part left-leaning, they were hostile to Papandreou personally and treated him with immense scrutiny. This tension between the socialist leader and the media could be traced back to the intra-party leadership campaign, which took place right after the 2007 election. At the time Venizelos, Papandreou's main contender, 'had the support of almost all media sympathetic to the party' (Dinas, 2008: 365).

#### **4.7 The impact of Papandreou's permanent campaign**

The centre-left Prime Minister made numerous public appearances delivering both major and minor addresses despite the fact that he stayed in office for only two years. In particular, as evidence shows (see Table 5), Papandreou made more major addresses rather than minor addresses, probably because the severe economic crisis and the need to travel abroad frequently coerced him to rely more on televised addresses than delivering speeches to special audiences or making domestic political trips to get his message across. In terms of the impact of Papandreou's campaigning style of governing upon his popularity, a review of primeministerial public appearances demonstrates a considerable and, to a large extent, consistent attempt to woo public opinion.

However, Papandreou's intensive campaigning appears to have barely influenced his popularity ratings. Specifically, results show that there is a moderate-strong relationship (Pearson: - 0,608) between the major addresses and primeministerial approval, which are negatively correlated, meaning that an upward change in one variable is accompanied by a downward change in the other variable. In particular, an increase in the major addresses may result in a decrease in the popularity ratings. However, the relationship is statistically insignificant (sig.: 0,200). There is also a negative, fairly weak association (Pearson: - 0,340) between the minor addresses and the primeministerial popularity which is also statistically insignificant.


Furthermore, it should be noted that Papandreou's popularity ratings were not simply unstable with ups and downs throughout his two-year tenure. They were constantly diminishing from the beginning of his tenure until the end of his premiership. His popularity dropped sharply within two years, losing more than 30 per cent. In particular, Papandreou's approval dropped from 62 per cent in December 2009 to 49 per cent in March 2010 decreasing to 45 per cent in June 2010, falling to 39 per cent by the end of the year and finishing at below 30 per cent a few months before his resignation. It is apparent that this sharp fall is attributed to other factors. Even though the examination and analysis of other factors influencing the primeministerial popularity exceeds the scope of this study, chapter six discusses to some extent possible explanations for the developments in Papandreou's public approval.

**Table 5:** Public approval of Papandreou and primeministerial major and minor addresses to the public

Date	Overall PM Approval (%)	Major	Minor
Dec '09	62	16	3
Mar '10	49	16	2
Jul '10	45	20	13
Dec '10	39	26	14
Mar '11	36	17	7
Jul '11	26	23	6

*Source: Metron Analysis polls – Webpage of Papandreou*

**Table 6:** Papandreou's popularity ratings 2009-2011



*Sources: Metron Analysis polls*

## Conclusion

As his predecessors, Papandreou undertook the permanent campaign strategy. He created new communication institutions next to the existing ones and collaborated with communication professionals who also had political affiliations with PASOK. Furthermore, he used private polling to shape strategy, policy and presentation while he was the first Prime Minister to use his own mechanism to conduct opinion surveys within the party's headquarters. Once being in the premiership, he tried to label his policy. In the beginning of his tenure he used his main election-campaign message as a motto of his government policy, yet a few months after the elections he was forced to change policy course and hence to formulate a new campaign-like message as motto of his new policy plan. Papandreou also made public appearances in 'live' television addresses and gave numerous interviews to foreign media in order to get his message across. Nevertheless, his public appearances did not influence his popularity ratings

meaning that other factors exerted impact on it. Having demonstrated that the recent prime ministers in Greece followed the permanent campaign trend, next chapter discusses the factors which contributed to the emergence of the campaigning style of governing from the late 1990s onwards.



## **Chapter 5**

### **The Permanent Campaign in Greece**

As it has been presented, since 1996 modern Greek premiers, both center-left and conservative, have undertaken the permanent campaign strategy. However, this has not always been the case. Before the middle 1990s, in spite of some indications of the permanent campaign concept having been identified in Mitsotakis' (1990-1993) and Papandreou's premiership (1993-1996), the Greek prime ministers had not employed in office the election campaign personnel, tools and techniques. Of course, it is reasonable to argue that prime ministers in Greece, as in other countries, are always interested in influencing public opinion in their favour. However, from 1974 up to the mid-1990s they did not pursue this goal by engaging in a permanent campaign process. So far, there is quite limited relevant literature on primeministerial communication in order to provide empirical evidence of this argument. Nonetheless, there are some indications that can offer a view of the political communication of the prime ministers before the permanent campaign era emerges.

First, until the mid-1990s prime ministers in Greece lacked a Press Office within the Office of the Prime Minister. As Sotiropoulos has pointed out in his study on the evolution of the Office of the Prime Minister, Simitis was the first premier who established communication apparatus within the Maximos Mansion (where the primeministerial office is located) (2001: 142-144). Second, the Greek premiers lacked distinct communication structures in the context of government communication. It is characteristic that the Ministry of Press and Media was established in 1994 (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 138). Third, the prime ministers and in general the Greek politicians, in line with their British counterparts, used mainly the

Parliament (called the Vouli) as the official forum of politics and political communication (Papathanassopoulos. 2000: 57; Seymour-Ure, 2003). The prime ministers surely made public addresses and received media coverage by the public media exclusively, since privately owned media did not exist until the early 1990s. Yet, they did not follow the permanent campaign trend.

So the question is what has changed in recent decades and motivated the Greek premiers to bring campaign staff, methods and tactics in office? This thesis argues that, in line with the cases in the US and the UK, political and technological developments explain the rise of the permanent campaign era in Greece as well. In particular, the chapter shows that the decline of political parties, the advent of television and the proliferation of new political technologies and experts have contributed, not only to the modernisation of the political communication and the election campaigning in Greece (Alexandrou, 2007; Demertzis, 2002; Papathanassopoulos, 2000; 2002; 2007), but also to the evolution of the campaigning style of governing.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section one outlines the structure and operation of the parliamentary majoritarian system in Greece. Section two outlines the key features of the Greek media system within the context of the Mediterranean media system. Section three analyses the contributing factors of the permanent campaign in Greece. It explores the causes and effects of the decline of Greek political parties in recent decades, the rise of television and its effects in the context of the modernisation of the political communication process in Greece and the development of new political technologies. Last section concludes.

## **5.1 The political system in Greece**

Following Lijphart's typology, Greece belongs to the group of parliamentary majoritarian systems (1999: 248). The Greek electoral system is a form of advanced proportionate list using the D'Hondt electoral formula, which favours the main political parties, enabling them to form single-party governments (Gallagher et al, 2006: 344, 352; Lijphart, 1999: 96-97). This is one of the reasons, why two large parties the centre-left PASOK and the centre-right ND dominate the political scene, even though the Greek political system is a multiparty one. Konstantinos Karamanlis and Andreas Papandreou founded both of them respectively, in the aftermath the collapse of the colonels' dictatorship and the restoration of the democratic regime in 1974 (Gallagher et al, 2006: 63; Pappas, 2003: 122; Voulgaris, 2008: 224).

According to the election results from 1974 to 2009, the two major political parties together were receiving around 80 per cent of the vote (Nikolacopoulos, 2005; Loulis, 2011). The center left PASOK party ruled Greece for much of the time since the restoration of the democratic regime. More specifically, it governed from 1981 until 1989, from 1993 to 2004 and from 2009 to 2011 while the conservative New Democracy party ruled the country from 1974 until 1981, from 1990 until 1993 and from 2004 until 2009. The only exception took place in the years 1989-1990, when the PASOK government changed the electoral law a few weeks ahead of the national elections, making it purely proportional, in order to prevent its centre-right rivals from forming a single-party government.

Indeed, the electoral law's provision that a party could formulate a government with almost 50 per cent of the vote undermined political stability, generating short-lived coalition governments and leading to three successive parliamentary elections (Nikolacopoulos, 2005). Although PASOK was defeated, the New Democracy party

still did not have the parliamentary majority to form its own government and so it participated in a coalition government with the left parties in July of 1989. The latter coalition also failed, leading to the elections of November 1989. ND again did not gain a parliamentary majority and the result was the forming of a cross-party coalition government including PASOK and the left parties, which however proved to be short-lived. Following the third consecutive national election of April 1990, ND finally gained a narrow parliamentary majority forming a single-party government, though its majority was marginal holding only 151 out of 300 seats in Parliament (called the Vouli) (Pappas and Dinas, 2006: 479; Voulgaris 2008: 106–110).

Moreover, single-party governments have completely dominated the political landscape for two additional reasons. The first is related to the fact that the role of the President of the Republic as Head of State (elected by Parliament for a five-year term with the possibility of re-election for a second term) is mainly formal; the President has no real executive or legislative power. At this point, it should be mentioned that from 1974 until 1985 when the first constitutional revision took place, the President of the Republic had quite important executive and legislative powers and responsibilities among which the most significant were: his right to dissolve Parliament, to dissolve the government and to call for a referendum (Makridimitris, 2001: 23). However, based on an initiative taken by the then Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou during the constitutional revision of 1986, these powers were removed from the President in order to strengthen the position of the prime minister. The second reason lies in the role of the opposition, which has few powers to influence decision-making. As Gallagher et al have suggested ‘all Greek governments are single-party majority governments, and the opposition in parliament has been effectively powerless, with government taking no account of its views’ (2006: 63).

In this context the prime minister exercises executive power as the head of a single-party government and the same time as leader of the main parliamentary party in a

unicameral parliament (called the Vouli) consisting of 300 seats, controls the majority of the parliamentary seats (Gallagher et al, 2006: 35; Lijphart, 1999: 248; Makridimitris, 2001: 23). In short, he appears to control both the executive and the legislative powers. In the majoritarian systems, like the Greek one, the influence of the prime minister in the legislative area is further reinforced by the notion that governing parliamentarians are expected to vote along party lines on all crucial issues either because of party loyalty or personal political calculations (Bowler et al, 1999; Gallagher et al, 2006: 57-58, 62). For instance, they might be interested to be members of the Council of Ministers (the Greek Cabinet) (Gallagher et al, 2006: 74; Makridimitris, 2001: 23-24). Another reason for the MPs to follow the party line is the fear of being suspended from their party's parliamentary group or, even worse, losing the party label at the next national election (Gallagher et al, 2006: 74).

Of course, in the parliamentary context the power of a prime minister faces limitations. The most important is that the premiers are dependent on the legislature since they need the confidence votes of the parliamentary majority to secure their position (Gallagher et al, 2006: 45; Makridimitris, 2001). However, in the Greek context the fall or resignation of a prime minister from office is a rare phenomenon. From the restoration of democracy in 1974 onwards, only two premiers the center-right Konstantinos Mitsotakis and the center-left George Papandreou<sup>6</sup> lost the confidence of the legislature (Voulgaris, 2008: 122). Therefore, it is safe to assume

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<sup>6</sup> Although Papandreou received a vote of confidence by the parliamentarians of his own party, he decided to resign from the post of Prime Minister in order to ease the possibility for the formation of a pro-euro coalition government with the participation of New Democracy and the right-wing party of LAOS (Λαϊκός Ορθόδοξος Συναγερμός/ Popular Orthodox Rally). In the lengthy negotiations that followed, the three political parties of PASOK, ND and LAOS managed to reach an agreement on forming a coalition government, appointing in the post of Prime Minister the former Vice-President of the European Central Bank Loukas Papadimos (Pretenteris, 2012: 149-152).

that the prime minister in the Greek context has emerged in recent years as the most powerful political figure in the Greek political system.

## **5.2 The Mediterranean media context: the case of Greece**

The Greek media system has been considered as a striking example of the Mediterranean model of media system, which also includes Portugal, Spain and Italy (Hallin and Mancini, 2004; Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2002; Papathanassopoulos, 2004). This model is characterised by ‘an elite politically oriented press with high political parallelism, commentary-oriented and weak professionalised journalism, low newspaper circulation, external pluralism covering different opinions and perspectives within one media branch, a public broadcasting strongly influenced by the government and strong state intervention in the media sector (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 67).

Within this context, the media in Greece specifically appear to be highly politicised, financially dependent (directly or indirectly) on the state and operating in an environment of clientelist relationships. As Hallin and Mancini have suggested, ‘Greek newspapers have always been political instruments above all, rooted culturally in passionate ideological divisions, and often tied to the state and/or parties’ and the Greek journalists ‘tend to be strongly opinionated and politically engaged, and often run for political office’ (2004: 98). Moreover, most of them are subject to intervention noting that the ‘line taken by owners of media enterprises determined the image and politics of the mass media’ (Hallin and Papathanassopoulos, 2000).

Hence, the Greek press is targeted to the well-educated elite with a keen interest in politics (Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 46). As a result, the level of readership as far as the circulation of the newspapers is concerned is one of the lowest in Europe. According to the World Association of Newspapers, the press circulation in Greece in 2002 amounted to 90 copies per thousand inhabitants, while France had 164 and

Sweden more than 500 (cited in Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 38). Consequently, Greek newspapers appear to be unable to be financially self-sustaining and need to receive financial subsidies from the state mainly in the form of advertising. Yet, as many scholars have pointed out, the public budget's financial support is 'not governed by a clear legal framework, consistent with the clientelist nature of Greek politics (..) [taking] the form of "soft loans", subsidies both overt and covert, and state jobs offered to many journalists' (Dimitras, 1997: 102-103; Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 121).

Similar trends are also evident in public and private broadcasting. The public television and radio, which emerged in 1965 with the state, owned *EPT* comprises three television channels, *ET-1*, *NET*, *ET-3* and *EPA* (Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 102). *EPT* has been largely politicised since the single-party governments dominate it. As Hallin and Mancini have pointed out, 'control is direct, with directors of the state broadcasting company *EPT* under the authority of the Minister of Press and the Mass Media' while the appointments of journalists 'tend to be made on the basis of political loyalty than purely professional criteria' (2004: 58).

Private broadcasting, although commercial, profit-oriented and less politicised than newspapers (Papathanassopoulos, 1997, 2000; Doulkeri, 1999, 2002) appears to have political ties and alliances since it is to a degree connected with the state in financial terms. As Hallin and Mancini have illustrated 'in all of the Mediterranean countries political logic tends to play a large role in broadcasting particularly - though not exclusively - in publicly owned media, and of course particularly in news' (2004: 109). The political logic of the private television networks can be identified in their ownership's status as well. For instance, three of the owners of *Mega Channel* (one of the biggest television networks in Greece), Christos Lamprakis, George Mpompolas and Christos Tegopoulos are at the same time the owners of the most powerful centre-left newspapers. Lambrakis owns *Ta Nea* and *Sunday Vima*, Mpompolas is the publisher of *To Ethnos* and Tegopoulos owns the newspaper *Eleftherotupia*. Another example is the owner of the television station *Skai TV*, Aristeidis Alafouzou who is

also the owner of the leading pro-conservative newspaper *Kathimerini* (Kurtsos, 2003: 245-249).

In terms of the financial subsidies provided by the government, these are distributed mainly according to clientelistic criteria. At this point, it should be noted that clientelism, as Fukuyama (2012) has suggested, ‘occurs when political parties use public resources, and particularly government offices, as a means of rewarding political supporters. Politicians provide (..) individual benefits like a job in the post office, an intervention on behalf of a relative in trouble with the government, or sometimes an outright payment of money or goods’. One example of this practice is the allocation of public sector advertisements. As Papathanassopoulos has illustrated:

‘since the late 1990s, and the preparation of the Olympics, major construction work co-financed by the European Union, lured the government to publicise its achievement directly through commercial adverts. These state adverts are a considerable source of revenue for the media, and it was noted that most of them (money) were directed towards “friendly” media’ (2007: 138).

Furthermore, in a context of large-scale government intervention in the economic process (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 133) it is no surprise that several entrepreneurs seek to own newspapers in order to influence political decisions in favour of their own interests, such as obtaining government contracts and concessions including broadcast licenses. To this end, as Hallin and Mancini have observed, ‘industrialists with interests in shipping, travel, construction, telecommunication and oil industries dominate media ownership and a long tradition of using media as a means of pressure in politicians continues’ (2004: 114).



### 5.3 Why the permanent campaign in Greece?

#### 5.3.A The decline of political parties in Greece

Greece is seen as an example of the Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralist Model along with Italy, Spain and Portugal. In Southern Europe, ‘liberal institutions, including both capitalist industrialism and political democracy, developed later. The forces of the *ancien regime* – the landholding aristocracy, the absolutist state and the Catholic or Orthodox Church – were stronger, and liberalism triumphed only after protracted political conflict that continued in many cases well into the twentieth century’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 89). It is characteristic that Greece, Portugal and Spain were the last European countries, which made the transition from dictatorship to democracy during the mid-1970s (Loulis, 2007: 224; Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 35-36). From the restoration of the democratic regime in 1974 until the beginning of 1990s, political parties and notably the parties of government, the center-right New Democracy and the socialist PASOK have dominated, as it is said, the political scene. They were strong enough to mobilise voters, influence decisively voting behaviour and intervene in the economic and social life.

The strength of the Greek political parties was evident on three levels. First, in the national elections held from 1977 onwards PASOK and ND together receive together over 80 per cent of the vote (Nikolacopoulos, 2005; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013: 524). Second, both PASOK and ND experienced comparatively high levels of party identification (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014: 224). Third, the Greek political parties are seen to exercise a highly intervening role in every aspect of the economy and society. As Papathanassopoulos has put it, ‘the major political parties, especially when they come to office, not only drive the operations of most governmental institutions, but also influence the developments in most aspects of the social system;

from sports and arts to education and the Church' (2007: 136). The phenomenon has been called partyocracy (Anthopoulos, 2008: 113; Mouzelis and Pagoulatos: 2002).

Three reasons explain the dominant role of the political parties. Firstly, both ND and PASOK represented clearly different ideological platforms. For example, they had completely different views regarding the entry of Greece into the European Community. Konstantinos Karamanlis, the founder of ND and the first Prime Minister of the Third Greek Republic in the aftermath of regime change, advocated the introduction of Greece into the European Community (EC) because as Kazakos has suggested, he 'considered membership as an additional instrument to consolidate the 1974 restored democracy and as best serving the long-term security interests of Greece. He also linked membership to the survival of the economic model of market economy in the country' (2012: 3). Eventually Karamanlis managed to secure Greece's entry to the EC in May 1979. In contrast, Andreas Papandreou, founder of PASOK and leader of the main opposition party, had turned against the European project (Kazakos, 2001: 337–340). He argued that participation in the European Community would 'consolidate the peripheral role of the country as a satellite in the capitalist system; will render national planning impossible; will seriously threaten Greek industry; and will lead to the extinction of Greek farmers' (Lyrintzis, 1984: 111).

Second, the role of political parties and consequently party identification in Greece were reinforced by the fact that the partisan debate took place in a context of highly hostile political environment, characterised by ideological polarisation, partisan extremism, intense populism and constant accusations over alleged scandals. In particular, the Greek political culture is rooted to historical divisions caused by past regime crises, the civil war between the left and right and in parallel influenced by existing clientelist relations (Featherstone, 2005: 229; Legg and Roberts 1997: 142) leading to the creation of 'highly durable parallel networks of "left" and "right" political blocs' (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014: 224). In particular, politicians in

Greece have traditionally engaged in clientelist relationships by offering jobs in the public sector to citizens in exchange for their votes (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 51; Vasilopoulou & Halikiopoulou, 2013: 526).

Third, party preferences in Greece are shaped also by the structure and function of the electoral system, which allows voters to choose their own parliamentarian, and as a result to have strong motives to participate or at least develop political connections and clientelist relations with party's candidates. In particular, the electoral system that foresees:

‘the party announces the list of candidate MPs, but those who will be elected for a seat in the Parliament depend on the preferences of the voters. The voters put a cross on the candidates they prefer from the party list on Election Day. This forces candidates of the same party to seek individual votes from the voters who vote for their party’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2001:21).

However, from 1990 onwards the political parties in Greece have seen their strength and influence to decline gradually. One indication of the decline is the falling numbers of party membership. For example, as the relevant data has shown, from 1985 to 1995 political parties' membership decrease to 42 per cent making hard for the political parties to mobilise public support at the grassroots level (Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, 2014). More specifically, as Papathanassopoulos has suggested ‘decreasing party alignment, diminishing participation in party events, and the fact that the electorate has become more volatile all highlight the decline of parties as mechanisms for political organisation’ (2000: 58). In parallel, the falling numbers of party membership in recent years go hand in hand with the fact that citizens express less trust in the political system in general and they feel increasingly reluctant to support a political party. For instance relevant research of the polling firm *Alco* has shown that ‘in the period 1990-1995, more and more voters came to believe that today's political parties

neither “express their views” nor “have a vision” for the future’ (cited in Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 51-52).

Another indication of the weakening of the Greek parties is the gradual decline of party identification over the years. Teperoglou & Tsatsanis have illustrated this point by comparing evidence provided research conducted by the *EKKE* Institute in 1985 and the polling organisations *Opinion* and *MRB* in 1993 and 2011 respectively (2014: 229). More specifically, party identification has decreased significantly in the age group 18-34 years old, from 80 per cent in 1985 to 75 per cent in 1993 falling further below 60 per cent in 2011. Furthermore, in the age group 35-54 years old, party identification rose from around 83 per cent in 1985 to 88 per cent in 1993 but since then it is in continuing decline falling well below 70 per cent in 2011. In the age group 55+ years old, partisanship was over 80 per cent in 1985, increased in 1993 reaching almost 90 per cent before being in decline falling below 75 per cent until 2011.

There are three reasons about the weakening of political parties in Greece. One of the reasons is that from 1990 onwards the ideological cleavages and policy differences between the two parties of government have been narrowed. As Papathanassopoulos has pointed out:

‘from about the late 1980’s, there has been congruence among the leading political parties (..) the entry of Greece into the European Union (EU), the internationalisation of the economy and the changes in the international political order have led the two leading political parties to adopt similar, if not identical, policies’ (2007: 128).

More specifically, within the EU context, both PASOK and ND had to promote a policy mix of fiscal consolidation and structural changes in order to enter and remain in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Thus, it can be argued that the consensus over the policy goals of the country has shifted the focus of voters from the ideology to the capacity of parties and party leaders to deliver (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 50-51). As a result, partisanship has been weakened.

Another reason, of the apparent parties' decline, is related to the policy limits imposed by the EMU context. The need to bring down the public deficit by applying spending cuts and tax increases constrained the ability of the political parties to satisfy their constituencies' demands by using clientelist means like the recruitment of the party's supporters in the public sector. It is characteristic that in '1994, the government passed a law - the so-called "Peponis law," named after the minister of the interior and public administration - to restrict clientelist practices such as providing public jobs for supporters' (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 51).

In this context, alterations within the parties have gone hand-in-hand with alterations in Greek political culture. Middle-ground voters have increased in number to become a critical part of the electorate, weakening any former ideologically driven identification between voter and party. In particular, as Pappas and Dinas have suggested:

'one could identify five major changes in Greek public opinion around that time: (a) a marked decline of statism, most notably in the belief that economic growth should not be left entirely to the state; (b) the ascendancy of political pragmatism over the radicalism and ideologization that had prevailed in the past; (c) the growth of the centre vote and the dramatic reduction in voters placing themselves on the left; (d) a widespread disillusionment with politics, which resulted in the tendency of the electorate to vote, not for the 'best' party, but for the 'least bad'; and (e) a high vote volatility, which severed past electoral alliances and caused significant shifts in political allegiances from one election to the next' (2009: 483).

As a result, the percentage of undecided or floating voters has increased, widening the middle ground of the political spectrum. According to the polling data of the *MRB* polling firm, at the end of 1980s the number of centrist voters had increased from 16 to 30 per cent of the electorate (cited in Loulis, 2007: 280). In addition, an increasing number of voters feels reluctant to identify itself in the left-right axis compared to the onset of the democratic regime and to what happened in other countries in South

Europe (Freire, 2006). As Teperoglou & Tsatsanis, based on the studies of *EKKE* and the polling firm *MRB*, ‘[in 1985] an overwhelming majority (91 per cent) of the sample selected a position on the left-right axis. This declined to around 80 per cent by 2000 (..) where it continued to hover for the rest of the decade (..) By 2011 it had dropped again, with only 74 per cent (..) declaring a left–right position’ (2014: 229).

Therefore, there has been a significant shift to the centre of the political spectrum on the part of the electorate and consequently the parties of government have positioned themselves within the middle ground, transforming from guardians of a certain strict political ideology to new age ‘catch-all’ parties (Loulis, 2003: 47). Their main objective has become the gathering of the majority of votes, abandoning past practices that created a strong ideological connection with voters. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that due to this ideological convergence ‘the leading political parties [in Greece] have faced considerable difficulties in getting their agendas placed before the public, since they are less able to differentiate themselves and Greek citizens have become less supportive of the political parties’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 16). At this point it is important to note that the expansion of the ‘middle ground’ and the consequent decline of the appeal of traditional ideologies were the logical result of the expansion of the middle class as a consequence of economic and social developments like the economic growth and of the enhancement of the welfare state (Alexandrou, 2007; Voulgaris, 2008). These social changes influenced the political parties in Greece, which in their turn began adapting to the new era.

The emergent pressing questions on which voters are called to pronounce and on which the parties target their communication mechanisms have to do with choosing the party with the most competent leader, or choosing the party that is best to govern, or selecting the leader that is more likely to become a successful Prime Minister. As Loulis has put it:

‘Particularly, our political leaders are judged by how engaged they seem in three critical areas. The sense of efficiency, they create, which in turn enhances confidence in their face. The sense of responsibility they exude, which strengthens their credibility. The sense they are socially sensitive, even if the circumstances deemed do not allow them to prove it in practice’ (2007: 361).

In this context, the parties have seen their positions to decline ‘within the political process – e.g. voters are no longer “aligned”, they no longer have access to their “own” media – which has made them even more dependent on the media’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 17). As a result, it could be argued that the role of political leaders in influencing voting preferences has been strengthened over time leading to the rise of candidate-centered rather than party-centered campaign. Of course ‘identification with political parties is still quite significant’ (Negrine, 2006:167), yet their role from 1990 onwards is weaker than in the past and therefore parties and party leaders co-exist in political communication terms. The increasing importance of leadership, in influencing voting behaviour as well as in political communication terms, is reinforced further by the rise and development of private television, which in turn has given rise to the personalisation of the political process (Papathanassopoulos, 2000:58). Next section considers the modernisation of the media system of Greece.

### 5. 3.B The modernisation of the Greek media system

By the end of 1980s, the winds of change in the broadcasting sector became visible with the initiatives of three politicians from the major opposition New Democracy party who were elected mayors of the three most important Greek cities in the 1986 local elections: Athens, Thessaloniki and Piraeus (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 128; Leandros 2000; Yannas 2002). The first three non-state radio stations Athens 98.4, Thessaloniki 100 and Station 1 of Piraeus were operated after 1987 by the municipal authorities of these three cities, ‘ruled by other parties than the PASOK then in power

in Athens' (Hallin and Mancini, 2004: 125). The same year, law no.1730 permitted the private sector to own and operate local radio stations provided their owners were Greek citizens. The law had such an immediate and profound impact on the broadcasting market that within a four-year period (1987 - 1991). 1200 new private local radio stations sprung up all over Greece. Sotiris Kouvelas, then mayor of Thessaloniki, founded the first local non-state TV station called *TV 100* (Papathanassopoulos, 2005: 286-287).

Since 1989, the Greek Parliament has passed legislation legalizing private broadcasting in both the radio and television sectors granted licenses to private interests for the ownership and operation of television channels (Alexandrou, 2007: 7). From the late 1980s onwards, the number of private television networks and radio stations has increased significantly. In the period 1989-1993, in addition to the three state-run television channels, two private channels, *Mega Channel* and *Antenna TV*, came on stream; and a few years later three more private nationwide television networks were established like *Skai TV* and *Star Channel* (Papathanasopoulos, 2000: 49). From 1993 onwards, specifically, there was a steady increase in the number of private television channels, with at least three networks reaching a nationwide audience and many more transmitting to local audiences. As a result, privately owned television became the public's principal source of information (Negrine and Papathanassopoulos, 1996; Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 48-49).

With the deregulation of the broadcasting, private television has adopted the commercialised logic of the marketplace. According to Papathanassopoulos (1997), 'the level of sensationalism is extremely high in the Greek commercial television'. In parallel, similarly with commercial television networks elsewhere, privately owned television channels in Greece put more emphasis on personalities and images rather than policies and ideas (Deligiaouri, 2011:64; Papathanassopoulos, 2000). The practice of the private television channels has also affected public broadcasting. For



example, public television networks, traditionally the mouthpiece of the government, have appeared to be more objective and more commercial after the emergence of privately owned television, though they have remained politically friendly to the governing party (Leandros, 2000).

Moreover, the explosion of private electronic media has created challenges for newspapers. First it has contributed to the further decline of newspapers' circulation (Papathanassopoulos, 2004: 43). Second, it has exerted pressure to the Greek press to be modernised by using new technologies like websites (Psychogios, 1992: 11-35; Zaharopoulos and Paraschos, 1993: 67). In response, newspapers have focused on the analysis and interpretation of events as well as starting to exploit the possibilities of the new technologies (Leandros, 2000). Furthermore, a lot of them became less partisan in order to attract a wider readership and others more, 'indulging in fanaticism and exaggeration to appeal more strongly to the supporters of a particular party' (Kotzaivazoglou and Zotos, 2007: 11).

The rapid development of the mass media and in particular the explosion of private broadcasting has had a considerable impact on the Greek political process and the implementation of campaigning. As Papathanassopoulos has put it, 'in Greece the modernisation of the political campaigning and marketing has changed as a result of the arrival, the development and the dominance of private television in the communication landscape' (2007: 22). The media have moved centre stage in election campaigning and they have gradually assumed a central role in the day-to-day practice of the government and the political parties. Political debate has moved from public gatherings to television talk shows and roundtables. In other words, 'television has become a significant, if not indispensable, medium for political parties and politicians in their efforts to communicate with the public' (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 127).

Since the parliamentary elections of 1990, and especially since the 1993 national elections, ‘there has been a greater degree of professionalisation in the use of the media in order to get the message across to the voters’ (Negrine, 2008: 167). Political parties have concentrated their campaigns around television news programming, television political advertising, television debates and appearances by candidates on television talk shows. In the early elections of 1996, television had shifted to centre stage. According to Papathanassopoulos ‘the 1996 national elections were coined as the first “TV Elections” and “the elections on the couch” while the growing importance of TV was confirmed in the coming national elections of 2000 and 2004’ (2007: 132).

At the same time, the media environment was becoming increasingly pressing and demanding, given that the number of television networks increased. For instance, six private nationwide television stations were in operation during Karamanlis’ tenure, almost all the newspapers had created digital editions, making a 24/7 news cycle possible, and blogging was also becoming highly popular. Moreover, the media ‘conduct their own polls - as they do in other countries. This means that, far more than just locating and reporting the “news” itself, they can then comment on it, often with their own political ends in view’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 137).

In particular, news bulletins and newspapers very often publish opinion polls, highlighting not only the figures of voting intention, party preferences and government popularity, but also the leaders’ assessment data, including ‘best prime minister’ and ‘satisfied/dissatisfied with the prime minister’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 47). As a result, they project the daily political battle in a campaign-like mode as a horse race, by putting emphasis on leaders’ personalities and sound bites (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 57) and hence reinforcing to some extent the personalisation of the political process. An indication of the personalisation of Greek politics is, as Alexandrou has put it, ‘the emergence of television broadcasting made its appearance at a later stage,

imposing a slower start of the professionalisation of political campaigns which emphasize the image of party leaders during election campaigns' (2007: 2).

Furthermore, the model adopted on news reporting by the major networks, with political commentators who interpret and criticise the government's positions made it very challenging and complicated for the government to impose its issue-framing in a hostile communication environment (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 57). As Antonaros argues, 'it is not easy for the agenda to be controlled in the current media landscape, especially since every newscast includes two or three political commentators who express views on almost all issues, bring their own agenda and promote their own interpretations' (2012b: interview with the author).

From the middle 2000s onwards, apart from newspapers, radio stations and national television networks, the 24/7 news websites and political blogs increased in number as well. Particularly with all the leading newspapers had their own digital editions as well as the number of websites and on-line forums constantly increases (Alexandrou, 2007: 17; Kotsikopoulou, 2002). Social media like Facebook, Twitter and YouTube were becoming increasingly popular, attracting the interest of the youth and contributing to the speedy transmission of news (Deligiaouri, 2011: 65-66). In addition, from the end of 2009 the media landscape facing political parties and government in Greece has been broadened. The reason was that Greece was in the spotlight, due to the Eurozone debt crisis, was attracting the focus of foreign media from all over the world. Consequently, Prime Minister Papandreou for example, had to deal not only with Greek but also with international media. He had to invest considerable time and energy in enhancing the way Greece was perceived by the media, journalists and public opinion, given that the member-states of the euro zone and the member-states of the International Monetary Fund were financing the bail-out package for Greece.

Overall, the modernisation of the Greek media system with the advent of private television has contributed to the modernisation of the political communication

practices adopted by the political parties and in parallel has contributed to the personalisation of politics by focusing particularly on the role of party leaders and consequently on the prime ministers. Both party leaders and the prime ministers have sought to collaborate with communication professionals in order to deliver to the needs created by the current political communication environment. Next section analyses the rise of the new political technologies in Greece in recent decades.

### 5.3. C The rise of new political technologies

From 1990 onwards, in parallel with the decline of the political parties and the advent of television, a new industry of communication professionals has risen in Greece providing its expertise to parties, leaders and politicians contributing not only to the modernisation of the election campaigning, but also to the development of the permanent campaigning. The New Democracy party collaborated with the strategists Lefteris Kousoulis, John Loulis and George Flessas. Loulis as a professional political strategist, he has held the post of the director of the *Center for Political Research and Information*, a political think tank of the conservative wing. He also has served as a political advisor to a certain number of New Democracy party leaders. (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 131). Flessas founded and has been the head of the political communication and public relations company *Civitas*, the first company ever to conduct this kind of business in Greece, and he has provided his services to candidates at the local, national and European election scale. During the 2000 national elections, he worked alongside the leader of New Democracy, Kostas Karamanlis (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 131).

The founder, owner and head of the *Saying and Doing* public communications company, Lefteris Kousoulis, has been perhaps one of the few political operatives in Greece to have provided his services to both the major political parties. He became

more broadly known for his work alongside the former leader of New Democracy, Konstantinos Mitsotakis, for the 1993 national elections and then continued with the former Mayor of Athens and later the former leader of the ND, Miltiades Evert. However, his major success is considered his work alongside the PASOK leader and [current] Prime Minister Simitis during the 2000 national elections (Yannas, 2001: 6). According to Papathanassopoulos ‘he had the idea of focusing on the 2000 election campaign more on Costa Simitis (..) and less on PASOK itself’ (2003: 131).

Apart from Kousoulis, who corresponds to the model of a communication professional, the other political analysts and pollsters have been affiliated for a long time with either ND or PASOK, indicating that party loyalty does play an important role in the selection of advisors. As Yannas has suggested ‘this observation is consistent with other findings from the United States and other European countries that support a positive relationship between the previous party background and ideological position of the consultants on the one hand and the parties they are likely to consult as clients’ (2001: 6).

In parallel, political parties have cooperated with professional advertisers and advertising agencies as well. According to Yannas:

‘The governing socialist party, PASOK, has been collaborating closely since 1992 with a Greek firm called *Mass Team Athens*. [From 1990 onwards] the major opposition party, New Democracy (..) has contracted out in different election periods the services of a number of Greek companies affiliated with foreign multinationals like *Spot Thompson*, *BBDO*, *Bold*, *McCan Erickson*, *Leo Burnett* etc. Political advertising is not limited to the two major parties. Other smaller parties as well employ advertising agencies subject to their own budgetary constraints. For example, in the October 1993 national elections, the Coalition of the Left employed the services of the advertising agencies *Odeon and Diabolo* and the Political Spring party started out with *Spot Thompson* and finished the campaign with *Komvos*’ (2001: 5).

Political parties and politicians have also used opinion polls in order to shape electoral strategy, select party leaders and measure candidates' popularity. In particular, parties use 'their own polls and their own internal information, not as a means of getting objective information but rather as just another weapon in the political campaign. Most of the times, the opposition party, using the evidence of the polls, accuses the government of inefficiency in dealing with the day-to-day problems of the citizens' (Papathanassopoulos, 2007: 137). Several polling firms have provided their research data and advice to political parties. The restoration of democracy in 1974 provided the necessary condition for their emergence. More than ten Greek polling firms comprise the Greek Association of Public Opinion and Market Research. Among the most prominent polling companies are *MRB*, *V-PRC*, *Kappa Research*, *ALKO* and *Metron Analysis* (Yannas, 2001: 4)

The significant impact of opinion polls on the political process is evident in several cases. According to Papathanassopoulos:

'an example that illustrates [this] point is when Dimitris Avramopoulos, in his second term as the Athens Mayor, announced on 18 December 2000, on TV the creation of a new party which, three months later (on March 6, 2001), he called the 'Movement of Free Citizens'. Fifteen months later, he announced that his decision to suspend the operations of KEP was due to the 'excessive economic demands...and our refusal to depend on powerful economic interests'. In fact, it was a party based, either in its formation or in its demise, on the results of the pollsters. He received a strong start in the opinion polls, but, despite the heavy promotion of the media, his party never received more than 16 per cent in the polls while in 2001 it slipped below 5 per cent' (2007: 137).

Since the early 1990s the involvement of the media in the political and social landscape has grown stronger and stronger and ultimately the media became the major platform presenting and at the same time influencing political matters. It is only logical then that alongside the explosion of the Greek media, including the electronic

media, an explosion of political advertising was evident and this gradually became a dominant characteristic of Greek political communication. Television in particular, but also radio, newspapers websites and the new media in general became an advertising arena for the parties and individual candidates in their effort to carry their message to the broader public. The political communication staffs were enhanced by the presence of professional advertisers and media consultants, who were in charge of campaign spots and political commercials on television, as well as special advertisements targeted to special demographics. They were also in charge of highlighting significant issues, analyzing poll ratings and selecting the appropriate media for message distribution. It is easy to identify the growing impact of political advertising by just taking a simple look at the share of the television advertising budget in the general advertising election budgets of PASOK and ND during the campaigns.

During the 1990 national elections, the television advertising budget of New Democracy absorbed 46.4 per cent of the party's advertising budget. A few years later in the run-up to the 1993 general election and particularly in October of that year, the share of television advertising almost doubled for ND to 83.8 per cent and for PASOK erupted from a modest 6.7 per cent to an astonishing 75.7 per cent of the party's advertising budget. The data from 1993 and onwards indicate that the two major parties have spent over 80 per cent of their advertising budget on television spots. Therefore, political advertising in Greece has grown immensely (Yannas, 2001: 4). As Yannas has illustrated, 'for the 1999 European Parliament elections, the advertising expenditure of PASOK totaled €4.5 million including taxes. For the final forty days prior to the 9 April 2000 election, PASOK exceeded €3 million in media expenditure and New Democracy spent over €2.2 million (2001: 7).

Regarding the campaign messages, the two major parties chose to place ads with positive future-oriented messages for the April 2000 election. The ruling party of PASOK focused its advertising on mottos projecting the future, such as 'we all create

the New Greece, the future has begun' or 'Development and a better life for all, the future has begun'. The emblem of the party was located on the bottom left part of each ad and on the bottom right corner of each ad the name of the leader, Kostas Simitis, could be found. 'The rising green sun of PASOK signified continuity with the past and was placed on the left corner to win over the traditional left-wing supporters of the party who might have been tempted to vote for smaller parties (e.g. Coalition of the Left) ideologically placed to the left of PASOK' (Yannas, 2001: 6). The name of the Prime Minister, Kostas Simitis, was placed on all ads in order for the voter to be able to connect him to the party and to enhance the party's overall performance, based on the primeministerial high popularity ratings and the Prime Minister's high job approval ratings. The core message of New Democracy was that 'there is a better Greece and we want it'. The party's name signed the ad with a call for a 'new beginning' (Yannas, 2001: 6).

Negative political advertising was also apparent in Greek elections. Since the 1993 election, a major part of the campaign strategy has been based on negative political television. One example that illustrates this point is the campaign of New Democracy in the European election of 1999. The New Democracy party launched a new negative television advertisement, which illustrated Costas Simitis' head painted green floating in a virtual reality environment. At the same time, it illustrated real images of street confrontations between the police and various social groups that resisted the promotion of policy reforms in education and social security, to which images the floating head was indifferent. According to Yannas, 'the effectiveness of the negative ad was undisputed: 55.8 per cent of Greeks could recall the negative ad of New Democracy and only 17.5 per cent the positive ads of PASOK' (2001: 7).

The 1996 general election is a good example of the use of negative advertising in a campaign for office (Papathanassopoulos, 2002: 80-81). Just two hours after Prime Minister Kostas Simitis had called a snap election, the opposition party of New



Democracy broadcast the first negative ad on television. The clip portrayed Simitis stating firmly in various speeches that the election would be held in September of the same year. Towards the end of the ad a 'voice-over asked: Elections on September 22. Can we trust him?' (Yannas, 2001: 8). Its role was to shed doubt on the credibility of Simitis and of the ruling party of PASOK by pointing out their inconsistency to their prior claims that the PASOK government would serve out the full four-year term of office. As Papathanassopoulos has put it 'in effect, both parties were accusing each other of being unable to run the country and of not being trustworthy' (2002: 81).

## **Conclusion**

All the factors mentioned in this chapter appear to have contributed significantly to the modernisation of the political communication context and the development of the permanent campaign trend in contemporary Greece. First, the decay of political parties and particularly the decline of ideologies have resulted in the broadening of the voters of the middle ground. Those voters are not ideologically oriented, so political parties and political leaders need sophisticated communication strategies to reach them. Those strategies appear to rely on leaders' personal qualities.

Second, the development of private broadcasting networks has altered the Greek political landscape covering the political process as a continuing horse-race and hence motivating parties and political leaders to apply modern communication techniques in order to get their messages across. Third, the need for both political parties and politicians to reach floating voters through the mass media and especially television has increased the use of new political technologies, such as advertising, polling, public relations and image making. This has in turn reinforced the notion of the permanent campaign era. Having analysed the factors that contributed to the emergence of the permanent campaign era in Greece, the following summarises the main conclusions, compares the permanent campaign of the three Greek premiers and discusses the

implications of the research as well as the contribution of the study to the relevant literature.

## **Chapter 6**

### **The Permanent Campaign in Greece Revisited**

So far the permanent campaign strategy has been implemented by executives in the US, Australia, Latin America and Europe (particularly the UK and Italy). Using the contemporary Greek political environment as a case study, this thesis has contributed to the ongoing research on the permanent campaign issue. In particular, it has concentrated on the terms of office of three recent Greek Prime Ministers: Costas Simitis (centre-left), Kostas Karamanlis (centre-right) and George Papandreou (centre-left). It attempted to provide answers to the following three questions: whether these Prime Ministers exercised a permanent campaign strategy, what led them to this strategy, and finally to what extent did the permanent campaign have on their popularity. The conclusion is that, due to political and technological factors, which altered the political communication environment in Greece, all three did indeed adopt a permanent campaign strategy in order to sustain their popularity, yet the impact on their public approval was weak.

The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section one compares the permanent campaign strategy of the three premiers under consideration highlighting similarities and differences. Section two, taking as its starting point the finding that the campaigning style of governing hardly affected the primeministerial popularity, analyses the factors influencing the primeministerial approval and considers the question of what would have happened if the Greek premiers had not followed the permanent campaign trend. Section three outlines the academic contributions of the work discussing its limitations and extensions regarding the opportunities of future research on the field.

## **6.1 The three Prime Ministers compared**

The thesis has showed that the three recent Greek prime ministers have brought the election campaign apparatus, experts, tools, techniques and tactics into governing in order to sustain public approval. To this end, the Greek premiers established new communication units in the primeministerial Office, collaborated with communication professionals, used private polling to shape political strategy, policy and presentation, formulated political messages in order to label their government plans and made campaign-like public appearances to get their message across.

Comparing the campaigning style of governing across the three prime ministers, a number of similarities emerges. First, they have strengthened, maintained and expanded the communication apparatus of the primeministerial Office. Simitis originally created the Press Office of the Prime Minister. Karamanlis retained the Press Office and expanded the communication apparatus of the Maximos Mansion by creating the posts of the Minister of State and his deputy who replaced the Minister of Press and Media acting as government spokespersons. Papandreou initially maintained the Press Office as well as the Minister of State and his deputy, though only the latter acted as government spokesperson. After a year in office, Papandreou formed the Group of Political and Communicative Planning consisting of certain members of the Council of Ministers (including the Deputy Minister of State as government spokesman) in order to achieve a better coordination inside his government, while he retained the primeministerial Press Office. However, due to the Group's apparent failure, Papandreou adopted the recommendations made by the Committee for the Reform of the Government and overhauled the Office of the Prime Minister. He created the post of the General Secretary to the Prime Minister responsible, among others, to supervise the seven units of the primeministerial Office, one of which was the Political and Communicational Planning Unit. In parallel, Papandreou assigned the responsibility of government representative to the Minister of State while he abolished the post of the Deputy Minister of State. Overall, from 1996 until 2011 new outreach

units were added in the primeministerial Office reinforcing the notion that modern prime ministers in Greece have engaged in a permanent campaign mentality.

The second common trend across the compared premiers is that they collaborated with communication professionals like pollsters, strategists and journalists, not only in the election campaigns but also in the governing process, in order to improve the communication strategy and the news management of their administration. Simitis cooperated with the pollster Stratos Fanaras and from 1999 onwards with the strategist Lefteris Kousoulis. Karamanlis consulted with the strategist John Loulis, the pollster Dimitris Mavros and from 2000 onwards with the former political journalist Theodoros Rousopoulos. In line with his predecessors, Papandreou collaborated with communication experts like the former political journalist George Elenopoulos and the pollster Maria Karaklioumi.

Third, the use of private (and public) polling in order to shape government policy and communication is another common feature of all recent Greek Prime Ministers. Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou regularly observed focus groups, opinion surveys on all critical issues and polling indicators like government and opposition popularity, the popularity of both the government and the opposition in specific policy areas, the voting intentions as well as the approval of the Prime Minister and of other political leaders. Especially Papandreou became a pioneer in this regard compared to his predecessors in the premiership. He established in the headquarters of his party a mechanism for conducting private polls since he did not trust the public opinion research companies.

Furthermore, the polls influenced the decisions of Prime Ministers in certain cases. For instance, they consulted opinion polls to choose the candidates for the municipal elections. Another case of influence by the polls is the reshuffles that all political executives in Greece made to improve the image of their government. Regarding policy issues there have been cases where the Prime Ministers changed tack based on

opinion poll findings. For example, Karamanlis postponed his education reform until 2006 because the findings of the polls showed that the public believed that he had not conducted the necessary dialogue among all of those who were involved with this issue. However, it should be noted there have been cases where, despite public support as expressed in polls, the reforms were never actually implemented. For instance, the privatisation of public enterprises had no actual results to present during both Karamanlis' and Papandreou's premierships. The vast majority of the public at rates of over 60 per cent were polarised of privatisation, but the views of the public sector unions had greater impact on the government. As a result, politicians treated the findings of opinion polls on these issues with skepticism. They believed that the conflict with the unions would entail tremendous political cost as the continuous and dynamic mobilisation might shift public opinion.

The fourth common trend is the use of campaign-like messages. Simitis, Karamanlis and in a lesser degree Papandreou attempted to formulate and communicate campaign-like messages, using them repeatedly and consistently as labels for their government plans throughout their tenures. For example, Simitis' main political goal was to 'modernise' Greece. In particular, his electoral pledge in the election of 1996 was the goal of securing Greece's entry into the Economic and Monetary Union and the main electoral pledge in the 2000 election was the effort to achieve the convergence of Greece with the European standards of living. To this end, throughout his two terms, Simitis used repeatedly and consistently the motto of 'Strong Greece' in order to express his policy in a simple and understandable message.

Karamanlis campaigned in the 2004 general elections stressing the need for a 'political change' after almost 20 years of PASOK's rule. Initially, he projected his fiscal retrenchment program as a 'mild' fiscal adjustment. In parallel, he labeled his sweeping changes in the economy and the welfare state as 'reforms'. The latter was Karamanlis' motto throughout his governance. Papandreou campaigned in the 2009 national elections promising to implement a plan of Keynesian expansionary policy to

get the economy out of the recession arguing that ‘there is money’ to finance his policy. The slogan ‘there is money’ followed Papandreou until the middle of January 2010 (Pretenteris, 2012:59). However, at the beginning of February 2010, he changed policy course and in the face of immediate default, he adopted a plan of rapid fiscal consolidation and supply-side reforms. The so called ‘Memorandum’ (the bail-out agreement between Greece and the Troika of the EC-ECB-IMF) which followed a few months later forced Papandreou to alter his central message arguing that his intention was to ensure the ‘rescue’ of the country by averting a disorderly default.

The fifth common feature of the Greek campaigning style of governing implemented by the three incumbents is the use of campaign-like tactics to get their messages across, even though as it has been illustrated, each of the PMs adopted a different campaigning style. However, apart from the campaign-like public appearances, recent premiers in Greece engaged in public activities in the context of parliamentary democracy. For example, they addressed the Parliament and the parliamentary groups of their parties, gave speeches to party conventions and congresses, gave press conferences after the European summits in Brussels or after their official meetings with foreign leaders (either in Athens or abroad). More specifically, they did make hundreds of those public appearances exploiting the opportunity to disseminate their messages to the public in an unfiltered way, given the fact that all these public addresses received extensive (live) media coverage by TV and radio networks as well as websites.

Certainly, Simitis’ predecessors, who did not engage in a permanent campaign process, made those public appeals to receive media coverage mainly by the public TV and radio networks, which had been monopolizing the media sector until the beginning of 1990s. Yet in the cases of Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou, these public appeals have been regarded as part of the permanent campaign because they differ in two respects. Firstly, they received live coverage not only by the public but also by the private media and websites. Secondly, they took place in a context of the

permanent campaign coupled with campaign-like public appearances, campaign-like messages and communication institutions filled with communication professionals and with the use of opinion polling. As a result, this study, following Kernel's typology, brought together all these public appeals, dividing them at the same time into major and minor public addresses.

At this point, it is notable that the regular governing season, in which the permanent campaign took place, was mediated by local/regional and European elections. So the question is raised whether Greek political leaders were forced to engage with a permanent campaign strategy given the timing of the elections. In the British context, as Seymour-Ure has noticed, 'with devolution, European parliamentary elections and the occasional referendum, prime ministers have more opportunities than in the past for partisan campaigning during the course of their government' (2001:196). There is no doubt that the mediated elections for the local government institutions and the European Parliament could be seen as motives for the prime ministers to engage in the notion of the permanent campaign.

However, their influence can hardly be viewed as decisive. One of the reasons is the timing of these elections. In the case of Simitis, the local/regional elections were held two years after the 1996 and 2000 national elections, in 1998 and 2002 respectively. Similarly, in the case of Karamanlis they were held in 2006 while in the case of Papandreou they took place only a year after the 2009 general elections, in November 2010. In addition, the elections for the European Parliament were conducted three times from 1996 until 2011, in 1999 (three years after the 1996 general elections), in 2004 (three months after the 2004 national elections) and in 2009 (two years after the 2007 parliamentary elections). Therefore, even though the political parties and the party leaders ran the campaign for the European elections, the timing of the latter hardly forced them to campaign constantly. Another reason is that the local/regional campaign is largely undertaken by candidates themselves, who run for mayors and heads of the regional government institutions, not by the political parties at the central



level, with the exception of Papandreou in 2010. The latter participated in person in the campaign in order to back his electoral strategy to turn the local elections into a referendum about his government, by linking the electoral appeal of the candidates supported by PASOK with public support to his government and the bailout package he had put in place.

It is certain that the implementation of the campaigning style of governing was differentiated, to some extent, between the political executives under consideration. For example, unlike Simitis and Papandreou, Karamanlis' permanent campaign appeared to exert more centralised control upon government communications having created within the Maximos Mansion the post of Minister of State who acted as government representative coordinating in parallel the heads of the ministerial press offices on a daily basis. In addition, unlike his center-left counterparts Karamanlis had more frequent and consistent consultation with communication professionals and relied more heavily on opinion polling and especially focus groups evidence to shape his political decisions.

There are three reasons that explain these qualitative differences. First, Karamanlis, as opposition leader, employed a model of centralised and well-coordinated party communications in order to improve its efficiency given he had to deal with a hostile media environment because the majority of the media were left leaning and pro-government. As a result, he continued to employ the same model once in power. Second, the New Democracy party had been out of office for 11 years and it had to transform itself in order to be electable again. The transformation resided in focus group data and sophisticated opinion polling, driven mainly by the strategist and expert on focus group analysis John Loulis. He was the one who formulated the middle-ground strategy arguing that ND should change its overall image from a right wing to a party of the middle ground. The third reason that explains the fact that the ND administration proved to be more poll-driven than the left-of-centre governments might be related to the notion that the center-right parties are ideologically more pro-

market and consequently they are used to adopt more easily (political) marketing techniques rather than the socialist parties.

Another difference between the permanent campaign strategies applied by the three premiers appears to be the use of particular campaign-like tactics to get their messages across. In the election campaigns the Greek leaders are expected to give televised, radio, press and web interviews, also to host press conferences, make nationwide tours delivering speeches to local audiences, give speeches in crowded partisan gatherings in Athens, make unedited televised addresses to the national audience as well as use mostly televised advertisements.

In the aftermath of the election, during the 'regular governing season', the three Prime Ministers continued to use campaign-like public appearances, yet they chose those that were more suited to the communication capabilities of each. Simitis, for instance, had no particular communicative or rhetorical skills and thus gave few televised interviews during his tenure, while he made numerous tours of the country highlighting in that way the work of the government, which placed particular emphasis on upgrading the country's infrastructure. Karamanlis also made went on domestic political tours but, unlike Simitis, preferred the live televised addresses from the Maximos Mansion to contact the Greek people on serious political economic, social and foreign policy issues given the fact that he had exceptional rhetorical skills and an outstanding communicative presence.

Papandreou, although his incumbency was relatively short-lived compared to his predecessors, showed as Prime Minister communicative hyperactivity. In the first year in office, he instructed that his speeches in the Cabinet would be broadcasted 'live'. Moreover, he gave several televised addresses from inside the Prime Minister's Office. In addition, he gave numerous interviews and published many signed articles to a number of Greek newspapers. Furthermore, he gave particular emphasis on the use of new technologies and social media such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube,

which allowed him to have direct, unmediated contact with citizens and especially with the younger generation. Additionally, he made several foreign media appearances. The latter occurred mainly because Greece, during the tenure of Papandreou, was placed at the heart of the European and global economic crisis and the Greek state appealed to the European support mechanism that was financed by the member-states of the Eurozone and the International Monetary Fund. Therefore, Papandreou considered it necessary to inform the public of other countries about the effort made by Greece.

However, in spite of some qualitative differences like the fact that they had different communication skills, they came from different political families or they represented different intraparty factions, all three premiers adopted the permanent campaign mentality, even though they adapted it, to some extent, to themselves.

## **6.2 The impact of the permanent campaign**

Another common feature of the Greek permanent campaign strategy is related to its impact on the primeministerial popularity. The study compared the number of primeministerial public addresses with the primeministerial popularity ratings indicating that the impact was rather weak. In general, neither the major addresses nor the minor addresses exerted considerable influence on popularity failing consequently to increase, let alone retain approval ratings. For instance Papandreou, who appears to be the most active of the three premiers in making public addresses and particularly campaign-like public appeals, saw his numbers fall steadily and from a certain point significantly until his resignation in November 2011. Overall, irrespective of the particular communication skills each of the three prime ministers has, none of them, whether center-left or center-right, affected their popularity by adopting the permanent campaign strategy.

Given that the permanent campaign cannot affect significantly the popularity ratings, the question is what can exert influence on them? It is obvious that there are larger forces influencing leaders' popularity (Edwards, 2003; Mueller, 1970; Ostrom and Simon, 1985; Jones, 1994). Of course, it has to be noted that the analysis of other factors affecting the Greek premiers' approval ratings exceeds the scope of this study. However, this research discusses the issue to some extent assuming that the issues dominating the public agenda like the state of the economy, scandals, foreign policy issues, domestic and international crises, the way political executives respond to these issues and the role of the media in shaping the same agenda play a crucial role in influencing the premiers' popularity ratings.

In the case of Simitis, at the beginning of the first term, he enjoyed high popularity ratings between 55 and 61 per cent, confirming the honeymoon hypothesis - the notion that newly elected governments and newly elected prime ministers enjoy a certain honeymoon phase with public opinion (Wenzelburger, 2012: 1159). The honeymoon lasted more than a year given that from October 1997 until May 1999; the primeministerial approval rating was in continuing decline. Particularly from 61 per cent in October 1997 Simitis' approval dropped to 50 per cent in February 1998 and to 45 per cent in April remaining at that level until May 1999, a month ahead of the elections for the European Parliament.

The reason was the discontent of powerful social groups, which had been triggered by the application of the fiscal consolidation program (in order to meet the fiscal criteria for the entry of Greece into the Eurozone) as well as the large-scale reforms in public sector (Hlepas, 2003; Kazakos, 2010). In addition to the social unrest was the political opposition of the New Democracy party and the left-wing Communist party, which damaged the primeministerial image even more. In addition, at the beginning of 1999, a foreign policy crisis produced significant negative publicity for the government. In

particular, the Turkish Secret Services in Kenya arrested the leader of PKK<sup>7</sup> Abdullah Ocalan while being transferred from the Greek embassy (where he had sought refuge) to the international airport of Nairobi (Voulgaris, 2008: 131). The crisis caused a diplomatic incident with Turkey, which had branded Ocalan as a dangerous terrorist. On the other hand, the opposition exerted harsh criticism over the government's handling of the issue, accusing the Prime Minister Simitis of handing over Abdullah Ocalan to the Turks.

At this point, Simitis initiated an attempt to counter-attack criticism and restore the socialist government's image as well as his own appeal by intensifying his communication activities, partly due to the then upcoming party congress in March 1999 (Simitis, 2005: 508), and the European Parliament elections of June 1999 (Loulis, 2007: 307). However, he hardly improved his personal ratings, failing to turn around the negative electoral prospects before the elections for the European Parliament in 1999. The New Democracy party under Karamanlis' leadership defeated PASOK by 3 per cent (Loulis, 2011: 156).

Yet, in the aftermath of the negative outcome of the European elections, Simitis saw his ratings to climb again to reach 58 per cent in September 1999 remaining close to the level of 60 per cent up to the parliamentary elections of April 2000. A combination of different factors contributed to the improvement of Simitis' performance during that time, including his success in dealing with the domestic crisis caused by a strong earthquake, which took place in Athens in September 1999, the accomplishment of the introduction of Greece into the Eurozone and the achievement of high growth rates. Additionally, at the Helsinki Council in 1999, Simitis was successful in initiating the process of Cyprus' entry into the European Union (Economides, 2005: 484-485).

From the April 2000 elections until March 2001 Simitis' approval ratings displayed a very slow decline to 54 per cent, in spite of the fact that his decision to erase the

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<sup>7</sup> Political Organisation of Kurdistan.

religious status from personal identity cards issued by the Greek state caused severe criticism from the Greek Orthodox Church organising massive rallies against the government's decision (Loulis, 2011: 140). One of the reasons of the modest decline is that the segment of the population that turned against Simitis' policy belonged largely to the conservative, right-wing part of the political spectrum rather than to the centre-left, and thus it was considered of lesser importance.

However, in March 2001 Simitis' public approval rating dropped well below the 54 per cent threshold (48 per cent) staying at a level below 50 per cent until September 2001. At the time, Simitis was promoting the reform of the Social Security system. The policy proposal submitted by the Minister of Labour Tasos Giannitsis was strongly resisted by the trade unions. In particular, as Kazakos has pointed out 'the General Confederation of Greek Labour (GCGL/ΓΣΕΕ), headed by representatives of the public sector unions, rejected any negotiation on this basis and took to the streets. After a massive demonstration, the largest in many years, and a general strike on May the 17<sup>th</sup> 2001, the whole process came to a halt' (2004: 911). Furthermore, leading government officials and party figures began to clash over the proposed change of the pensions system. As Giannitsis has put it:

'In fact nobody inside PASOK wanted any discussion of any form. The union space attached to PASOK reacted with vehemence and the union bodies and individuals rejected any dialogue. Of course the full (...) support of this reaction from almost all government and party officials fueled its intensity and its extent (...) It was obvious that PASOK and the social security issue ran on a divisive track' (2007: 151–152).

As a result, Simitis withdrew his proposal and called for a party congress in October 2001 in order to renew his leadership mandate and reshape his falling status within the party. Eventually, the party congress re-elected Simitis as Chairman of PASOK who saw at the same time his public approval rating rise again, exceeding the 50 per cent mark (54 per cent) in November 2001 and remaining at that level until the beginning of 2002 (52 per cent). Yet, from February until July 2002, Simitis saw his popularity

decline to 49 per cent. Intraparty criticism by prominent political figures and the failure to promote health care reform due to, among other reasons, the reactions of powerful organised interests in the health system and the departure of the Minister of Health could explain the fall of his popularity (Loulis, 2004; Mossialos & Allin, 2005: 431-432).

However, from July onwards Simitis saw his popularity ratings climb again above 50 per cent remaining at that level up to the summer of 2003 (51 per cent). One of the reasons was the arrest of members of various left-wing terrorist groups (Loulis, 2004: 162-165). In addition, Simitis avoided the initiation of controversial reforms. Instead, he concentrated on the completion of public works, Greece's European presidency in the first half of 2003 and the preparation of the Olympic Games of 2004. Lastly, in September 2003 he announced a plan of expansionary policy measures as well as a program aimed to raise the Greek standards of living to reach those of the people of the most developed members of the European Union (Karakousis, 2006; Karzis, 2006; Kazakos, 2010; Pantagias, 2009: memo; 2009b: interview with the author).

In the case of Karamanlis, after eleven consecutive years of PASOK government, ND came to power taking 45.4 per cent of the total vote and gaining a solid majority with 160 parliamentary seats. Thus, ND enjoyed a long honeymoon period with public opinion winning the elections for the European Parliament held a few after the national election in June 2004. In parallel, Karamanlis saw his popularity ratings remain at a high level, above 60 per cent, from May 2004 up to February 2005. One of the reasons, explaining his high approval ratings, was the successful organising of the 2004 Olympic Games in Athens. Another reason was that, in spite of the fact he displayed, by revising the statistical data on public finances, that fiscal deficit and the public debt were higher than the previous government had admitted and hence initiated a fiscal consolidation program to bring the deficit down, he managed to blame the former PASOK government for this. He could be said to have employed a

tactic of blame avoidance, which has been considered as effective in the cases of fiscal consolidation plans promoted by newly elected governments (Weaver 1986; Vis & Vas Kersbergen, 2007).

A third reason was that he promoted a policy plan of gradual fiscal consolidation along with incremental reforms in the economy, public services and public administration, which was consistent with the image of the moderate political leader of the ‘middle ground’ he had projected while being in opposition (Loulis, 2008: 120; Dinas, 2008: 601). Moreover, he not only managed to build a consensus with PASOK, the main opposition party, in the issue of electing the new Head of State<sup>8</sup> but he was also able to impose party discipline since he had won the election by a landslide (after 11 years in opposition) and ND enjoyed a solid majority of 165 seats in Parliament.

Between February 2005 and June 2007, Karamanlis’ popularity fell, yet it remained over 50 per cent. One of the reasons was that during this period a number of corruption scandals emerged generating negative publicity for the government and exerting negative influence on Karamanlis’ appeal. In the first months of 2006 the so-called Vodafone scandal occurred. In particular, at the end of January 2006 three ministers – the Minister of Public Security, George Voulgarakis, the Minister of Justice Anastasis Papaligouras and the Minister of State (press spokesman) Theodoros Rousopoulos – gave a press conference at which they declared that during the 2004 Olympic Games an ‘unknown centre’, situated close to the American Embassy, had tapped into the system of the mobile company Vodafone. The calls of more than a hundred mobile phones belonging to top-ranking state officials, elected representatives and even the Prime Minister himself had been affected (Loulis, 2008: 131; Pappas, 2010). The scandal caused damage to the image of both the government and Karamanlis personally, probably because the three ministers had no convincing

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<sup>8</sup> In Greece, the President of the Republic is elected by the Parliament. The election requires approval by at least 180 votes in a chamber of 300 seats (Lijphart, 1999; Makridimitris, 2003).



answer to the question as to why they had delayed disclosing the information (Loulis, 2008: 133).

Moreover, in the run-up to the local elections in October 2006, a new scandal<sup>9</sup> occurred concerning the function of the Hellenic Competition Commission. Opinion polls suggested that the new scandal caused moderate damage to the Karamanlis administration, yet ND managed to win the following local elections, with conservative candidates elected in the majority of prefectures and municipalities (Loulis, 2008: 159-160). A third scandal, which came to light in 2007, was related to the function of the pension funds. In particular, the heads of pension funds that had close links with government officials and figures of the governing party appeared to have invested in over-priced, high risk bonds (Loulis, 2008: 216). Karamanlis attempted to overcome the scandal by expelling the supervising Labour Minister, Savvas Tsitouridis, by changing the whole process of hiring the heads of the social security funds and by cancelling the particular investment in high-risk bonds (Dinas, 2008: 602).

Another reason explaining the decline of Karamanlis' approval was the political cost accumulated by most of the promoted reforms from 2005 onwards in the economy, public administration and the welfare state. In particular, the trade unionists of the public sector turned against the government plans by staging a series of strikes (Loulis, 2008). According to Loulis, the demonstrations made the government's policy look much more radical than it really was and, since public opinion backed the reform,

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<sup>9</sup> The director of the independent authority of the Hellenic Competition Commission and two other individuals, who were seen as having connections with government officials, had demanded a large amount of money from a well-known dairy company in return for their dropping the accusation that an anti-competitive cartel had been created in the milk industry (Dinas, 2008: 602). Karamanlis reacted immediately and the head of the Commission involved in the scandal was arrested. However, PASOK and Papandreou strongly criticised strongly the government, accusing it of corruption.

what the demonstrations actually did was to help Karamanlis to focus public attention on government policy and away from the scandal of the tapped mobile phones (2008: 135-137).

In addition, at the beginning of 2006 he began to promote constitutional reform focusing on several areas like the function of universities. Moreover, in April 2006 the ND government and particularly the Minister of Education, Marietta Giannakou, presented a draft plan for the reform of Greek universities. The proposals 'created a chain of reactions among Greek students, who demonstrated in rallies and the occupation of the buildings of 243 (out of 258) university departments. The government decided to postpone the submission of the bill to Parliament until September, but when the issue was brought back, students resumed their protesting in a second wave of rallies and faculty occupations (..) that lasted until November' (Dinas, 2008: 602). In March 2007, Karamanlis managed to pass through parliament his Education reform, which had already met with widespread student demonstrations throughout 2007 (Loulis, 2008: 192–193). According to Dinas, 'given the difficulties encountered in pushing for educational reform, the government appeared reluctant to raise other important policy issues after March 2007' (2008: 602).

At this point, it should be noted that towards the summer of 2007, the public finances seemed to have been put in order, given that the deficit had been reduced below the 3 per cent target set by the Growth and Stability Pact. However, the deficit reduction proved to be barely sustainable and a few months later, it began to climb once again, with the result that it exceeded the 3 per cent ceiling by the end of the year (Kazakos, 2010: 142). Probably anticipating the need to introduce new austerity measures and aiming to exploit his lead in the opinion polls, Karamanlis called for snap elections on 16 September 2007 (Kazakos, 2010: 162).

From June 2007 until December, Karamanlis ratings remained unchanged at over 50 per cent, in spite of the domestic crisis broke a few days after calling for early

elections in August 2007. The immense environmental, financial and human devastation caused by the destructive fires that broke out in the Peloponnese and which caused 70 deaths, led as expected to the postponement of any campaign activities (Dinas, 2008: 603). Initially the ND government attempted to avoid the blame for the catastrophe, which in retrospect was attributed to the disorganised state crisis mechanism. Then Karamanlis made an effort to shift public focus from the responsibility of his government over the inefficiency of public administration in dealing with the fires to the need to restore the damaged areas. In this context, he managed to gain ‘considerable financial support from the European Union and this ameliorated the image of the government. What proved much more beneficial, however, was the decision to provide direct financial support of 3,000 euro to everyone who had suffered from the fires’ (Dinas, 2008: 603). ND managed to keep ahead of PASOK, due to Karamanlis' restoration plan after the fires. As Loulis has suggested, the greatest part of the electorate blamed both ND and PASOK for the failure of the public administration to prevent the environmental crisis; yet ND had a better image than PASOK, Karamanlis enjoyed higher popularity than Papandreou and he was also seen as the most significant electoral asset of the governing party (2008: 262-269). At the end, the ND party won the parliamentary elections.

From September 2007 until the summer of 2008, Karamanlis saw his popularity decline further below 50 per cent. In spite of his efforts to continue the implementation of his reform plan, in particular the privatisation scheme, a series of corruption scandals<sup>10</sup> attracted the public's attention. In parallel, in the autumn of 2008

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<sup>10</sup> More specifically the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Culture, close ally of the Prime Minister, was implicated in a sex scandal, which caused him to resign his post, and even to attempt to commit suicide. The Minister of Labour, who was responsible for the ongoing pension reforms, was also forced to resign due to the revelation that he had illegally employed an immigrant Indian family as housekeepers. The Minister of State and spokesperson of the government along with the Minister of Culture also had to leave their posts, because of their involvement in a shady land-swap

Karamanlis announced new austerity measures and particularly tax increases that aimed to bring down the rising deficit (Kazakos, 2010: 163).

However, Karamanlis' plan was hardly credible and it failed to put the public finances in order. Additionally, the international financial crises broke out and affected the Greek economy, by degrade the banking system and consequently, threw the economy into recession. In an effort to avert the deeper economic downturn, the ND government increased public spending (Kazakos, 2010: 165). In November, Karamanlis saw his personal approval ratings improve because, as Kazakos (2010) has put it, in a time of crisis public opinion tends to back the incumbents. Nevertheless, the sharpest fall in Karamanlis' popularity was evident in the period from November 2008 until March 2009. It dropped significantly by 10 percentage points to 42 per cent. In December 2008, a police officer shot down a student in downtown Athens initiating widespread riots all over Greece, with vandalism of public property, shops and violent clashes with police forces.

In an attempt to restore his government's image, Karamanlis undertook a reshuffle of the Cabinet replacing, among others, the Minister of Economy and Finance. Yet, he failed to restore his own and his government's image due to the deepening of the economic crisis and the continuing corruption scandals. In parallel, in the second term, even though the New Democracy party had achieved a clear victory over PASOK with a lead of 4 per cent, it saw its share of the vote decline from 45.4 per cent to 42 per cent and won only a narrow parliamentary majority. Consequently, as Rousopoulos and Antonaros have noted, some MPs of the governing party frequently criticised government policy in order to defend the interests of their core constituencies

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between the Greek state and the Mount Athos monastery of Vatopedi. One of the biggest corruption cases was the one that involved top-ranking civil servants, party members of both major parties and former ministers, with bribes received from the multinational corporation Siemens in return for favouring the company in securing lucrative public works contracts (Mavrogordatos, 2009: 968).

(Antonaros, 2012b: interview with the author; Rousopoulos, 2012: interview with the author). Additionally, due to the marginal parliamentary majority, Karamanlis was unable to expel the rebels because this would cause early elections, while the possibility of gaining more seats in Parliament was diminishing over time. The damage to the image of New Democracy, however, could also be explained by the fact that public opinion seems to have added to the scandals of the second term the scandals of the first term, which cumulatively operated consistently against the government (Loulis, 2011: 209-213).

As a result, Karamanlis lost by 4 per cent the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009. Yet, the popularity of Karamanlis started to rise again towards the autumn of 2009 because of the activity of the government in dealing with the issues of the economic crisis, crime and illegal immigration. As Dinas has suggested:

‘Karamanlis came to power as the modest politician determined to fight this phenomenon [corruption] and to proceed with necessary reforms. Failing in both of these aspects, he was left only with the effort to retain a positive personal profile, which, however, was less and less associated with the record of his government. People did and still do think positively of Karamanlis, but this positive evaluation became an increasingly weak predictor of their evaluations of his record as Prime Minister’ (2010: 397).

In the case of Papandreou, during the first months of his premiership he was able to a certain extent to sustain high ratings of popularity over 60 per cent in spite of the deteriorated economic situation. Papandreou had managed to blame his predecessor in the premiership Karamanlis for the inherited economic mess revealing that instead of what had been stated, the fiscal deficit had reached double-digit levels. Of course, the revelation generated negative publicity. Greece’s European partners and the international markets exerted pressures on government to apply measures of fiscal retrenchment and form a budget plan aiming to reduce the deficit. However,

Papandreou was seen to keep his election commitments of implementing expansionary policies.

As a result, the European Commission and the ECO-FIN assessed the fiscal consolidation plan of the centre-left government as unrealistic. Additionally, the international markets exerted pressure on the Greek economy raising the interest rates of Greek bonds, while the rating agencies downgraded the borrowing status of Greece (Kazakos, 2010: 203-204; Loulis, 2011: 277). In an attempt to respond to the various pressures to change policy course, Papandreou announced that he would take some additional austerity measures including, among others, spending cuts of the operating costs of the State, restriction of uncontrolled waste in pension funds, partial suspending of recruitment of public employees and abolishing of public sector units (Papandreou, 2009d). Those measures were regarded as painless by public opinion hardly affecting Papandreou's popularity, which remained over 60 per cent.

Yet, from January onwards Papandreou's approval started to decline losing 13 per cent in three months until March 2010 when it stood at 49 per cent. One of the reasons was that the state of the economy had deteriorated further. In January, the European Council identified that Greece had not taken effective steps to reduce the deficit and in parallel, the spreads of the Greek bonds kept climbing while the rating agencies continued to downgrade the Greek economy (Kazakos, 2011: 26). Another reason was that Papandreou changed policy course. At the beginning of February 2010, he announced the first wave of austerity measures, including wage cuts and increases in indirect taxes while in March he announced the second wave of austerity measures deviating from the pre-election commitments.

From March until December 2010, Papandreou's public approval was still falling (from 49 per cent to 39 per cent). Two reasons explain the continuing fall. First, the government proved to be unable to stop the deterioration of the state of the economy. International markets still remained unconvinced about the will and capacity of the

Greek government to put its house in order and hence lowered the credit ratings of Greece and raised interest rates making it difficult for the country to refinance its debt (Loulis, 2011: 278). Then Prime Minister Papandreou faced with the possibility of an immediate default asked for financial assistance from its European partners. The European Union launched the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) in order to bail-out Eurozone members in need on the condition of the application of a policy plan including austerity measures and structural changes under the supervision of the so-called Troika.

Second, the Memorandum was a policy package that deviated from both the pre-election commitments and the ideology of the party causing intra-party and inter-governmental reactions as well as strikes by the trade unions. In particular, the parliamentary approval of the Memorandum marked a radical reverse in Papandreou's government in comparison with the core election promise of the implementation of a stimulus package to scale back recession. Papandreou had now put in place a savage austerity package, accompanied by liberal reforms such as the liberalisation of the product and labour market, social security reform, the restructuring of state-owned corporations and the reorganisation of the public administration (Kazakos, 2011: 78-83). The policy plan as a whole seemed to deviate from the ideological principles of PASOK as well, as Papandreou had recognized.

In this context, it is easier to explain to a certain degree the intra-party reactions to the government's policy. For example, during the voting process for the Memorandum in May 2010, three MPs from the leftist populist faction of PASOK voted against and consequently Papandreou had to expel them from the Parliamentary Group (Loulis, 2011: 279). Another example is the public critique by the Minister of Labour against the Troika regarding its policies on the issue of labour market reform. A third example is the attack by dozens of the MPs of the ruling party against the Minister of Finance on the issue of privatisations, which put PASOK in direct confrontation with the

public sector unions that were practically the backbone of the party (Kazakos, 2011: 109-111; Pretenteris, 2012: 58).

From the beginning of 2011 onwards, Papandreou saw his popularity ratings fall further. More specifically from 39 per cent in December 2010, they fell to 36 per cent in March 2011 while the most substantive drop took place between March and July when they fell well below 30 per cent (26 per cent). There are several reasons to explain this continuing decline in the polling figures. First, the fiscal programme failed to meet the targets, since the deficit was projected to reach 9.5 per cent instead of 7.5 per cent of GDP. Therefore, the government had to proceed to take new measures in accordance with the Midterm Fiscal Strategy Programme in the summer of 2011 in order to bring the programme back on track. Second, although the reforms received parliamentary approval, they were not actually implemented and thus a great deal of criticism was generated on behalf of the Troika of Greece's lenders.

Third, the central theme in the media which dominated the public agenda were the Troika's quarterly checks exercised on the Greek economy; these aimed to draft progress reports on the implementation of measures on which the disbursement of the loan installments depended. An example of a Troika's intervention with a significant communicative impact was the issue of privatisations. At a press conference given by representatives of the tripartite body after completion of the evaluation in February 2011, and after having recognized the progress made by Greece, they stressed the need for further efforts on expenditure and revenue issues through the speeding-up of the reform process. As stated by the representative of the European Commission Servaas Derouse, the country had until 2015 to proceed with the privatisations and sale of public assets of 50 billion euros instead of the 7 billion by 2013, which previously had been the goal. Despite the fact that this issue had been agreed with the government (Kazakos, 2011: 128), Ministers and prominent party figures attacked the Troika, while Papandreou complained to the head of the EC, IMF and ECB respectively (Kazakos 2011: 130).



Fourth, the recession had deepened more than expected and unemployment had increased more than estimated triggering widespread social discontent. Fifth, social discontent along with the continuous strikes called by the major trade unions of the country protesting over both the austerity measures and the reform of the government and state-owned enterprises, fuelled the tension among the ranks of PASOK's Parliamentary Group. In particular, two PASOK MPs George Floridis and Hector Nasiokas resigned from their seats in parliament. Another PASOK MP George Lianis resigned from the Parliamentary Group and became independent while several MPs speculated that they would vote against the Midterm Fiscal Strategy Programme (an obligation set by the Memorandum) increasing the catastrophic possibility that the country would not be able to receive the deposit from the loan and would be led to a disorderly default (Loulis, 2011: 293). At the same time, thousands of citizens, the Greek 'Indignados'<sup>11</sup>, were protesting at the centre of Athens.

Sixth, the situation deteriorated further due to the political maneuvering that Papandreou made in June 2011. More specifically, he tried to reach a consensus with Samaras, and in a desperate move, he even proposed resigning from the post of Prime Minister so that a coalition government could be formed with the participation of the two major parties. Yet most of the prominent party figures rejected Papandreou's initiative because they were worried about losing power. This move seems to have brought about a fatal blow to the image of Papandreou's leadership capacity. According to Pretenteris, 'the Prime Minister [Papandreou] began talking to Samaras [leader of the main opposition New Democracy] about the possibility of forming a coalition government with the participation of PASOK and ND and instead he ended

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<sup>11</sup> Inspired by the Spanish example of the 'Indignados', ordinary citizens organised via social media such as Facebook and Twitter massive demonstrations in the major squares of all major cities in Greece, protesting against the austerity policy.

up co-governing with Venizelos [his intra-party rival] in a reshuffled PASOK government' (2012: 120).

At this point, a question is raised. If the effect of the permanent campaign is limited and the primeministerial popularity is shaped by other factors, then what would have happened if the premiers had not engaged in a permanent campaign process?

Given the fact that the opposition and the media seek consistently to dominate the public agenda, it is likely that if prime ministers do not engage in communication activities then they might see their political position undermined, even though they may enjoy the primary role in setting the agenda through their governing activities. As Seymour-Ure has put it, if the prime minister does not use his public communication resources then he risks 'losing the initiative to others, within and outside the core executive, who will also be using media to influence the same things (...) Poor communication can positively weaken a prime minister. This disadvantage reinforces the fundamental importance to the prime minister of managing to keep control of public communication' (2003: 52, 64). Among the other actors, who compete with the prime minister (in political communication terms), are the opposition leaders, the media and the intraparty opposition.

In terms of the opposition leaders, one example that illustrates this point is Karamanlis. The latter, as it has been indicated, campaigned constantly as opposition leader against Prime Minister Simitis. Another example is George Papandreou who, as opposition leader, appeared to have adopted the permanent campaign style against Prime Minister Karamanlis. Therefore, if the Greek prime ministers had engaged in endless campaigning they might have seen their position undermined by their rivals.

Of course, one can argue that both opposition leaders undertook the permanent campaign because they have to deal with prime ministers who acted as permanent campaigners. Therefore, if the latter had not applied this concept, the opposition leader would not have implemented it. Yet, the truth is that Karamanlis and Papandreou

campaigned in a non-stop mode not only because of the respective incumbents' campaigning but also because they had to deal with pressing and hostile media.

Karamanlis, for instance, faced harsh criticism from the mainstream media of the country for two reasons. First, the print and electronic media with the greatest impact were affiliated with PASOK and consequently they were negatively predisposed against him (Karakousis, 2006; Karzis, 2006; Kurtzos, 2003: 245-249). The second reason was that Karamanlis had accused the center-left leaning media that they were protecting Simitis at a communication level not due to their political positioning or for commercial reasons, but because the owners of these media were also business owners who had financial transactions with the government. In particular, he had accused the government of offering government contracts for public works and public procurements in exchange for positive media coverage and vice versa (Karakousis, 2006: 426; Karzis, 2006: 191-193; Kottakis, 2011). Another example of a political leader who followed the permanent campaign trend in order to deal with hostile media is George Papandreou. Most of the left-leaning newspapers and television networks that dominate the media landscape<sup>12</sup> criticised him throughout the first term of his party leadership from 2004 to 2007, because of his inability to improve PASOK's performance (Loulis, 2008). Moreover, as it has been mentioned, when he lost the 2007 general election, the newspapers and television stations close to his party strongly criticised him and held him accountable for the defeat.

The above are an indication of the crucial role the media play in contemporary politics in Greece and their capacity to reinforce or damage the image of modern leaders. In particular, in line with what happens in other countries with modern systems of

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<sup>12</sup> Among the left-leaning media are the leading dailies *Ta Nea*, *To Ethnos*, *To Vima* and *Eleftherotypia* and the *Sunday Vima*, *Sunday Ethnos* and *Sunday Eleftherotypia*, as well as the television network Mega Channel (whose owners are the publishers of the left-leaning newspapers) (Kurtzos, 2003).

political communication, ‘Greek media have begun to fight with the politicians for control of the political agenda and have started to make themselves heard in the process of political communication with a constant stream of criticism of politicians and the actions of the parties (..) [they] have tried to create stories about political conflict by giving particular attention to politicians who hold controversial views or who oppose the actions of the government’ (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 58). Thus, prime ministers and in general politicians in Greece have to compete, in setting the political and public agenda not only, with their political rivals, but also with powerful media and aggressive journalists, so they need to be active in political communication terms in order to, at least defend themselves.

Except for the role of the opposition and the media, the prime ministers face also intraparty opposition, which seek to undermine their position. For instance, Simitis emerged from the modernising wing of his party and came to power without a strong party support base. When he was first elected Prime Minister, Simitis managed to secure only the support of 54 per cent of the votes (Featherstone, 2005: 226; Loulis, 2007: 297). In subsequent re-elections, even whilst standing unopposed, he never managed to secure the support of more than 71 per cent of party members. As Simitis notes, ‘the electoral result meant that a significant part of PASOK would continue to distance itself from the government’ (2005: 508). Therefore, it may be appropriate to consider that if he had not engaged in a permanent campaign process in order to demonstrate public popularity, he would have seen his relatively weak position within the party weaken further.

Another example is Papandreou who, in his capacity as president of PASOK, had to deal with significant intra-party opposition and, hence, it is reasonable to assume that he needed to campaign on a permanent basis in order to increase his popularity and strengthen his position within the party. In the intra-party elections, Papandreou’s main rival received 38.2 per cent of the party vote, coming from the minority faction

within PASOK. After the electoral victory of 2009, PASOK enjoyed a solid parliamentary majority of 160 seats (Pappas, 2010: 280), thus it can be argued that Venizelos influenced a considerable number of parliamentarians who could act as intra-party rebels and Papandreou would see his political capital evaporate if he had not followed the permanent campaign trend.

As a result, executive leaders may need to engage in a permanent campaign process to defend their image and their policy and to make their positions as well known as possible to the public. As Edwards has put it, explaining why the American presidents persist in following the permanent campaign in spite of its weak effect on their popularity, ‘the real public leadership may be on elite debate, journalistic coverage or congressional deliberation’ (2003: 244-245). Therefore, politicians recognize that much of what they have to do is damage limitation; they are on an electoral popularity treadmill, where they have to run just to stand still. Permanent campaigning is an attempt, among others, to keep control, to manage the agenda (political and media), to project a positive image. They believe in it; they also think that if they did not do it, things would be even worse.

### **6.3 The Greek case in a comparative context**

From a certain point of view, the notion of the endless campaign has been considered as part of the post-modern election campaigning whereby the influence of the professional political staff consisting of pollsters, advertisers, marketing specialists and media strategists became as important as their employers, the politicians. Furthermore, these professionals became if not equal political actors, then as competent as politicians did and, consequently, their role inside the government was rapidly upgraded in a permanent campaign environment (Norris, 2000).

Although the concept of the post-modern election campaigning grasps the main point of the permanent campaign process, mainly as a non-stop effort of elected party leaders to sustain public support until the next election by bringing advanced campaign personnel, tools, techniques and tactics into office, it misses at the same time the broader picture of the campaigning style of governing. The latter is evident at two levels. First, public support is not only a means to improve re-election prospects, but also a means to influence decision-making in the governing process. Second, participants in a permanent campaign process are not only the political executives, but also other various figures. In the US, where the permanent campaign firstly emerged, apart from presidents, other actors like congressional representatives, organised interests, media and journalists have engaged in campaign-like mode of doing politics.

However, this study focuses specifically on the implementation of the permanent campaign by incumbent leaders to retain public approval. So far, the permanent campaign strategy has been implemented by incumbents around the world in developed democracies in the US, Europe, Australia as well as in developing democracies in Latin America. In the European parliamentary context, prime ministers have followed the trend in the majoritarian system in the UK and the consensual system in Italy. Focusing on the majoritarian parliamentary systems in Europe, the scope of this study was to extend the research of the permanent campaign in Greece. This work contributes to the existing research in that it is the first study about the permanent campaign in Greece and it adds another national case study both on the permanent campaign of the prime ministers in the majoritarian systems in Europe.

Certainly, presidents and prime ministers have always wooed public opinion by engaging in political communication activities. Hence, this study, based primarily on the US and for the European parliamentary part on the UK literature on the permanent campaign, has suggested the introduction of an element of order by grouping five components in an effort to identify, analyse and understand how recent incumbents have followed the permanent campaign trend to sustain public approval. In particular,

it has included the creation of communication units in the premier's office, collaboration with communication professionals, the use of polling to device policy and presentation, the formulation of campaign-like messages to label government policy and the making of campaign-like public appeals to get the messages across. In this context, the study has shown that, not only recent American presidents and British premiers, but also recent prime ministers in Greece have adopted the campaigning style of governing confirming the notion that the application of the permanent campaign has extended to other parliamentary majoritarian systems in Europe.

Surely, Greek premiers have not just simply copied the permanent campaign strategy based on what happened in the US or in the UK. Rather they have adapted it to the national context. One example that illustrates this point is that the expansion of the Office of the Prime Minister with the creation of new public outreach units was not as broad as in the US or the British context. Greek premiers established new institutions in order to improve the coordination and the centralised control of government communication, yet most of them like Karamanlis and Papandreou, who had served as opposition leaders, in parallel maintained the communication apparatus established in their party's headquarters throughout their tenures in office. Another example is that the Greek prime ministers continued to collaborate with communication professionals once in power and the latter exerted significant influence on the primeministerial political strategy, policy and presentation, yet their role was not as dominant as it is within the parties and governments in the cases of the US and the UK. A third example is related to the public appeals the Greek prime ministers have made to get their messages across. All of them invested more time and energy addressing party conventions and delivering public speeches in Parliament, which receive live televised coverage, than their British counterparts.

Two reasons explain why the Greek permanent campaign differs from the other two countries. The first is that the Greek permanent campaign process, similarly to the UK but opposed to the US case, takes place in a parliamentary context. Given the

institutional context, as Papathanassopoulos has observed, ‘in Greece, as in Britain for example, voters choose between different political parties and not between individual candidates for president or prime minister as in the United States’ (2000: 58), though the role of leadership in shaping voting behaviour has increased substantially in recent decades. In addition, comparing to some extent the communication behaviour of the American presidents with the British prime ministers, Seymour-Ure (2003: 198-199) has suggested that the American presidents lack the opportunity to use Congress as a public forum to disseminate their messages (with the exception of the State of the Union Address). Hence, they have adopted other communication tactics like the regular monthly press conferences in the White House. On the contrary, in the parliamentary majoritarian context British prime ministers have the opportunity to make numerous public appearances in Parliament disseminating their messages to the public especially since parliamentary debates were given live televised coverage. Given that, the UK and the Greek political systems strike as the most representative examples of the parliamentary majoritarian democracies in Europe<sup>13</sup> (Gallagher et al, 2006; Lijphart, 1999), it is possible to claim that the argument about the British premiers applies to the Greek context as well.

The second reason explaining the differences considering the implementation of the campaigning style of governing in Greece is that, unlike the United States and to a lesser degree the United Kingdom, within the Greek political context the political parties play a comparatively stronger role. In particular, following Hallin & Mancini’s typology about the three models of politics, Greece belongs to the Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralist Model which is, among others, characterised by late democratization, polarised pluralism, weaker development of rational-legal authority, clientelism and a strong role of political parties, while the US and the UK belong to

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<sup>13</sup> The Greek system is unicameral while the British one bicameral, yet as Lijphart (1999) has noted, the House of Commons, and not the House of Lords, possesses almost all the legislative power.



the North Atlantic or Liberal Model which is, among others characterised by early democratization, moderate pluralism, comparatively stronger development of rational-legal authority and comparatively weaker party organisations (2004: 68).

However, the institutional, historical, cultural and political differences between Greece and the US as well as the UK, hardly prevented the Greek prime ministers from adopting the permanent campaign. Furthermore, the fact that current political executives in different countries with different institutional, historical, cultural and structural backgrounds have implemented the permanent campaign suggests that the permanent campaign is a reaction to broader and more powerful political and technological developments that have taken place in all these countries. While the relevant literature in the US has analysed various factors contributing to the rise of the permanent campaign era, this study has indicated that three of them have come up as the most important: the decline of political parties, the rise of television and more recently the internet as well as the proliferation of new political technologies.

In addition, the thesis, based on the relevant UK and Greek literature, has indicated that these factors have emerged as contributing to the rise of the permanent campaign both in the UK and in Greece. Therefore, Greece offers another example of how political and technological developments affect the conduct of the primeministerial political communication. To this end, the permanent campaign is considered not just as a description of what political executives are doing, but more than that, it is a theoretical concept about the nature of political communication, which appeared at a certain point in the development of media and politics in advanced democracies.

Of course, there are differences regarding the form of these factors. For instance, in the United States the particular erosion of the parties' strength is related, among others, to the adoption of primaries as a method to select the candidates running for the presidency ahead of the presidential race. In contrast, in the UK and Greece, the adoption of primaries is a recent phenomenon (Scarrow 1996: 169-170; Seyd, 1999:

385) (in 1994 and 2004<sup>14</sup>) which usually takes place as an intraparty event in the aftermath of an electoral defeat (in 2007 in the case of PASOK and in 2009 in the case of ND).

Another difference relates to the nature of the media systems. Following Hallin & Mancini's typology about the models of politics and media, the United States and the United Kingdom belong to the North Atlantic or Liberal Model, which is, among others, characterised by a politically neutral, strongly professionalised and market-oriented media system. In contrast, Greece belongs to the Mediterranean or Polarised Pluralist Model which is, among others, characterised by a highly politicised and financially dependent on a clientelist state media system (2004: 67-68). In particular, the political and economic evolution of the European South differs from the political and economic evolution in the rest of Western Europe and North America, where the development of the market economy has led to the development of the media market and subsequently to the development of a mass circulation press and commercial media.

However, in spite of these differences, these three factors remain strong enough to motivate the rise of the permanent campaign in Greece. Firstly, as Negrine has put it, 'the television services have been commercialised and deregulated with consequences for both the conduct and the practice of political communication' (2006: 167). Second, the combination of the decline of political parties - as is evidenced by the weakening of party identification, as well as by the gradual erosion of political polarisation and the subsequent deep ideological cleavage – with the advent of television have contributed to the increasing personalisation of the political process which reinforces the role of leadership in shaping voting behaviour. Of course, the role of political

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<sup>14</sup> PASOK was the first political party adopting the primaries in selecting its leader ahead of the 2004 general election, though Papandreou ran unopposed for the post (Dinas, 2008:607).

parties remains significant. Yet parties and party leaders co-exist within political communication terms in Greece.

All these are related to the notion that Greece has been part of the modernisation of political communication, a term that is used to describe a process of rapid changes in both the media and politics over recent years (Swanson, 1993). In particular, it suggests that there are growing similarities in political communication practices across many countries ‘despite great differences in political cultures, histories, and institutions of the countries in which they have occurred’ (Mancini & Swanson, 1996 p. 2). These developments in Greece are a part of a changing wave over the modus operandi of the media system as well as the structure of the political environment, including the parties, in line with other developed democracies (Papathanassopoulos, 2000: 58). Thus, modern prime ministers in Greece had strong motives, as their counterparts in the UK, to engage in a permanent campaign.

In parallel, the research has found that the impact of the permanent campaign upon the premier’s popularity is weak confirming the vast amount of empirical studies, most of them applied in the US. In other words, the case of Greece provides additional evidence for the argument that the endless campaigning hardly improves the premiers’ approval ratings.

Apart from the contribution of the study to the broad context of the permanent campaign literature, it also contributes to the Greek political communication literature in many respects. Firstly, it enriches a field of scientific interest that has never been analysed in Greece whereas in other countries the results of the studies have been presented years ago. So far, the existing Greek literature has concentrated on the election campaigning of parties and party leaders and the factors that have transformed the election campaigning landscape from the restoration of democracy in 1974 until nowadays (e.g. Alexandrou, 2007; Demetzi, 2002; Heretakis, 2002; Kotzaivazoglou & Zotos, 2007; Pappas, 2010; Papathanassopoulos, 2000; 2007). In contrast, the post-

election political communication era had largely been neglected. This study has concentrated on the post-election political communication of the incumbent parties and party leaders and particularly on the political communication of the modern prime ministers in Greece. Secondly, in methodological terms, this research is the first that employs the method of elite interviewing in order to gather data and analyse in-depth the function of the primeministerial political communication. So far, to the best of my knowledge, no other study has carried out and used interviews with prime ministers, ministers and primeministerial consultants on the political communication field.

Thirdly, in this context, the study contributes to our knowledge on the permanent campaign in Greece. Research findings suggest that the three modern PMs - Simitis, Karamanlis and Papandreou - undertook the permanent campaign strategy. The fact that - although they had different communications skills or they came from different political families or they represented different intraparty factions - they adopted the campaigning style of governing allows us to safely assume that the modern Greek PMs have engaged in a permanent campaign process. Yet, future research should examine whether the results hold for their successors in the premiership.

Fourth, this thesis has advanced our understanding of the nature of the political communication of recent Greek premiers at a certain point in the development of media and politics in the country. It is the first study that shows that political and technological developments, which have taken place in a context of modernisation of the political communication landscape of Greece in recent decades, have transformed not only the election campaigning of party leaders but also the political communication of the prime ministers. More specifically, it has shown that the Greek premiers have been motivated to engage in a non-stop campaigning process by bringing in campaign-like personnel, tools, techniques, methods and tactics into office in order sustain public approval as a means to improve re-election prospects. Lastly, this is the first study that explores the impact of the primeministerial communication activities on the premier's popularity, actually finding that the effect is hardly

important, which suggests that other factors have greater explanatory power on what shapes public attitudes against the prime ministers in Greece and therefore setting the basis for future research in that direction.

In terms of the limitations of the research, as it has already been said on numerous occasions, the existing literature on primeministerial communications and in general on government communications is limited. So it was not feasible to analyse in great depth the political communication of Greek prime ministers in order to highlight the point at which the lines between election campaigning and governing become blurred, the point just before the permanent campaign takes the place from the election campaigning. Moreover, the study has discussed to some extent (without exploring in detail since this analysis exceeds the scope of this study) the impact of other determinants of primeministerial popularity given the inability of the permanent campaign to exert significant influence.

Nonetheless, this study will encourage further studies on political communication and permanent campaign in Greece as well as studies in a comparative perspective. One of the directions would be to compare the permanent campaign concept in different political settings and political cultures. In addition, future research on the factors that exert influence on incumbents' popularity should shift its attention from leaders' communication activities to other factors. The latter include the state of the economy, foreign policy and domestic issues, foreign domestic crises, scandals or the particular political reactions and policy decisions taken by the political leaders or even the timing, the place and medium they choose to make their public announcements.

A third direction should be towards the examination of the primeministerial permanent campaign beyond 2011 especially since Papandreou's successors in the premiership

ruled coalition-government<sup>15</sup>. Another direction should be to explore the political communication operated by the Greek Prime Ministers before the emergence of the permanent campaign era, in particular from 1974 until 1996, in order to identify the developments of the incumbency communications. A fourth direction could focus on whether other political as well as non-political actors have engaged in a permanent campaign mentality. To take one example, this study has analysed to some extent the permanent campaign process in which Karamanlis and Papandreou engaged as opposition leaders in the periods 1997-2004 and 2004-2009 respectively.

Future studies should explore further the permanent campaign of each main opposition party as well as the permanent campaign followed possibly by the minor opposition parties. Another example is whether, apart from the Prime Ministers, Ministers have also followed the campaigning style of governing within the current political communication environment, either to promote their policy plans or to increase re-election prospects since most of them run for a parliamentary seat.

Other political actors who might have been motivated to adopt a permanent campaign concept are parliamentarians. Even though their resources compared to the resources of the prime ministers and ministers are limited, they may have followed the permanent campaign trend either because they are interested in entering the Council of Ministers or being re-elected. In addition, due to the nature of the Greek electoral system, they have to compete with other candidates of their own party in order to get elected. Therefore, they may have the incentive to adopt a form of permanent campaign at least at local level. The last direction is towards in-depth examination of

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<sup>15</sup> The rise of the coalition governments was due to the political turmoil and the subsequent unprecedented fragmentation of the Greek political landscape caused by the protracted economic and resulted in the successive national elections of May and June 2012 (Pretenteris, 2012). In spite of the fact that the Greek electoral system favours one-party government given that the party-winner receives a bonus of 50 seats in a 300-seat Parliament.

the factors influencing primeministerial popularity given the limited impact of the permanent campaign upon it.

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# Appendices

## Appendix A

### Major addresses – Minor addresses

#### Summary of Kernell's typology

##### Presidential Public Activities

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
Major public addresses	Addresses broadcast on radio or television in which president speaks more than 1,000 words
Minor public addresses	Non-major addresses in which the president speaks more than 1,000 words

##### Primeministerial Public Activities

<u>Activity</u>	<u>Explanation</u>
Major public addresses	Speeches or interviews on TV, on radio and national newspapers as well as signed newspaper articles by the prime minister of more than 1,000 words.
Minor public addresses	Public addresses to specific groups or community events that took place inside or outside Athens and include primeministerial statements more than 1,000 words. Brief remarks to the press are not included as speeches.

## **Appendix B**

### **Costas Simitis**

#### Major Addresses (presented in chronological order)

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 8 October 1996

Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 10 October 1996

Second speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 12 October 1996

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 16 October 1996

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 18 October 1996

Speech in Parliament regarding the Intergovernmental Summit, 9 December 1996

Speech in Parliament for the Budget, 21 December 1996

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 15 January 1997

Speech in Parliament on ‘Agriculture-Countryside’, 17 January 1997

Answer in Questions to the PM in Parliament, 24 January 1997

Speech in Parliament on Education, 19 February 1997

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 21 February 1997

Speech in PASOK Political Youth Convention in Athens, 22 February 1997

Televised cross-national broadcasting networks ‘MEGA, ANT-1 and ET-1’ interview on journalists Petros Euthimiou, Giannis Pretenteris & Nikos Chatzinikolaou, 12 March 1997

Speech in Parliament on Personal Data Protection Bill, 13 March 1997

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 02 April 1997

Signed article in Expression party magazine, 8 April 1997

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 07 May 1997

Speech in Parliament on economic policy, 19 May 1997

Speech in Parliament on Social Dialogue, 10 June 1997

Speech in Parliament on Constitutional Reform, 11 June 1997

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 20 June 1997

Speech in PASOK Central Committee on 'Management and Local Governing' in Nafplio, 18 July 1997

Speech in the opening of the 62nd International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 5 September 1997

Speech in the formal dinner of the 62nd International Exposition in Thessaloniki, 6 September 1997

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 19 September 1997

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 20 September 1997

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 08 October 1997

Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 6 November 1997

Speech in PASOK Central Committee on Youth, 14 November 1997

Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 18 November 1997

Speech in Parliament on European Cohesion, 9 December 1997

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 17 December 1997

Speech in Parliament on the 1998 Budget, 21 December 1997



Speech in PASOK National Convention on ‘Socialism and Democracy in the 21st century Europe’, 13 February 1998

Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, Greek-Turkish relationships and NATO, 26 February 1998

Speech in a PASOK event on ‘Agenda 2000-Agriculture’ in Athens, 20 March 1998

Speech in Parliament honoring the 200th anniversary of Rigas Velesinlis’s death, 31 March 1998

Speech in parliament on the Bill for Olympic Airways, 08 April 1998

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 11 April 1998

Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring Konstantinos Karamanlis, 27 April 1998

Speech in Parliament on Social Policy, 28 April 1998

Speech in Parliament on Constitutional Reform, 29 April 1998

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 29 April 1998

Press Conference on the EMU in Zappeio Mansion-Athens, 07 May 1998

Speech in Parliament on EMU and the European Course, 02 June 1998

Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring the memory of Andreas Papandreou, 23 June 1998

Speech in Parliament on Education, 25 June 1998

Speech in PASOK National Board, 12 September 1998

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 18 September 1998

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 07 October 1998

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 21 October 1998

Second Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 21 October 1998

Speech in Parliament setting a motion of confidence to Government, 01 November 1998

Second speech in Parliament setting a motion of confidence to Government, 03 November 1998

Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring the memory of Georgios Papandreou, 04 November 1998

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 06 November 1998

Speech in Parliament on the 1999 Budget, 21 December 1998

Speech in Parliament on Education 11 January 1999

Speech in Parliament on the motion of no-confidence against the Government submitted by ND, 16 January 1999

Interview in 'Mega Channel' national broadcasting network on reporters Pavlos Tsimas and Alexis Papahelas, Athens, 03 February 1999

Speech in Parliament on the Ratification of the Amsterdam Pact, 10 February 1999

Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 05 March 1999

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 13 March 1999

Speech in PASOK 5th National Convention seeking reelection as leader, 21 March 1999

Second Speech in PASOK 5th National Convention seeking reelection as leader, 21 March 1999

Speech in PASOK 5th National Convention after reelecting as leader, 21 March 1999

Televised Address on the crisis in Kosovo from Maximos Mansion, 05 April 1999

Interview in 'Ta Nea' newspaper, 13 April 1999

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 17 April 1999

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 28 April 1999

Speech in Parliament on NATO and the crisis in Kosovo, 03 May 1999

Speech in Parliament on Greece's European Course, 19 May 1999

Televised press conference on the European Election, 25 May 1999

Televised press conference on the crisis in Kosovo from Zappeio Mansion, 26 May 1999

Speech in Parliament on the European Union and the crisis in the Balkans, 28 May 1999

Interview in national public broadcasting network 'NET', 01 June 1999

Televised press conference during the European Council-Koln, Germany, 03 June 1999

Televised press conference during the European Council-Koln, Germany, 04 June 1999

Interview in national public broadcasting network 'Ant-1' on journalist Stratis Liarelis, 10 June 1999

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 09 July 1999

Televised press conference in the International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 05 September 1999

Speech in Parliament on dealing with the aftermath of the earthquake, 08 October 1999

Joint televised press conference with the President of the U.S Bill Clinton in Maximos Mansion, 20 November 1999

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 03 December 1999

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 04 December 1999

Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 15 December 1999

Speech in Parliament on the 2000 Budget, 21 December 1999

Speech in PASOK Political Youth Convention in Athens, 21 January 2000

Interview in 'Sunday Vima' newspaper, 04 February 2000

Speech at the revealing ceremony of the Charilaos Trikoupis statue in Parliament, 24 February 2000

Speech and Press conference in Zappeio Mansion on the presentation of the Governmental Program for 2000-2004, 02 March 2000

Speech in Parliament on 'Political Rights and Union Freedom', 03 March 2000

Interview in national broadcasting network 'Ant-1' on journalist Giannis Pretenteris, 07 March 2000

Speech in the event for the Entry Request of Greece to the Eurozone, 09 March 2000

Speech in Parliament on 'The terms and preexisting conditions of the pre-election political struggle of the parties', 10 March 2000

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 11 March 2000

Interview in 'Sunday Vima' newspaper, 12 March 2000

Interview in national public broadcasting network 'Mega Channel' on journalists Pavlos Tsimas and Nikos Chatzinikolaou, 14 March 2000

Speech during a press conference on the 'New Social State' in Zappeio Mansion, 15 March 2000

Speech in presentation of PASOK candidates for the 2000 election, 15 March 2000

Press conference in Volos, 16 March 2000

Interview in national broadcasting network 'Alpha' on journalist Manolis Kapsis, 20 March 2000

Press conference on local media, 23 March 2000

Televised press conference in the European Council in Lisbon, 23 March 2000

Televised press conference after the end of the European Council in Lisbon, 23 March 2000

Interview in 'Flash 96, 1' radio, 28 March 2000

Speech and press conference in Zappeio Mansion on 'Foreign Policy in the new Four-Year Term', 29 March 2000

Interview in national broadcasting network 'Mega Channel' on reporter Stavros Theodorakis, 02 April 2000

Interview in national broadcasting network 'Star Channel' on reporter Theodoros Rousopoulos, 05 April 2000

Interview in national public broadcasting network 'NET', 06 April 2000

Online press conference, 06 April 2000

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 20 April 2000

Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 22 April 2000

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 12 May 2000

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 24 May 2000

Speech in Parliament on the 2004 Athens Olympic Games, 31 May 2000

Signed article in ‘To Vima’ newspaper, ‘For a progressive governance’ 28 May 2000

Press conference in Porto, Portugal on the admission of Greece in the Eurozone, 19 June 2000

Televised press conference after the end of the European Council, 20 June 2000

Speech in the 65th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 01 September 2000

Televised press conference in the 65th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 03 September 2000

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 04 October 2000

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 06 October 2000

Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring the 2000 Greek Olympics Team, 11 October 2000

Televised press conference during the European Council, 13 October 2000

Speech in PASOK National Summit, 03 November 2000

Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 14 December 2000

Speech on the Introduction of Greece in the Eurozone, 04 January 2001

Speech in Parliament on a motion of no-confidence to the Minister of Economics submitted by ND, 02 February 2001

Speech in Parliament on the new International Airport of Athens ‘Eleftherios Venizelos’, 16 February 2001

Speech in Parliament on a special session celebrating the International Women's Day, 08 March 2001

Signed article in 'Ta Nea' newspaper , 'The creation of powerful Europe', 19 March 2001

Speech in Parliament on the Constitutional Reform, 06 April 2001

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 02 May 2001

Second speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 02 May 2001

Speech in Parliament on 'The social and financial state of the country', 10 May 2001

Speech in PASOK Political Youth Open Air Convention, 11 May 2001

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 01 June 2001

Interview in national public broadcasting network 'NET' on journalist Stavros Theodorakis, 05 June 2001

Speech in Parliament on Social Policy, 11 June 2001

Televised press conference before the Heads of Government EU Summit, 14 June 2001

Televised press conference after the end of the Heads of Government EU Summit, 16 June 2001

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 09 July 2001

Second Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 09 July 2001

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 31 August 2001

Televised press conference in the 66th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 09 September 2001

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 09 October 2001

Speech in PASOK 6th National Convention, 13 October 2001

Second Speech in PASOK 6th National Convention, 13 October 2001

Speech in PASOK 6th National Convention after being reelected as leader of the party, 14 October 2001

Televised press conference during the Informal European Council in Gand, 19 October 2001

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 22 October 2001

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 09 November 2001

Televised press conference in Maximos Mansion, 13 November 2001

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 16 November 2001

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 20 November 2001

Second Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 20 November 2001

Speech in Parliament on ‘9/11 and its Consequences’, 27 November 2001

Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 04 December 2001

Press conference after meeting with the President of the U.S G.W. Bush, the Secretary of State Powell and the Secretary of Defence Ramsfeld in Washington D.C, 10 January 2002

Speech in Parliament on the 2004 Athens Olympics, 16 January 2002

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 18 January 2002

Second Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 19 January 2002

Speech in PASOK 5th Political Youth Convention in Athens, 08 February 2002



Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 15 February 2002

Signed article in ‘Ta Nea’ newspaper , ‘The euro and the future’, 21 February 2002

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 01 March 2002

Televised press conference before the end of the European Council in Barcelona, 15 March 2002

Televised press conference after the formal dinner of Heads of Governments and State in Barcelona, 15 March 2002

Televised press conference after the end of the European Council in Barcelona, 16 March 2002

Speech in Parliament on the ratification of the Nice Pact, 19 March 2002

Televised cross-national broadcasting networks press interview, 08 April 2002

Speech in Parliament on changing the electoral system, 09 April 2002

Second Speech in Parliament on changing the electoral system, 09 April 2002

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 12 April 2002

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 12 April 2002

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Hour of the Prime Minister’, 17 May 2002

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 22 May 2002

Second Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 22 May 2002

Televised address after the Meeting with the Opposition Leaders on the Cyprus Issue, 24 May 2002

Speech in Parliament on the State of the Economy, 29 May 2002

Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 14 June 2002

Second Speech in PASOK Central Committee, 15 June 2002

Televised press conference after the end of the morning session of the European Council in Sevilla, 21 June 2002

Televised press conference after the end of the European Council in Sevilla, 22 June 2002

Signed article in PASOK Political Youth online site, 30 June 2002

Speech in PASOK National Summit, 05 July 2002

Speech in PASOK National Local Government Convention, 07 July 2002

Speech in the 67th International Thessaloniki Exposition, 06 September 2002

Televised press conference in the 67th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 08 September 2002

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 08 October 2002

Televised press conference after the end of the first session of the European Council and after meetings with UK Prime Minister Blair, 28 October 2002

Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council, 29 October 2002

Televised press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 22 November 2002

Televised press conference after the formal dinner of the European Heads of Government, 13 December 2002

Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council, 13 December 2002

Speech in Parliament on the Cyprus issue, 17 December 2002

Televised press conference for the Extraordinary European Heads of Government Summit on the Iraq War, 17 February 2003

Televised press conference after the Spring Session of the European Heads of Government, 21 March 2003

Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council on the results of the session and the Iraq War, 26 March 2003

Speech in Parliament on the results of the Spring Session of the European Heads of Government and the War in Iraq, 27 March 2003

Televised address on the Telemarathon for the Children in Iraq, 31 March 2003

Joint televised press conference with Romano Prodi and Tassos Giannitsis on the results of the EU Heads of Government Summit, 17 April 2003

Minor Addresses (presented in chronological order)

Speech in Elefsina, 16 December 1996

Speech in Elefsina, 14 January 1997

Speech in Thessaloniki, 01 February 1997

Speech in Ano Liosia, 11 February 1997

Speech on the launching event for the 'European Year against Racism', 26 February 1997

Speech in Larisa, 01 March 1997

Speech in Volos, 02 March 1997

Speech to farmers in Athens, 05 March 1997

Speech in Athens, 04 April 1997

Speech in Thessaloniki, 05 April 1997

Speech at the Economist conference for the Greek Economy, 09 April 1997

Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 23 May 1997

Speech in Arta, 01 June 1997

Speech in Athens, 30 June 1997

Speech at the 'ΙΣΤΑΜΕ' international meeting, 03 July 1997

Speech at the Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 25 November 1997

Speech in the International Airport of Athens, 10 January 1998

Speech in Zappeio Mansion, 08 May 1998

Speech in the Center of Substitute Drugs, 19 May 1998

Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 20 May 1998

Speech at the Annual Local Government convention, 22 May 1998

Speech in Ancient Olympia, 20 June 1998

Speech in the headquarters of Greek Petroleum Group, 24 June 1998

Speech in Attiko Metro-Athens, 02 July 1998

Speech in Lamia, 04 July 1998

Speech in Lefkada, 18 July 1998

Speech in the launching day of the construction of the Rio-Antirrio Bridge, 19 July 1998

Speech in Argolida, 23 July 1998

Speech in Kallithea, 22 September 1998

Speech in the launching day of the new independent administrative authority 'Ombudsman', 24 September 1998

Speech in Agrinio, 26 September 1998

Speech at the Center of European Constitutional Law convention-Athens, 01 October 1998

Speech in Lavrio, 06 October 1998

Speech at the international seminar with title 'Seeking the European Identity', 14 November 1998

Speech in PASOK Local Government Department in Athens, 27 November 1998

Speech on Youth Issues in Athens, 30 November 1998

Speech at the 9<sup>th</sup> Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 08 December 1998

Speech in Kilkis, 14 February 1999

Speech in Ano Liosia, 1 March 1999

Speech in the Ministry of Economics, 04 May 1999

Speech in Elefsina, 06 May 1999

Speech in Krustallopigi - Athens, 09 May 1999

Speech in the Attica PASOK Election Committees, 12 May 1999

Speech in Komotini, 15 May 1999

Speech in Kalamata, 16 May 1999

Speech at the 'Ylikon' S.A. in Mandra-Athens, 20 May 1999

Speech in Patra 23 May 1999

Speech in Heraklion of Crete, 24 May 1999

Speech in Larisa, 27 May 1999

Speech in Korinthos, 30 May 1999

Speech in Naxos Island, 06 June 1999

Speech in Thessaloniki, 08 June 1999

Speech in Athens, 11 June 1999

Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 21 June 1999

Speech in an event for young citizens in Athens, 22 July 1999

Speech at the international Scientific Conference honoring the memory of the leftist intellect Nikos Poulantzas, 29 September 1999

Speech in Helioupoli, 29 September 1999

Speech in PASOK National Local Government and Regroup Convention, 09 October 1999

Speech in Lesbos Island, 21 October 1999

Speech in the University of Aegean, 21 October 1999

Speech in Arkadia, 30 October 1999

Speech at the Hellenic-American Chamber, 20 November 1999

Speech on the opening of the new Ministry of Transportation and Communications building, 23 November 1999

Speech on the offices of the Personal Data Protection Authority, 01 December 1999

Speech at the Hellenic-American Chamber, 07 December 1999

Speech in the University of Athens, 10 January 2000

Speech in Aigio, 15 January 2000

Speech in Achaia, 15 January 2000

Speech on the National Committee for the Human Rights, 20 January 2000

Speech at the 3<sup>rd</sup> National Industrial Conference, 21 January 2000

Speech at the 1<sup>st</sup> National Meeting of the Elderly, 22 January 2000

Speech at the Center of Maritime Affairs of the ‘Ethniki Trapeza’ (National Bank), 25 January 2000

Speech on the launch of Attiko Metro, 28 January 2000

Speech in Prespes, 02 February 2000

Speech in PASOK Political Views Conference, 05 February 2000

Speech in the new Judiciary Building of Athens, 16 February 2000

Speech in the Port of Piraeus, 17 February 2000

Speech in Xanthi, 19 February 2000

Speech in Hemathia, 26 February 2000

Speech at the ‘Athlete’s Festival’, 29 February 2000

Speech at the University Hospital of Western Athens, 06 March 2000

Speech in Volos, 16 March 2000

Speech in Ikaria, 18 March 2000

Speech in Fournoi, 18 March 2000

Speech in Samos, 18 March 2000

Speech in Heraklion, 19 March 2000

Speech in Patra, 21 March 2000

Speech in Larisa, 26 March 2000

Speech in Rhodes, 28 March 2000

Speech in Ioannina, 31 March 2000

Speech in Agrinio, 01 April 2000

Speech in Nikaia, 03 April 2000

Speech in Thessaloniki, 04 April 2000

Speech in Kozani, 05 April 2000

Speech in Helia, 06 April 2000

Speech in Athens, 07 April 2000

Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 24 May 2000

Speech in the University of Athens on the Euro, 23 June 2000

Speech in a PASOK event on ‘Progressive Governance’, 06 July 2000

Speech in Hepiros, 04 November 2000



Speech at the 11<sup>th</sup> Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 05 December 2000

Speech in PASOK Local Government Department, 21 February 2001

Speech in the opening ceremony of Evinos River Dam, 20 July 2001

Speech in Gyaros Island, 24 July 2001

Speech in Argos, 25 August 2001

Speech at the European group 'Notre Europe' conference, 05 October 2001

Speech in the opening of 'Sovel' new factory in Volos, 26 January 2002

Speech to entrepreneurs in Volos, 26 January 2002

Speech during inspection on the construction site of the Olympic Village in Athens, 29 January 2002

Speech at the Station of Liquefied Natural Gas in Crete, 09 February 2002

Speech at the Local Government Conference in Athens, 15 February 2002

Speech in Hemathia district, 22 February 2002

Speech in Pella, 23 February 2002

Speech in Kefalonia, 06 April 2002

Town-hall meeting in Nikaia City Hall, 15 April 2002

Speech in Rhodes Island, 06 May 2002

Speech in Kastelorizo Island, 07 May 2002

Speech in an event on 'Dialogue for the future of Europe - Political and Institutional Changes', 15 May 2002

Speech in Lamia, 25 May 2002

Speech in Karpenisi, 26 May 2002

Speech in Preveza, 28 June 2002

Speech in Arta, 29 June 2002

Speech in PASOK National Local Government Convention, 07 July 2002

Speech in former political prison in Oropos, 24 July 2002

Speech in Heraklion-Crete, 11 September 2002

Speech in the construction site of the Olympics International Broadcast Center, 13 September 2002

Speech in Tripoli, 20 September 2002

Speech in Kalamata, 21 September 2002

Speech in Aulaki village, 26 September 2002

Speech on the Metropolitan Park in Elliniko, 03 April 2003

## **Appendix C**

### **Kostas Karamanlis**

#### Major Addresses (presented in chronological order)

Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 20 March 2004

Second Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 21 March 2004

Interventional Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 21 March 2004

Closing Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 22 March 2004

Speech in ND. Parliamentary Group, 23 March 2004

Press televised conference in Brussels after the first European Council session, 25 March 2004

Televised press conference in Brussels after the end of the European Council, 26 March 2004

Speech in Parliament on Briefing of the Parliament concerning the Cyprus issue, 02 April 2004

Second Speech in Parliament on Briefing of the Parliament concerning the Cyprus issue, 02 April 2004

Televised address in Maximos Mansion after the Meeting with the Opposition leaders under the President of the Greek Republic on the Cyprus Issue, 15 April 2004

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 23 April 2004

Joint televised press conference with the President of the Republic of Cyprus Papadopoulos, 28 April 2004

Televised address on the introduction of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU, 30 April 2004

Joint televised press conference with the Prime Minister of Turkey Erdogan, 07 May 2004

Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 May 2004

Second Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 May 2004

Televised press Conference in Greek and foreign journalists in New York after meeting with the U.N General Secretary, 18 May 2004

Televised press conference after the meeting with the President of the U.S George W. Bush, 20 May 2004

Speech in ND presentation of the European Election Party Declaration, 27 May 2004

TV Interview in the national broadcast network 'Antenna TV', 10 June 2004

Televised address in Zappeio Mansion on the European Election, 13 June 2004

Televised press conference during European Council's Summit first day, 17 June 2004

Televised press conference after the end of the session of the European Council Summit, 19 June 2004

Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 28 June 2004

Speech at ND 6th Party Convention Opening Day, 23 July 2004

Speech at ND 6th Party Convention Closing Day, 25 July 2004

Speech in the Opening Day of the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 10 September 2004

Speech in the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business representatives, 11 September 2004

Televised press conference in the 69th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 12 September 2004

Speech at an event for the 30 years Anniversary of ND's Foundation, 01 October 2004

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 14 October 2004

Speech in the Parliament on a special session honoring the 2004 Olympics Greek athletes, 19 October 2004

Televised press conference at the European Council Summit, 05 November 2004

Speech in Parliament on Education, 8 November 2004

Second speech in Parliament on Education, 8 November 2004

Joint press statement with Cyprus President Papadopoulos in Maximos Mansion, 12 November 2004

Speech in Parliament on honoring Greek athletes who competed in the Special Olympics 2004, 24 November 2004

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 4 December 2004

Speech in ND Central Committee, 10 December 2004

Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 17 December 2004

Speech in Parliament on the 2005 Budget, 22 December 2004

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on the election of the President of the Greek Republic, 08 February 2005

Speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February 2005

Second speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February 2005

Third speech in Parliament on Agricultural Issues, 18 February 2005

Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 22 February 2005

Press conference at the Foreign Correspondents Association, 08 March 2005

Speech in Parliament on 'Health and Social Solidarity', 18 March 2005

Second Speech in Parliament on 'Health and Social Solidarity', 18 March 2005

Third Speech in Parliament on 'Health and Social Solidarity', 18 March 2005

Press televised conference in Brussels after the European Council session, 23 March 2005

Speech in Parliament on Ratification of the European Constitution, 15 April 2005

Joint televised address and press conference with the President of the European Commission Manuel Barozo, 18 April 2005

Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005

Second Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005

Third Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 13 May 2005

Speech in Parliament on the 60th Anniversary of the End of World War II, 17 May 2005

Speech in Parliament on Growth, Employment and Social Coherence, 08 June 2005

Speech in Parliament setting a Trust Motion to Government, 08 June 2005

Speech in Parliament on the closing of the Trust Motion to Government session, 12 June 2005

Speech in Parliament commenting the speech of the Opposition leader, 12 June 2005

Press televised conference in Brussels after the European Council session, 18 June 2005

Speech in Parliament on Women's Employment, 22 June 2005

Second speech in Parliament on Women's Employment, 22 June 2005

Speech in Parliament on Public Administration, 28 June 2005

Second Speech in Parliament on Public Administration, 28 June 2005

Speech in ND Central Committee, 26 August 2005

Speech at the opening of the 70th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 10 September 2005

Speech in the 70th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business representatives, 11 September 2005

Televised press conference during the 70th International Exposition in Thessaloniki, 12 September 2005

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 03 October 2005

Second Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 03 October 2005

Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the Synaspismos party Alekos Alavanos, 14 October 2005

Second answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the Synaspismos party Alekos Alavanos, 14 October 2005

Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the Synaspismos party MP Nikos Konstantopoulos, 14 October 2005

Second speech in Parliament on Question to the PM by the Synaspismos party MP Nikos Konstantopoulos, 14 October 2005

Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 01 November 2005

Second speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 01 November 2005

Speech in Parliament on the Ratification of the Admission in the E.U. of Bulgaria and Romania, 02 November 2005

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on 'Economy and Growth for the present and the future', 08 December 2005

Speech in ND Central Committee, 10 December 2005

Speech in Parliament on the 2006 Budget, 22 December 2005

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on the 'Constitutional Reform', 17 January 2006

Speech in ND Central Committee, 29 January 2006

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 24 February 2006

Speech in Parliament on 'Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social Protection', 27 February 2006

Second speech in Parliament on 'Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social Protection', 27 February 2006

Third speech in Parliament on 'Youth Unemployment and measures on their Social Protection', 27 February 2006

Speech in Parliament on the 50th Anniversary of the Women Voting Act, 08 March 2006

Speech in Parliament on a special session dedicated to the memory of former PM Rallis, 22 March 2006

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 24 March 2006

Speech in Parliament on 'Developing the District', 29 March 2006



Speech in Parliament on the ‘Economic Policy of the Government’, 13 April 2006

Second speech in Parliament on the ‘Economic Policy of the Government’, 13 April 2006

Third speech in Parliament on the ‘Economic Policy of the Government’, 13 April 2006

Speech in Parliament on Education, 26 May 2006

Second speech in Parliament on Education, 26 May 2006

Third speech in Parliament on Education, 26 May 2006

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Function of the State and Institutions’, 22 June 2006

Second speech in Parliament on ‘The Function of the State and Institutions’, 22 June 2006

Third speech in Parliament on ‘The Function of the State and Institutions’, 22 June 2006

Speech in Parliament on a special session honoring the Air Force pilots fallen on duty, 28 June 2006

Speech in Parliament on the Constitutional Reform, 29 June 2006

Speech in the 71st International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business representatives, 09 September 2006

Televised press conference during the 71st International Exposition in Thessaloniki, 10 September 2006

Speech in ND Central Committee, 17 September 2006

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 04 October 2006

Speech in Parliament on ‘Foreign Policy’, 02 November 2006

Second speech in Parliament on 'Foreign Policy', 02 November 2006

Third speech in Parliament on 'Foreign Policy', 02 November 2006

Speech in Parliament during a session on the issue of contract staffers, 17 November 2006

Second speech in Parliament during a session on the issue of contract staffers, 17 November 2006

Speech in Parliament on Education, 24 November 2006

Second speech in Parliament on Education, 24 November 2006

Third speech in Parliament on Education, 24 November 2006

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 07 December 2006

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 15 December 2006

Speech in Parliament on the 2007 Budget, 21 December 2006

Speech in ND Central Committee, 20 January 2007

Speech in Parliament on the motion of no-confidence to the Government submitted by PASOK, 04 February 2007

Speech in Parliament on the proposals for the Constitutional Reform, 14 February 2007

Televised address in Maximos Mansion for the promotion of the Educational Reform, 20 February 2007

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 07 March 2007

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 09 March 2007

Speech in Parliament on the Economic Policy of the Government, 22 March 2007

Second speech in Parliament on the Economic Policy of the Government, 22 March 2007

Speech in the ONNED (ND Political Youth) Central Committee, 15 April 2007

Speech in Parliament on Agricultural Policy, 03 May 2007

Second speech in Parliament on Agricultural Policy, 03 May 2007

Third speech in Parliament on Agricultural Policy, 03 May 2007

Speech in the 7th ONNED Annual Convention, 08 June 2007

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 23 June 2007

Speech in Parliament on 'Family Economics', 03 July 2007

Second speech in Parliament on 'Family Economics', 02 July 2007

Speech at the end of the 7th Regular Convention of ND, 08 July 2007

Speech in ND Central Committee, 13 July 2007

Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister to call early national elections, 17 August 2007

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 18 August 2007

Speech in ND Central Committee, 23 August 2007

Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister to announce extraordinary measures to deal with the destruction caused by the forest fires in Peloponnese and Euboea, 25 August 2007

Speech at the 72nd International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business Representatives, 08 September 2007

Interview in the national broadcasting network 'Alpha', 12 September 2007

Interview in the national broadcasting network 'Ant1', 12 September 2007

Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 28 September 2007

Second speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 28 September 2007

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 03 October 2007

Speech in ND Central Committee, 20 October 2007

Speech in Parliament on 'Ecological Policies in Greece', 01 November 2007

Second speech in Parliament on 'Ecological Policies in Greece', 01 November 2007

Third speech in Parliament on 'Ecological Policies in Greece', 01 November 2007

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA MP Fotis Kouvelis on student upheaval, 09 November 2007

Answer in a Question to the PM by PASOK MP Charis Kastanides on VAT increase, 09 November 2007

Answer in a Question to the PM by PASOK MP Nikitas Kaklamanis on the Telephone Hacking Scandal Committee, 09 November 2007

Answer in a Question to the PM by leader of the LAOS party Georgios Karatzaferis, 16 November 2007

Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE (Greek Communist Party) MP Spuros Chalvatzis on flood victims compensation and anti-flood infrastructure measures, 23 November 2007

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA MP Fotis Kouvelis on changing the electoral law, 23 November 2007

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group on 'Challenges and Prospective on Greece's Growth', 29 November 2007

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 14 December 2007

Speech in Parliament on the 2008 Budget, 20 December 2007

Speech in Parliament on ‘Reform for a Modern, Just and Viable Social Security’, 16 February 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis on Government’s position concerning the independence of Kosovo, 22 February 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the Opposition leader of PASOK Papandreu on high prices and the protection of low-income families, 22 February 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the Opposition leader of PASOK Papandreu on Public Education, 29 February 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the KKE General Secretary Aleka Papariga on Civil Aviation Authority and airports, 29 February 2008

Second answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of SYRIZA Alekos Alavanos on Ministry of Culture issues, 29 February 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis on FYROM, 29 February 2008

Speech in special parliamentary session dedicated to Greek Women Farmers, 05 March 2008

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 14 March 2008

Speech in Parliament on ‘The Rights of Youth in Education and Culture’, 21 March 2008

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 27 March 2008

Speech in Parliament on the motion of no-confidence, 29 March 2008

Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister on the foreign policy of the introduction of FYROM in the NATO, 03 April 2008

Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 04 April 2008

Speech in Parliament on FYROM, 10 April 2008

Second speech in Parliament on FYROM, 10 April 2008

Speech in ND Central Committee, 12 April 2008

Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 17 April 2008

Speech in Parliament on Constitutional Reform, 06 May 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis and PASOK leader George Papandreou, 09 May 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 16 May 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the PASOK leader Papandreou, 1 May 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the PASOK leader Papandreou on NHS, 30 May 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE leader Aleka Papariga and SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos on Education, 30 May 2008

Speech in Parliament on the Ratification of the Lisbon Treaty, 11 June 2008

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 20 June 2008

Speech in Parliament on high prices, 27 June 2008

Second speech in Parliament on high prices, 27 June 2008

Third speech in Parliament on high prices, 27 June 2008

Speech in ONNED Political Festival, 18 July 2008

Speech at the 73rd International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki to Business Representatives, 06 September 2008

Televised press conference during the 73rd International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 07 September 2008

Speech in Parliament on celebrating International Democracy Day, 15 September 2008

Speech in ND Central Committee, 26 September 2008

Second speech in ND Central Committee, 26 September 2008

Speech in ONNED Central Committee, 04 October 2008

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 06 October 2008

Speech in Parliament on the International Financial Crisis, 31 October 2008

Second speech in Parliament on the International Financial Crisis, 31 October 2008

Third speech in Parliament on the International Financial Crisis, 31 October 2008

Televised press conference after the Extraordinary European Council session, 07 November 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 14 November 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE leader Aleka Papariga, 14 November 2008

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 19 November 2008

Speech in Parliament honoring the 2008 Olympics Greek athletes, 19 November 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 21 November 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 21 November 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the PASOK leader Papandreou, 28 November 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA MP Fotis Kouvelis, 28 November 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 28 November 2008

Speech in Parliament on the Economy and Labor Reform, 05 December 2008

Second Speech in Parliament on the Economy and Labor Reform, 05 December 2008

Third Speech in Parliament on the Economy and Labor Reform, 05 December 2008

Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister on the killing of a Greek student by a police-officer, 08 December 2008

Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister on the riots taking place in Athens and other Greek cities, 09 December 2008

Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister on the measures taken by the Government to deal with the damages caused by the riots in Athens and other Greek cities, 10 December 2008

Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 12 December 2008

Speech in ND Parliamentary Group, 16 December 2008



Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister to announce extraordinary measures to deal with the consequences caused by the international financial crisis, 18 December 2008

Speech in Parliament on the 2009 Budget, 21 December 2008

Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 16 January 2009

Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 16 January 2009

Speech in Parliament on Education, 23 January 2009

Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 06 February 2009

Answer in a Question to the PM by the SYRIZA leader Alekos Alavanos, 06 February 2009

Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 February 2009

Second Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 February 2009

Third Speech in Parliament on the Economy, 12 February 2009

Answer in a Question to the PM by the LAOS leader Georgios Karatzaferis, 20 February 2009

Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 01 March 2009

Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister after the convocation of the Political Leaders Board chaired by the President of the Greek Republic on the issue of the economic crisis, 05 March 2009

Answer in a Question to the PM by the PASOK leader Papandreou, 06 March 2009

Speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 12 March 2009

Second speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 12 March 2009

Third speech in Parliament on Foreign Policy, 12 March 2009

Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 20 March 2009

Speech in Parliament on 'Voting rights for Greeks living abroad', 02 April 2009

Press conference at NATO Heads of Governments Summit, 04 April 2009

Speech in Parliament on Public Security, 08 April 2009

Second speech in Parliament on Public Security, 08 April 2009

Third speech in Parliament on Public Security, 08 April 2009

Speech in Parliament on 'Youth Rights in Education, Culture and Sports', 08 May 2009

Second speech in Parliament on 'Youth Rights in Education, Culture and Sports', 08 May 2009

Third speech in Parliament on 'Youth Rights in Education, Culture and Sports', 08 May 2009

Speech in ND Central Committee, 09 May 2009

Televised Press Conference after the end of the European Council session, 19 June 2009

Televised press conference after meeting with NATO Secretary General, 27 August 2009

Televised Address from the Office of the Prime Minister to call early national elections, 02 September 2009

Minor Addresses (presented in chronological order)

Speech at the Economist 8th Roundtable Discussion on ‘Leadership Strategy for Security and Prosperity in an Era of Uncertainty’, 05 May 2004

Speech at the Hellenic-Turkish Business Forum, 07 May 2004

Speech in the Hellenic-American Business Council on ‘Greece: Ideal Business Partner in Southeastern Europe’. 19 May 2004

Speech in the 10th Annual Thessaloniki Forum hosted by Northern Greece Industry Association and the Hellenic-American Chamber, 25 May 2004

Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 26 May 2004

Speech in the 12th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association), 02 June 2004

Speech in Thessaloniki on European Elections, 05 June 2004

Speech in the 6th Annual ONNED, 25 June 2004

Speech in ND Pre-Convention in Thessaloniki, 16 July 2004

Speech in ND Pre-Convention in Patra, 17 July 2004

Speech at the International Herald Tribune Symposium for the Greek Economy in the Aftermath of the Olympics, 11 October 2004

Speech at the 8th Dialogue between the Greek-Orthodox Church and the EPP, 21 October 2004

Speech at the 15th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The Hour of the Greek Economy’, 02 November 2004

Speech in an event on ‘Polythecneio’ hosted by ONNED, 14 November 2004

Speech in the Athens Symposium on ‘Issues of International and Greek Economy’, 19 November 2004

Speech in a formal dinner hosted by the Ioannina District Chancellor, 19 November 2004

Speech in an event on ‘Post-Olympics Use of Infrastructure’, 07 December 2004

Speech in Karpathos Island, 05 January 2005

Speech at the Opening of the National Discussion on Education, 21 January 2005

Speech in ND Women Department, 26 January 2005

Speech in Samothraki Island, 19 February 2005

Speech on the Memorial of Eleftherios and Sofoklis Venizelos, 27 March 2005

Speech in the 13th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 11 April 2005

Speech at the Economist 9th Roundtable Discussion, 19 April 2005

Speech at the Signing of the Agreement for the ENISA Headquarters in Heraklion city of Crete, 22 April 2004

Speech at the Executive Committee of the International Democratic Association in Athens, 27 April 2004

Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 26 May 2005

Speech in an event celebrating the 50th Anniversary of Thessaloniki Technical University, 27 May 2005

Speech in an event celebrating the 10th Anniversary of the National Judiciary School, 27 May 2005

Speech in an event for the opening of a World War II Memorial Monument in Kaisariani, 24 June 2005

Speech in an event for the beginning of the construction of the Hellenic-Turkish Oil Tube in Alexandroupolis, 03 July 2005

Speech in an event for the beginning of the construction of the Hellenic-Turkish Oil Tube in Gefira Kipon, 03 July 2005

Speech in an ONNED event in Limnos Island, 15 July 2005

Speech in dinner to the members of the European Central Bank Board of Directors, 06 October 2005

Speech at the 16th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The Hour of the Greek Economy’, 08 November 2005

Speech in working dinner hosted by Japan Industry Association (Keindaren), 11 November 2005

Speech in Grevena on business issues, 19 November 2005

Speech in an event celebrating the 30th Anniversary of the Centre for Political Research and Communication, 29 November 2005

Speech in ND Women Department, 25 January 2006

Speech at the Economist Convention on ‘Priorities in A Changing World’, 04 April 2006

Speech at the ND National Convention for Local Governance, 07 April 2006

Speech in Kilkis, 14 April 2006

Speech in Sparta, 05 May 2006

Speech in Messinia on Entrepreneurs, 06 May 2006

Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 16 May 2006

Speech in the International Convention in Delphoi on ‘Local Governments: Instruments of Democracy, Social Change and Growth’, 19 May 2006

Speech in an event celebrating the 25th Anniversary of the Admission of Greece to the E.U, 28 May 2006

Speech in Fthiotida on Entrepreneurs, 02 June 2006

Speech in the Economist Three-Party Summit (Greece-Bulgaria-Romania), 28 June 2006

Speech at the ONNED Political Festival in Lefkada Island, 08 September 2006

Speech in an event for World Peace Day, 24 September 2006

Speech in the opening day of the first International Forum for the Internet Governance, 30 October 2006

Speech at the 17th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 05 December 2006

Speech at the 6th Regular Assembly of the Greek Immigrants Association (S.A.E.) in Thessaloniki, 08 December 2006

Speech in the ND Regional Organisations Conference, 19 January 2007

Speech in ND Women Department, 22 January 2007

Speech in the Second Two-Year Symposium of Stock Markets, Investments, Energy and Maritime, 16 April 2007

Speech at the Economist 11th Roundtable Discussion, 24 April 2007

Speech at the convention hosted by the Ministry of Economics on ‘Which model we want for Europe?’, 26 April 2007

Speech in Kassos Island, 01 May 2007

Speech in the 15th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 08 May 2007

Speech in an event honoring Greek National Contributors, 15 May 2007

Speech in the conference of the Institute of International Finance in Zappeio Mansion, 31 May 2007

Speech in ND Pre-Convention in Thessaloniki, 03 June 2007

Speech in the 11th ‘Thessaloniki Forum’ on ‘International Markets: Position of Thessaloniki and Northern Greece’, 04 June 2007

Speech in the International Conference hosted by the ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Institute on ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis in the 20th century’, 05 June 2007

Speech in ND Pre - Convention in Central Greece-Thessalia, 10 June 2007

Speech in an event hosted by the Trade and Industry Chamber of Athens), 12 June 2007

Speech in an event hosted by the ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Institute on Climate change, 13 June 2007

Speech in ND Pre - Convention in Crete, 17 June 2007

Speech in ND Pre - Convention in Patra, 25 June 2007

Speech in ND Pre - Convention in Epeiros & Ionian Islands in Ioannina, 01 July 2007

Speech in an event host by the Hellenic-German Trade and Industry Chamber honoring Chancellor Merkel, 20 July 2007

Speech in the opening of the European Cultural Centre convention in Delphoi, 23 July 2007

Speech in the ceremony of Appointing New Firemen, 26 July 2007

Speech in Drama, 19 August 2007

Speech in Keratsini, 05 September 2007

Speech in Kozani, 07 September 2007

Speech in Grevena, 07 September 2007

Speech in Serres, 07 September 2007

Speech in Heraklion, 10 September 2007

Speech in Agrinio, 11 September 2007

Speech in Mitilini, 12 September 2007

Speech in Thessaloniki, 13 September 2007

Speech at the launch of the Hellenic-Turkish Oil Tube in Kipoi, Evros, 18 November 2007

Speech at the 18th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic 'The Hour of the Greek Economy', 04 December 2007

Speech in an event hosted by the NGO 'Transparency International', 14 January 2008

Speech in the Women Issues Secretariat, 21 January 2008



Speech in an event celebrating the 50th anniversary of the National Research Institution, 19 March 2008

Speech in the opening of the 4th Plenary Session of the Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Conference, 28 March 2008

Speech at the 6th Forum of the 'International Coalition of Cities against Poverty', 28 March 2008

Speech at the Economist 12th Roundtable Discussion, 08 April 2008

Speech in an event hosted by the European Bank in Zappeio Mansion, 08 May 2008

Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 14 May 2008

Speech in the 16th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 22 May 2008

Speech in an event hosted by 'Konstantinos Karamanlis' Institute, 24 May 2008

Speech in the 1st Symposium of the International Greek University, 24 June 2008

Speech in the European Economic and Social Committee Summit, 08 September 2008

Speech in an event hosted by the Ministry of Maritime Issues on the International Maritime Day, 19 September 2008

Speech in the 13th International Conference against Corruption, 30 October 2008

Speech on the 50th anniversary of the European Investment Bank, 10 November 2008

Speech at the 19th Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 25 November 2008

Speech at the E.P.P Youth Convention, 24 January 2009

Speech in the presentation of the Cultural Centre 'Stavros Niarchos', 24 January 2009

Speech in the Women Issues Secretariat, 26 January 2009

Speech in the Insurance Companies Annual General Assembly, 16 February 2009

Speech in ONNED Central Committee, 22 February 2009

Speech in Agrinio Trade Chamber, 14 March 2009

Speech in Zante Island, 28 March 2009

Speech in an event hosted by the Research General Secretariat, 01 April 2009

Speech in Pella, 11 April 2009

Speech in the General Assembly of the Western Macedonia Industry Association, 26 April 2009

Speech in a European Commission conference on ‘Protecting Biodiversity beyond 2010’, 27 April 2009

Speech in Argolida on Business Representatives, 03 May 2009

Speech in the 17th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 05 May 2009

Speech in ONNED District Convention, 10 May 2009

Speech in Arta, 17 May 2009

Speech in the 4th International Convention of the Hellenic Telecommunications and Post Commission, 20 May 2009

Speech in an ND event on Small and Middle Enterprises, 20 May 2009

Speech in an event hosted by the ‘Konstantinos Karamanlis’ Institute on the 30th anniversary of the Admission of Greece to the European Economic Community, 21 May 2009

Speech in Larisa, 23 May 2009

Speech in Tripolis, 24 May 2009

Speech in Aspropurgos, 25 May 2009

Speech in the Economist conference, 26 May 2009

Speech in Markopoulo, 29 May 2009

Speech in the launching ceremony of the Egnatia Road in the Venitco Bridge, 30 May 2009

Speech in Lamia, 31 May 2005

Speech in the International Convention on 'Climate Change', 02 June 2009

Speech in Thessaloniki, 03 June 2009

Speech in Athens, 05 June 2009

Speech at the 8th International Thracians Convention, 15 August 2009

## **Appendix D**

### **George Papandreou**

#### Major Addresses (presented in chronological order)

Speech in the first session of the newly elected Council of Ministers (Greek Cabinet),  
07 October 2009

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 14 October 2009

Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 16 October 2009

Second Speech in Parliament for the Program of the Government, 18 October 2009

Speech in PASOK National Council, 23 October 2009

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 30 October 2009

Joint press address after Meeting with Secretary General of the United Nations in  
Maximos Mansion, 04 November 2009

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 05 November 2009

Answer in Parliament on Question to the PM by the leader of the SYRIZA party  
Alexis Tsipras, 13 November 2009

Answer in a Question to the PM by leader of the LAOS party Georgios Karatzaferis,  
13 November 2009

Answer in a Question to the PM by the KKE leader Aleka Papariga, 13 November  
2009

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 18 November 2009

Speech at the Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference with topic ‘The Hour  
of the Greek Economy’, 30 November 2009

Speech in 17th Ministerial Council of the OSCE, 01 December 2009

Speech in Parliament on the Extraordinary Financial Aid of Social Solidarity, 01 December 2009

Press Conference of the OSCE Troika in Hellinikon Complex, Fencing Center, 02 December 2009

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 03 December 2009

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 09 December 2009

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 11 December 2009

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 14 December 2009

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 19 December 2009

Speech in Parliament on the 2010 Budget, 23 December 2009

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 10 January 2010

Speech in Parliament, 22 January 2010

Speech in Parliament, 01 February 2010

Speech in Parliament, 08 February 2010

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 11 February 2010

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 12 February 2010

Speech in Parliament, 26 February 2010

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 01 March 2010

Speech in Parliament, 02 March 2010

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 04 March 2010

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 18 March 2010

Speech at PASOK National Council in Thessaloniki, 20 March 2010

Speech in Parliament, 22 March 2010

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 26 March 2010

Signed article in 'O Kosmos tou Ependuti' newspaper, 27 March 2010

Interview on 'To Vima' newspaper, 11 April 2010

Speech in Parliament, 14 April 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM in Parliament, 16 April

Speech at the Council of Ministers in Kastellorizo Island, 23 April 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM in Parliament, 30 April

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 27 April 2010

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 28 April 2010

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 02 May 2010

Speech in Parliament, 05 May 2010

Speech in Parliament, 06 May 2010

Joint televised press conference with Prime Minister of Turkey Tayyip Erdogan, 14 May 2010

Speech in Parliament, 21 May 2010

Speech in Parliament, 25 May 2010

Speech in Parliament, 04 June 2010

Speech in Parliament, 25 June 2010

Speech in Parliament, 30 June 2010

Interview on 'Sunday Eleftherotypia' newspaper, 04 July 2010

Speech in Parliament, 07 July 2010

Speech in Parliament, 09 July 2010

Signed article in the website of the government, 23 August 2010

Speech in PASOK 9th National Council, 03 September 2010

Speech in PASOK 9th National Council closing day, 05 September 2010

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 10 September 2010

Speech in the 75th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 11 September 2010

Televised press conference in the 75th International Trade Fair in Thessaloniki, 12 September 2010

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 16 September 2010

Televised press conference after the Europe-Asia Summit in Brussels, 05 October 2010

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 07 October 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 15 October 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 15 October 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 15 October 2010

Televised press address in the Maximos Mansion on the Unemployment, 19 October 2010

Signed article in 'Sunday Vima' newspaper, 24 October 2010

Televised cross-national broadcasting networks interview, 25 October 2010

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 29 October 2010

Interview in 'Real News' newspaper, 31 October 2010

Town hall meeting hosted with young citizens broadcasted online, 05 November 2010

Interview in 'Ta Nea Weekend' newspaper, 06 November 2010

Interview in 'Sunday Ethnos' newspaper, 07 October 2010

Interview in 'To Proto Thema' newspaper, 14 November 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 26 November 2010

Interview in 'Kathimerini' newspaper, 28 November 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 10 December 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 10 December 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 10 December 2010

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 18 December 2010

Interview in 'Sunday Eleftherotypia' newspaper, 19 December 2010

Speech in Parliament, 22 December 2010

Interview in 'Sunday Ethnos' newspaper, 31 December 2010

Answer in a Question to the PM by KKE, 14 January 2011

Speech in Parliament, 24 January 2011

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 26 January 2011



Televised press conference after the European Council session, 04 February 2011

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 09 February 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 11 February 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 11 February 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 25 February 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 25 February 2011

Speech in PASOK National Council, 04 March 2011

Televised press conference after the Informal Heads of Government Summit of the member-states of the Eurozone, 12 March 2011

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 13 March 2011

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 15 March 2011

Speech in Parliament, 16 March 2011

Speech in Parliament, 22 March 2011

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 25 March 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 01 April 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 01 April 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by ND, 01 April 2011

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 15 April 2011

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 15 April 2011

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 28 April 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 06 May 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 06 May 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by SYRIZA, 10 May 2011

Answer in a Question to the PM by LAOS, 10 May 2011

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 11 May 2011

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 16 May 2011

Interview in ‘Sunday Ethnos’ newspaper, 22 May 2011

Signed article in ‘Kathimerini’ newspaper, 29 May 2011

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 06 June 2011

Speech in PASOK Political Council, 08 June 2011

Interview in ‘Sunday Vima’ newspaper, 12 June 2011

Speech in PASOK Parliamentary Group, 16 June 2011

Speech in the Council of Ministers, 17 June 2011

Speech in Parliament on the motion of no-confidence, 19 June 2011

Televised press conference after the European Council session, 24 June 2011

Speech in Parliament on a special session on Special Olympics, 27 June 2011

Speech in Parliament, 29 June 2011

#### Minor addresses (presented in chronological order)

Speech in Ancient Olympia, 11 October 2009

Speech in the 11th Annual Conference of the Greek ICT Forum, 04 November 2009

Speech at the Global Forum for Immigration and Growth, 04 November 2009

Speech on the 'Kallikratis' bill, 18 January 2010

Speech in Economist Discussion and Debate on 'In or out of the economic crisis?', 02 February 2010

Speech in the 34th National ΓΣΕΕ (General Confederation of Greek Labour), 19 March 2010

Speech in an event hosted by Transparency International Greece, 19 April 2010

Speech in the 18th Annual Convention of the Greek Tourism Enterprises Association, 21 April 2010

Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Rhodes Island, 23 April 2010

Speech in an Economist event, 28 April 2010

Speech at the 'digital economy forum' of the Greek Association of Computing and Communication Enterprises, 03 May 2010

Speech in the opening of the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 11 May 2010

Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Fthiotida, 13 May 2010

Speech in the Hellenic-Turkish Business Forum, 14 May 2010

Speech at the 3rd Annual Conference for Climate and Energy Security in Southeastern Europe, 19 May 2010

Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Rodopi, 28 May 2010

Speech in the Financial and Social Committee of Arkadia, 10 June 2010

Speech in Ilion on the Drug Problem, 06 July 2010

Speech on the Opening Ceremony of the Symi's Symposium in Symi Island, 12 July 2010

Speech in the Closing Ceremony of Symi's Symposium in Symi Island, 15 July 2010

Speech in National Center of Public Administration, 28 July 2010

Speech at the International Cretan Conference in Crete, 30 July 2010

Speech in PASOK Commerce Department, 10 September 2010

Speech in a discussion on Education in Delphoi, 26 September 2010

Speech during a meeting with the National Exporters Federation, 14 October 2010

Speech during a meeting with young and innovative entrepreneurs, 20 October 2010

Speech in the Mediterranean Initiative for Climate Change, 22 October 2010

Speech in the Green Investment Mediterranean Forum, 23 October 2010

Speech in Corfu Island, 10 October 2010

Speech in Larisa, 17 October 2010

Speech in Peristeri, 21 October 2010

Speech in Alexandroupolis, 23 October 2010

Speech in Agioi Anarguroi, 30 October 2010

Speech in Kozani, 31 October 2010

Speech in Thessaloniki, 01 November 2010

Speech in Ioannina, 02 November 2010

Speech in Patra, 04 November 2010

Speech in Athens, 05 November 2010

Speech in the ‘News Xchange 2010’ Conference, 11 November 2010

Speech in an event for Educating the new Local Authorities, 24 November 2010

Speech in the 21st Annual Hellenic-American Chamber Conference, 30 November 2010

Speech in an event hosted by the Ministry of Development and Competiveness, 08 December 2010

Speech in Crete, 12 December 2010

Speech at an event hosted by the General Secretariat of Communications for the heads of the Press Secretariat abroad, 17 January 2011

Speech in Kozani, 20 January 2011

Speech in Thessaloniki, 21 January 2011

Speech at the Conference of the Chairmen of the American-Jewish Organisations, 10 February 2011

Speech in Samothraki, 17 February 2011

Speech in Komotini, 18 February 2011

Speech in Dimario village in Xanthi, 18 February 2011

Speech at the Founding Convention of ‘Dimokratiki Aristera’ party, 31 March 2011

Speech in Meganisi Island, 07 May 2011

Speech at the Transparency International Greece conference, 09 May 2011

Speech in the 19th Annual Convention of SETE (Greek Tourism Enterprises Association), 04 May 2011

Speech at the Economist Conference, 17 May 2011

Speech in Argolida, 20 May 2011

Speech in the Annual General Assembly of the Hellenic Federation of Enterprises, 24 May 2011

Speech in Achaia, 30 May 2011

## Appendix E

### List of Interviewees

1. Simitis, Costas: Prime Minister 1996 - 2004
2. Fanaras, Stratos: Pollster, Head of the *Metron Analysis* survey organisation
3. Kousoulis, Lefteris : Strategist, Head of the *Saying and Doing* political communication agency
4. Pantagias, George : Simitis press advisor 1996-2003
5. Paschalidis, George : Deputy Minister without portfolio 1996-2000
6. Reppas, Dimitris: Minister of Press and Mass Media 1996-2001
7. Protopapas, Christos: Minister of Press and Mass Media 2001-2004
8. Hitiris, Tilemahos: Deputy Minister of Press and Mass Media 2000-2004
9. Rousopoulos, Theodoros: Minister of State 2004 - 2008
10. Antonaros, Evaggelos: Deputy Minister of State 2004 – 2008 (Minister of State 2008 – 2009)
11. Elenopoulos, George: Head of Press Office 2009 – 2011
12. Karaklioumi, Maria: Pollster of Prime Minister Papandreou 2009 - 2011

## **Appendix F**

### **The Conduct of Interviews**

All of the interviewees were interviewed during the time between October 2009 and July 2012 and all the interviews were conducted in a face-to-face basis apart from one with Rousopoulos, a small part of which was conducted by phone due to shortage of time on his behalf in the day of the scheduled meeting. In the majority of the interviews, the use of tape-recorder was permitted with the exception of the interviews with former Prime Minister Simitis, the Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister George Paschalidis and Papandreou's press spokesperson George Elenopoulos. The interviewees were informed that their names would be mentioned in a doctoral thesis. The respondents were also informed that their answers would be ascribed to them in the thesis and they complied with it. With the two exceptions of when the respondents requested for the tape-recorder to turn off near the end of the interview in order to make some off-the-record comments, a request which was granted and respected later when the data was used. The size of the interviews varies from 40 to 50 minutes each, while in some cases there had to be a follow-up interview in order for all the objectives of the thesis to be discussed. After the completion of the interviewing process, the interviews were transcribed and the data was analysed, their findings were assessed and attributed accordingly to the five components of the permanent campaign.



## **Appendix G**

### **List of government communication documents**

1. Prime Minister's image: Problems and Communication Proposals, 11 November 1998
2. Communication initiatives for the next three months, 5 January 1999
3. The problematic points of the government image and how to deal with, 20 January 1999
4. Communication proposals for the Olympic Games of 2004, 15 July 1999
5. From the first to the second 4-year term: Proposals to improve the communication policy, 12 December 1999
6. Key-points, January 2000
7. Communication support, January 2000
8. Model of electoral behaviour focusing on the Prime Minister, February 2000
9. Three-month plan of prime ministerial communication activities, 12 May 2000
10. A realistic strategy for the Olympic Games of 2004, 24 January 2002
11. Review of the communication and image of Government, 3 April 2002
12. The political and communication problems of the Third European Community Support Framework, 23 May 2002
13. Costas Simitis and the 2004, 7 September 2002

